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ABSTRACT	
Do	conservatives	and	liberals	have	differing	sensitivities	to	avoidance,	inhibition,	
and	negative	emotion?	Do	psychological	factors	beneath	our	conscious	awareness	
underlie	the	political	ideologies	we	embrace?	Political	science	researchers	have	broken	
new	ground	over	the	past	ten	years	in	our	understanding	of	the	psychology	and	
physiology	of	political	ideology.		However,	large	questions	remain	about	how	political	
ideology	may	be	related	to	avoidance	motivations	and	negative	emotion.		This	work	
expands	our	current	knowledge	in	this	area	by	presenting	three	studies	with	multiple	
methodologies:	original	survey	data,	electroencephalographic	measurements,	and	
behavioral	experiments	in	a	lab	setting.	Working	in	the	tradition	of	J.A.	Gray’s	dual	
systems	of	behavioral	motivation,	I	explore	how	political	ideology	is	related	to	several	
related	dispositional	measures	of	behavioral	avoidance,	behavioral	inhibition,	and	
negative	affectivity.		Overall,	and	in	contrast	to	literature	expectations,	my	evidence	
suggests	that	liberals	and	conservatives	do	not	have	persistent	differences	in	avoidance	
sensitivity	or	negativity	bias.		While	strong	evidence	remains	demonstrating	important	
dispositional	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives,	additional	research	will	be	
required	before	researchers	can	conclude	that	conservatives	are	uniquely	motivated	by	
psychological	avoidance	or	negative	affect.	
		1	
CHAPTER	ONE	
INTRODUCTION	
According	to	the	Oxford	New	Monitor	Corpus	in	October	2014,	insults	levied	at	
Democrats	and	Republicans	have	taken	an	especially	explosive	turn	in	recent	times.	A	
sample	of	1200	negative	phrases	gathered	from	online	sources	reveals	incredible	
negativity	and	no	small	amount	of	creativity	(Martin	2014).	The	right	accuses	the	left	of	
being	loons,	twits,	nitwits,	trash,	hippies,	morons,	hypocrites,	fools,	scum,	and	elitists.		
The	left	responds	in	kind	against	the	conservatives	with	labels	such	as	fanatics,	
obstructionists,	extremists,	misogynists,	ideologues,	zealots,	nut-jobs,	thugs,	and	
crazies.		The	only	thing	they	seem	to	agree	about	is	that	the	other	guys	can	best	be	
described	as	“idiots.”			
Although	the	lists	of	commonly	used	insults	includes	terms	such	as	“extremist”	
and	“ideologue,”	accusing	someone	of	being	an	ideologue	is	not	the	same	insult	that	it	
once	was.	The	most	common	ideological	labels	used	in	American	politics—liberal	and	
conservative—are	typically	used	as	descriptors,	not	insults.	Political	candidates	in	the	
modern	era	often	run	toward	these	labels,	particularly	Republicans	towards	the	term	
“conservative.”		Democrats	often	prefer	“progressive”	instead	of	“liberal”	but	the	two	
terms	are	indistinguishable	in	terms	of	meaning.	These	ideological	labels	function	as	a	
kind	of	summary	statement	of	the	beliefs	held	by	an	individual.		The	summary	
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statements	are	readily	used	to	bolster	credentials	and	signal	intentions.	Politicians	self-
identify	as	either	conservative	or	liberal,	using	these	labels	to	help	their	political	brand.		
But	this	is	a	modern	innovation.		As	I	will	explain	in	Chapter	Two,	for	two	
centuries,	political	ideology	itself	was	an	insult,	a	slur	thrown	at	you	by	your	political	
rivals.	An	accusation	of	ideology	meant	you	had	tremendous	bias,	close-mindedness,	
and	living	in	false	consciousness.	Your	political	opponents	used	these	charges	to	
galvanize	their	supporters	towards	(or	against)	political	revolution.	Being	called	an	
“ideologue”	was	an	incendiary	accusation	that	you	made	a	practice	of	systematically	
distorting	facts,	figures,	and	events	to	obfuscate	the	truth	and	manipulate	people.	
Political	ideology	was	thought	to	be	a	blinding	worldview	which	made	one	unreliable	
and	untrustworthy.		
The	modern	understanding	of	political	ideology	
Beginning	with	Philip	Converse’s	seminal	paper	(1964),	political	ideology	came	to	
take	on	a	useful	technical	definition.		Converse	described	political	ideology	as	a	
structured	collection	of	abstract	values	by	which	one	understands	the	political	and	
social	environment.		Political	ideology	crystalizes	and	communicates	shared	values	in	
political	outlook.	In	other	words,	political	ideology	is	a	lens	by	which	to	understand	the	
world.		
Converse	famously	introduced	the	idea	of	constraint	to	political	ideology.	If	a	
person	is	truly	ideological,	holding	viewpoints	on	some	issues	ought	to	constrain	their	
viewpoints	on	others.	For	example,	imagine	your	friend	is	pro-gun,	pro-religion,	pro-free	
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trade,	anti-minimum	wage,	and	pro-small	government.	Scanning	that	list	of	issues,	you	
might	surmise	that	your	friend	was	motivated	by	several	abstract	principles,	including	
favoring	the	free	market,	distrust	of	national	government,	and	favoring	freedom,	
individualism,	and	responsibility.	
Given	that	belief	structure,	now	take	a	moment	to	predict	your	friend’s	stance	
on	nationalized	healthcare.	Given	the	abstract	values	described	above,	and	the	
closeness	of	these	views	to	American	conservatism,	you	might	guess	they	would	be	
opposed	to	nationalized	healthcare.		Are	you	right?	Probably,	yes.	While	it	is	possible	
that	your	friend’s	viewpoints	are	not	motivated	by	abstract	principles—perhaps	they	
have	randomly	acquired	their	views	purely	by	luck	or	purely	in	mimicry	of	another	
person—it	seems	unlikely	they	would	have	acquired	this	interrelated	portfolio	without	
an	underlying	set	of	abstract	political	values	to	build	on.	This	is	political	ideology.	As	I	
will	discuss	further	in	Chapter	Two,	while	Converse	found	that	few	people	outwardly	
recognized	their	beliefs	as	ideological,	we	have	good	reason	to	suspect	that	many	
people	hold	beliefs	in	recognizable	ideological	patterns	without	being	able	to	articulate	
them.	
How	common	is	political	ideology?		Converse,	writing	in	the	1960s,	estimated	
that	only	1	in	10	Americans	were	truly	ideological,	a	very	low	number	that	seems	to	
have	surprised	him	and	our	discipline.		To	assess	their	political	beliefs,	Converse	
interviewed	a	sample	of	Americans	and	had	independent	judges	assess	whether	
abstract	political	values	were	directly	expressed	during	the	conversations.	Michael	
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Lewis-Beck	and	colleagues,	updating	Converse	into	the	2000s	with	a	deliberately	similar	
technique,	note	that	this	number	had	doubled	to	1	in	5	Americans	(Lewis-Beck	et	al.,	
2008).	The	remaining	Americans	held	political	beliefs	not	anchored	to	abstract	values,	
but	instead	clustered	around	either	group	interests	or	the	current	state	of	the	country.	
Or	they	simply	had	no	issue	content	whatsoever	to	the	political	views	they	reported	(for	
example,	identifying	with	a	political	party	but	being	unable	to	articulate	even	a	vague	
understanding	of	what	the	party	stood	for).			
Still,	if	only	20	percent	of	the	American	public	is	ideological,	why	are	political	
scientists	so	interested	in	political	ideology?	As	noted	by	social	psychologist	John	Jost,	a	
person	need	not	be	consciously	aware	of	their	ideology	(Jost	et	al.	2006).	They	are	not	
required	to	recognize	or	understand	their	own	belief	structure	for	it	to	be	guiding	their	
political	behavior.	Ideological	principles	may	be	latent	or	implicit	to	the	individual,	an	
unidentified	engine	under	the	hood	of	a	car	driven	to	work	every	day.	The	studies	of	
Converse	and	Lewis-Beck	put	a	high	burden	on	participants.	These	participants	must	
have	sophisticated	political	awareness	to	be	able	to	verbalize	how	their	abstract	
conception	of	politics	fits	into	representational	political	schema.	Jost	argues	that	a	
latent	belief	structure	can	guide	attitude	formation	without	the	individual	actually	being	
aware	of	it,	or	without	them	being	able	to	name	it.	One	does	not	need	to	be	able	to	
describe	or	categorize	the	physics	of	internal	combustion	engines	in	order	to	drive	the	
car.	Regardless	of	your	understanding	of	what	is	happening	under	the	hood,	your	ride	is	
still	deeply	affected	by	the	engine.	Consistent	with	this	argument,	as	will	be	detailed	in	
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Chapter	Two,	researchers	today	have	found	considerably	more	evidence	that	the	mass	
public	is	ideological	than	what	Converse	was	able	to	detect	earlier.		
The	concept	of	ideology	as	an	abstract	belief	structure	has	proven	to	be	
exceptionally	useful	for	political	scientists.	According	to	one	estimate,	more	than	50	
percent	of	all	papers	published	in	the	American	Political	Science	Review	(the	top	journal	
in	our	discipline)	include	the	word	ideology	(Knight	2006,	620).	One	central	concern	in	
the	political	psychology	subfield	is	the	question	of	where	do	beliefs	come	from,	and	
many	literatures	within	the	political	behavior	subfield	have	found	use	for	Converse’s	
definition	of	political	ideology.		
Political	ideology,	emotion,	and	political	psychology	
Where	does	political	ideology	come	from?		Our	best	answer	is	that	political	
ideology	is	shaped	by	culture,	environmental	forces,	elites,	personal	relations,	
personality	dispositions,	and	evolutionary	origins.		Our	field	is	increasingly	taking	a	wide	
viewpoint	on	the	origins	of	political	attitudes.		On	the	cutting	edge	of	these	questions	
are	the	new	political	behaviorists	who	are	integrating	insights	from	many	scientific	fields	
to	improve	our	understanding	of	political	attitudes,	fields	including	political	science,	
social	psychology,	political	psychology,	and	cognitive	neuroscience.				
For	example,	political	scientists	are	increasingly	noticing	the	connection	between	
emotion	and	politics.		George	Marcus	and	colleagues	proposed	the	Affective	Intelligence	
theory,	demonstrating	how	emotional	states	of	enthusiasm	and	anxiety	have	a	large	
impact	on	political	learning	and	political	information	processing	(Marcus	et	al.	2000).	
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Ted	Brader’s	study	of	campaign	advertisements	outlined	how	politicians	can	(and	do)	
use	emotionally	infused	advertisements	to	affect	political	attitudes	and	behavior	
(Brader	2005,	2006).			
But	nowhere	has	the	study	of	ideology	been	more	riveting	than	in	the	political	
psychology	and	biology	of	political	ideology.		Kevin	Smith,	John	Hibbing,	John	Alford,	and	
their	colleagues	and	students	report	study	after	study	of	the	physiological	correlations	
to	political	attitudes	(e.g.	Alford	et	al.	2005;	Alford	and	Hibbing	2008;	Smith	et	al.	2011),	
drawing	particular	attention	to	the	role	of	threat	and	negative	affect	in	political	
conservatives	(Oxley	et	al.	2008;	Dodd	et	al.	2012).		John	Jost	and	colleagues	have	
connected	threat,	fear	and	uncertainty	to	political	conservatism,	arguing	that	political	
ideology	is	motivated	by	the	individual’s	cognitive,	emotional,	and	social	needs	(Jost	et	
al.	2003).		This	recent	wave	of	heavy	lifting	on	the	subject	of	political	ideology	has	been	
initiated	by	political	scientists	growing		access	to	methodologies,	training,	and	data	from	
other	disciplines.		
Political	scientists	have	long	been	interested	in	how	political	attitudes	are	
formed,	and	now	we	are	realizing	the	importance	of	understanding	how	emotion	relates	
to	political	attitude	formation.			Psychologists	and	neuroscientists	have	waged	pitched	
battles	over	the	relation	of	cognition	to	emotion	(Zajonc	1980;	Lazarus	1982;	Zajonc	
1984;	Leventhal	and	Scherer	1987;	Gray	1990;	Pessoa	2008),	and	these	arguments	have	
defined	significant	portions	of	psychology	and	cognitive	neuroscience	(these	six	papers	
listed	immediately	above	have	over	11,000	citations).		We	are	still	waiting	for	the	dust	
		
7	
to	settle	on	a	conclusive	understanding	of	emotion	and	cognition,	but	it	has	become	
increasingly	clear	that	emotion	has	a	highly	integrated	role	in	cognitive	processing.	And,	
so,	political	science—a	“borrower”	discipline	from	its	very	founding—will	also	need	to	
consider	more	fully	the	importance	of	emotion	for	cognition.		
Rising	study	of	physiological	politics	in	political	science	
The	core	project	of	the	political	psychology	of	ideology	is	to	understand	how	
differences	in	political	ideology	are	related	to	the	vast	array	of	cognitive,	emotional,	and	
physiological	factors	that	predict	or	explain	political	attitudes.	Broadly,	most	of	the	work	
from	researchers	in	this	field	operate	from	one	of	two	different	perspectives.		
The	first	perspective	was	developed	by	political	scientists	John	Hibbing,	Kevin	
Smith,	John	Alford,	and	the	University	of	Nebraska-Lincoln	Political	Physiology	Lab.		
Their	theory,	which	I	call	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	focuses	on	emotional	sensitivity,	
specifically	the	theory	that	conservatives	are	dispositionally	more	sensitive	to	negative	
emotion.	Their	perspective	on	the	psychological	differences	between	liberals	and	
conservatives	has	been	shaped	by	dozens	of	studies	that	look	at	genetic	and	
physiological	differences	in	people.	In	2014,	Hibbing	and	colleagues	published	a	paper	
called	“Differences	in	Negativity	Bias	Underlie	Variations	in	Political	Ideology”	which	
summarizes	a	great	host	of	their	work,	and	integrates	the	findings	into	a	central	theory.		
The	second	perspective	comes	out	of	social	psychology.	The	‘Motivated	Social	
Cognition	Theory’	is	based	on	the	work	of	psychologist	John	Jost	and	many	colleagues,	
and	it	argues	that	conservatism	is	motivated	by	a	network	of	psychological	factors	
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related	to	fear,	threat,	and	reducing	uncertainty.	According	to	Jost	and	colleagues,	two	
primary	factors	divide	liberals	and	conservatives:	first,	advocating	versus	resisting	social	
change	(as	opposed	to	tradition)	and	second,	rejecting	versus	accepting	inequality	(Jost	
et	al.	2003,	Jost	2006,	Jost	and	Amodio	2012).	In	their	important	seminal	paper	(Jost	et	
al.	2003),	they	conduct	a	meta-analysis	on	the	psychology	of	political	conservatism,	and	
they	discovered	that	these	two	factors	are	highly	correlated	with	personality	traits,	
dispositions,	and	psychological	motivations	related	to	fear,	threat,	and	reducing	
uncertainty.		
In	our	literature	so	far,	these	two	perspectives	have	been	considered	largely	
complementary.	The	findings	and	theories	have	substantial	overlap	and	there	is	much	
cross	citation.		In	my	view,	however,	the	two	theories	are	conceptually	different.		
Hibbing	and	colleagues	have	focused	on	physiological	differences	between	liberals	and	
conservatives,	and	they	tie	their	theory	together	through	emotions.		Psychologist	John	
Jost’s	work	focuses	on	differences	in	psychological	processes	and	motivations,	but	does	
not	home	in	on	negative	affect	specifically.	Jost’s	work	has	a	strong	connection	to	
motivational	avoidance.	Both	of	these	projects	are	tremendously	important	to	work	on	
political	ideology	by	political	psychologists.		However,	given	the	breadth	of	psychological	
factors	and	physiological	dispositions	that	humans	have,	it	is	not	surprising	that	a	great	
deal	of	additional	work	must	be	done	to	deepen	our	understanding	of	the	political	
psychology	of	ideology.		Our	theories	can	only	mature	by	enlarging	the	scope	of	
psychological	factors	that	are	being	investigated.		
		
9	
Purpose	of	Dissertation	
This	dissertation	has	one	primary	objective:	to	expand	our	knowledge	about	how	
negative	emotional	sensitivity	and	avoidance	motivations	are	related	to	political	
ideology	at	the	root	level	of	the	individual,	operating	before	(or	outside	of)	political	
stimuli.	I	propose	one	useful	place	to	expand	our	understanding	of	negative	affect	and	
avoidance	motivations	is	through	the	work	of	Jeffrey	Allen	Gray,	a	British	psychologist	
and	cognitive	neuroscientist.		Gray	developed	a	dual	model	of	behavioral	motivation	to	
explain	how	and	why	cognition	and	emotion	lead	to	behavior.	According	to	Gray,	
animals	have	a	appetitive	system	of	behavioral	activation	that	engages	in	goal	pursuit,	
while	also	having	a	aversive	system	of	behavioral	inhibition	that	monitors	the	
environment	for	changing	information	and	threats.		As	I	will	explain,	Gray’s	theories	
combine	cognition	and	emotion	in	a	way	that	would	benefit	the	theories	of	Hibbing’s	
Negativity	Bias	Theory	and	Jost’s	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory.	By	exploring	the	
meaning	of	Gray’s	theories	for	political	ideology,	we	will	have	an	opportunity	to	sharpen	
several	elements	of	the	political	psychology	theories	that	have	been	proposed.		
This	dissertation	presents	data	from	three	studies	aimed	to	clarify	the	specific	
role	of	avoidance	motivation	and	sensitivity	to	negative	emotion	in	political	ideology.	
These	sets	of	questions	have	always	been	interdisciplinary	in	nature,	and	this	
dissertation	is	no	different.	I	employ	survey	methodology	alongside	cognitive	
neuroscience	methodology	to	approach	these	important	questions	from	multiple	
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perspectives.		Along	the	way,	I	take	the	opportunity	to	outline	how	the	theories	of	
Hibbing	and	Jost	have	similarities	and	a	few	important	differences	in	predictions.		
This	dissertation	will	proceed	as	follows.	Chapter	Two	details	the	use	of	political	
ideology	by	political	scientists	and	clarifies	how	the	biology	and	politics	research	
program	contributes	to	these	important	questions.		Chapter	Three	summarizes	the	core	
theories	of	the	political	psychology	of	ideology	that	are	under	investigation	in	this	
dissertation.		Chapter	Four	describes	and	characterizes	the	participant	pool	for	two	
behavioral	experiments	while	also	testing	for	dispositional	correlations.	Chapter	Five	
presents	the	results	of	an	electroencephalography	study	of	frontal	cortical	asymmetry	
and	its	implications	for	political	ideology.		Chapter	Six	presents	additional	
electroencephalography	work,	this	time	from	a	behavioral	experiment	called	the	Go/No-
Go	task.		Chapter	Seven	concludes	the	dissertation	with	a	discussion	of	implications.		
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CHAPTER	TWO	
LITERATURE	REVIEW	
Do	psychological	factors	beneath	our	conscious	awareness	underlie	the	political	
ideologies	we	embrace?	Political	science	researchers	have	broken	new	ground	over	the	
past	ten	years	in	our	understanding	of	the	psychology	and	physiology	of	political	
ideology.	This	chapter	outlines	a	general	research	program	for	studying	dispositional	
differences	in	liberals	and	conservatives.	My	approach	is	interdisciplinary,	and	I	borrow	
from	political	science,	social	psychology,	and	cognitive	neuroscience	to	better	
understand	the	study	of	political	ideology.		
A	brief	preview	of	the	chapter’s	findings	may	be	useful	here.	The	reader	should	
see	the	importance	of	political	ideology	for	understanding	political	attitude	formation	
and	should	better	understand	the	complexity	of	measuring	ideology	in	the	mass	public.		
The	reader	will	also	see	that	while	political	scientists	have	made	serious	advances	in	the	
past	two	decades	to	understand	the	cognitive	and	affective	processes	of	political	
attitude	formation,	we	still	have	many	questions	remaining.		We	will	see	that	political	
psychology	literature	increasingly	finds	that	political	conservatism	is	correlated	with	
negative	affect	and/or	avoidant	behavioral	motivations,	but	these	associations	leave	
several	important	questions	unexplored.		Finally,	the	reader	will	also	note	the	
importance	of	multidisciplinary	work	for	this	research	program.	Psychology	and	
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cognitive	neuroscience	have	considerably	more	advanced	techniques	and	theories	to	
investigate	cognitive	and	affective	differences	between	individuals.	However,	
psychology	often	neglects	to	fully	consider	the	multidimensionality	of	political	ideology,	
which	compromises	the	applicability	of	those	findings	for	political	science	questions.	
Approaching	our	questions	from	multiple	disciplines	bolsters	several	weaknesses	in	
analysis.	
There	are	two	major	theories	concerning	the	psychological	differences	between	
political	liberals	and	conservatives.		First,	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	posits	
that	differences	in	psychological	factors	(traits,	dispositions,	cognitive	styles)	suggest	
conservatives	are	more	motivated	by	needs	to	reduce	uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	
and	disgust	than	liberals	(Jost	et	al.	2003).		Later,	I	outline	an	interpretation	of	this	
theory	as	describing	conservatives	as	being	motivated	by	avoidance.	Second,	the	
Negativity	Bias	Theory	argues	that	conservatives	have	more	sensitivity	to	negative	
emotion.		
These	two	theories	do	not	directly	compete;	in	fact,	there	appears	much	
common	ground	between	them,	including	considerable	cross-citation.		At	their	core,	
however,	I	believe	they	are	studying	different	psychological	mechanisms	and	potentially	
ought	to	have	different	predictions	about	the	physiology	of	political	ideology.		I	will	
argue	below	that	avoidance	sensitivity	and	negativity	bias	are	different	processes,	and	
they	need	to	be	studied	as	such,	with	a	kind	of	precision	that	is	available	to	us	from	
other	disciplines.	In	this	research	program	of	the	psychological	and	biological	
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determinants	of	political	ideology,	it	is	time	for	researchers	to	be	more	precise	with	how	
specific	psychological	mechanisms	may,	or	may	not,	be	related	to	political	beliefs.		
This	dissertation	takes	up	that	charge	by	employing	Jeffrey	Allen	Gray’s	theories	
(1972,	1981)	on	behavioral	motivation,	which	have	direct	connection	to	both	avoidance	
sensitivity	and	negativity	bias.	J.A.	Gray	hypothesized	that	animals	have	two	
complementary	systems	that	underlie	cognition,	affect,	and	behavior.		The	behavioral	
activation	system	(BAS)	facilitates	behavior	towards	the	completion	of	an	objective	or	
goal.		We	use	this	system	hundreds	of	times	a	day;	from	reaching	for	a	cup	of	coffee,	to	
opening	a	doorknob,	to	speaking	with	a	friend.		The	behavioral	inhibition	system	(BIS)	
halts	ongoing	behavior	in	response	to	the	introduction	of	novel	information.		This	is	a	
surveillance	system,	helping	us	react	to	unexpected	changes	in	the	environment.	For	
example,	we	may	be	in	the	process	of	drinking	coffee	when	we	see	a	dead	fly	floating	at	
the	top	of	the	cup.		Seeing	the	fly	cues	a	disgust	reaction,	and	we	halt	our	planned	
action	to	drink	a	sip	of	coffee.	Introducing	Gray’s	theories	to	the	study	of	political	
ideology	will	help	specify	and	articulate	the	mechanisms	underneath	both	of	the	
established	theories.			
Establishing	the	place	of	this	project	within	the	larger	literature	of	political	
science	and	political	psychology	requires	several	steps.		First,	we	engage	the	current	
political	science	literature	on	political	ideology,	including	the	history,	relevance,	and	
structure	of	political	ideology	in	the	literature.		Second,	we	move	into	the	current	state	
of	the	psychological	and	physiological	findings	on	political	ideology,	including	an	
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investigation	into	the	two	major	theories	in	the	literature—the	Motivated	Social	
Cognition	theory	and	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory.		Third,	we	discuss	the	political	
implications	of	Gray’s	behavioral	motivation	systems,	and	how	it	intersects	with	the	
current	political	psychology	theories	of	political	ideology.		
Political	Ideology:	History	and	Present	
Political	attitudes	are	ubiquitous,	and	they	have	created	the	sociopolitical	world	
around	us.		Political	communities	are	characterized	by	sharp	disagreement	on	societal	
rules,	values,	and	expectations.	These	differences	in	opinion	occur	within	regional	areas,	
within	small	communities,	within	social	groups,	within	economic	classes,	and	even	
within	families.	Larger,	more	heterogeneous	populations	have	larger	differences	in	
opinion.	Even	in	small	political	communities,	where	shared	backgrounds	and	mutual	
experiences	yield	a	fairly	common	way	of	life,	political	disagreements	can	be	surprisingly	
divisive.	Sometimes,	the	family	unit	is	the	most	heated	battleground!		Perhaps	this	is	
due	to	the	paradox	of	it	all—a	unit	of	people	that	have	so	much	shared	environment	are	
expected	to	have	a	common	politics.		When	they	do	not,	it	is	puzzling.		
Why	do	human	beings	have	so	many	central	disagreements	over	how	a	society	
should	be	structured?		No	doubt	the	incredible	variety	of	human	experience	would	yield	
an	incredible	variety	of	political	opinions.		However,	interestingly,	for	all	the	diversity	of	
human	experience	and	political	attitudes,	political	disagreements	tend	to	actualize	as	a	
general	debate	between	only	two	opposing	camps.	One	side	largely	values	traditions,	
existing	institutions,	communities	and	families	over	government,	and	promotes	safety,	
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economic	freedoms,	and	economic	inequality.	This	perspective	has	been	labeled	the	
"right-wing"	perspective.	The	other	side—the	left-wing—largely	values	government	as	a	
corrective	tool	to	balance	unequal	starts	and	protect	disadvantaged	groups,	while	
promoting	privacy	at	home	and	in	religion.		
In	the	United	States	and	other	places,	the	right-wing	approach	is	called	
conservative	and	the	left-wing	approach	liberal,	and	these	perspectives	emphatically	
disagree	over	the	core	values,	policies,	and	politics	that	a	society	should	embrace.	There	
are	some	political	issues	that	have	no	disagreement	between	liberals	and	conservatives;	
these	valence	issues	can	be	important	to	partisan	politics	(Stokes	1963,	Green	2007).	
But	while	we	all	agree	that	decreased	crime	and	increased	economic	growth	are	good,	it	
is	puzzling	and	intriguing	that	we	find	ourselves	mostly	divided	into	two	opposing	
camps,	who	frequently	have	orthogonal	opinions	on	a	variety	of	public	policies.	
Partisanship,	elite	opinion	leadership,	and	media	all	contribute	to	the	polarization	of	our	
politics.	But	there	is	an	important	role	for	the	individual	self,	which	is	our	central	
concern	here.	Explaining	why	people	have	political	disagreements	requires	an	
understanding	of	political	ideologies,	the	term	political	scientists	use	to	refer	to	belief	
structures	of	political	attitudes.		
Approaches	to	Studying	Political	Ideology	in	Political	Science	
Political	scientists	have	a	number	of	approaches	they	have	used	to	examine	the	
nature	and	origins	of	political	ideology.		Traditional	researchers	have	focused	on	
environmental	factors	as	the	chief	agents	for	explaining	political	behavior.	They	have	
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made	tremendously	important	contributions.	Political	behaviorists	have	sought	the	
origins	of	political	attitudes	in	socioeconomic	classes,	racial	groups,	ethnic	groups,	
religious	affiliations,	social	groups,	work	socialization,	family	socialization,	cultural	
environment,	elite	influences,	and	particularized	historical	contexts.	This	work	on	
political	attitudes	has	been	dominant	in	the	contemporary	study	of	political	behavior.			
More	recently,	political	science	has	had	an	explosion	of	research	into	the	
psychological,	physiological,	and	biological	factors	in	the	formation	of	political	attitudes.		
These	researchers	have	looked	at	correlations	between	political	values	and	genes,	
physiology,	and	the	brain.		“Over	the	last	three	decades,	we	have	witnessed	the	
emergence	of	neurological,	biological,	endocrinological,	and	physiological	paradigms	for	
the	study	of	human	behavioral	differences”	(Hatemi	and	McDermott	2011,	1).		
Political	science	has	taken	enormous	strides	in	the	past	decades	towards	a	better	
understanding	of	political	behavior.	From	the	sociological	studies	of	Lazarsfeld	and	
colleagues	(1944),	to	the	social	psychological	school	of	Campbell	and	colleagues	(1960),	
to	Downsian	economic	voting	and	rational	choice	(1957),	and	even	to	newer	theories	of	
political	attitude	formation	such	as	Zaller	(1990),	political	science	has	a	long	and	
distinguished	literature	for	explaining	how	people	act	politically.		Interdisciplinary	
insights	have	fueled	each	of	these	forward	movements,	and	it	is	no	accident.		Political	
scientists	have	often	benefited	from	borrowing	heavily	from	the	methodological	
techniques	of	other	disciplines,	and	the	four	seminal	works	above	are	perfect	examples	
of	this	trend.	Lazarsfeld	was	writing	from	a	sociologist’s	point	of	view	and	used	a	
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sociological	framework	to	analyze	political	behavior;	Campbell	and	his	colleagues	
borrowed	survey	methodology	and	attitude	theories	from	social	psychology;	Downs	was	
a	young	economist	applying	market	principles	to	voting	behavior;	and	Zaller	borrowed	
theories	and	understandings	from	cognitive	and	social	psychology	in	attitude	formation	
and	applied	it	to	questions	about	survey	answers.		
Outside	of	these	trailblazing	political	behavior	researchers,	the	discipline	as	a	
whole	has	frequently	reached	out	and	incorporated	other	fields	of	study.	Political	
scientists	reach	out	to	philosophy,	ethics,	and	history	as	quickly	as	it	reaches	out	to	
economics,	psychology,	and—increasingly—biology.		In	the	next	section,	we	explore	in	
detail	how	political	ideology	has	been	studied	in	political	science	in	the	past.	
Origins	and	Definitions	of	Ideology	
Political	ideology	has	long	been	a	topic	of	interest	to	political	scientists,	and	it	
holds	a	unique	position	in	political	science	scholarship.	Political	science	has	been	
generally	characterized	as	a	"borrower"	discipline	(Rigney	and	Barnes	1980;	Miller	1997;	
Amadae	and	Bueno	de	Mesquita	1999;	Pieters	and	Baumgartner	2002;	Bartels	and	
Brady	2003;	Knight	2006;	Sigelman	and	Goldfarb	2008,	2012).	However,	ideology	is	one	
of	the	few	constructs	widely	studied	in	contemporary	political	science	to	originate	
directly	within	political	science	itself	(Knight	2006,	619).	In	her	study	of	the	history	of	
ideology	in	political	science	literature,	Knight	(2006)	reports	that	the	term	"ideology"	
has	grown	substantially	over	time,	and	it	now	occupies	a	central	role	in	research.	During	
the	first	decade	of	the	American	Political	Science	Review,	only	2.6	percent	of	articles	
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included	"ideology"	or	a	variant	(620).	By	1976,	50	percent	of	articles	published	in	the	
APSR	included	the	term	ideology,	and	the	percentage	remained	high	into	the	2000s	
(620).		
Specific	definitions	of	political	ideology	vary	widely,	but	political	science	has	
worked	with	a	few	core	definitions	over	the	years.	The	original	usage	of	ideology	in	
politics	was	as	slander	against	intellectual	and	political	opponents	in	the	19th	Century,	
used	by	figures	such	as	Napoleon	and	Marx	against	opponents	whom	they	saw	as	being	
dogmatically	unreasonable	and	biased	against	their	own	views	about	government	and	
political	economy	(620).	Ideology	at	this	time	was	synonymous	with	bias	and	false-
consciousness.	This	"blinding	worldview"	usage	of	ideology	is	characterized	by	the	idea	
that	an	ideological	person	has	a	worldview	permeating	their	ideas	and	that	worldview	
insidiously	causes	them	to	be	unable	to	see	alternative	or	contrasting	viewpoints.	Early	
political	scientists	also	used	ideology	in	the	“blinding	worldview”	sense	in	our	journals	
(albeit	with	much	less	fiery	rhetoric	than	a	political	speech	by	Napoleon	or	Marx).	It	is	
important	to	note,	though,	that	prior	to	1930,	the	use	of	"ideology"	in	political	science	
literature	is	overall	quite	scarce	(620).	It	is	unsurprising	that	a	term	used	by	political	
revolutionaries	to	score	political	points	and	brand	opponents	was	not	used	frequently	
by	more	restrained	political	scientists,	but	it	also	demonstrates	that	political	scientists	
had	not	yet	come	to	understand	how	ideology	could	be	a	tool	for	understanding	belief	
structures	in	the	mass	public.		
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World	War	II	increased	attention	to	the	study	of	ideologies,	as	communism,	
fascism,	socialism,	and	Marxism	became	hotly	studied	topics	in	political	science	
literature	(Knight	2006,	621).	Ideology	during	this	period	continued	to	be	defined	as	a	
collection	of	interrelated	beliefs	or	a	worldview.	As	before,	the	"blinding	worldview"	
was	employed	against	opposing	viewpoints	in	a	slanderous	way,	boldly	painting	
opponents	as	biased	or	close-minded.	It	is	during	this	period,	however,	that	ideology	as	
"blinding	worldview"	began	to	give	way	to	a	new	usage	of	"worldview	system,"	
dropping	the	insulting	or	accusatory	tone.	By	"worldview	system,"	I	mean	that	political	
scientists	began	to	recognize	that	structures	of	interconnected	values	and	attitudes	
existed	in	states	and	individuals,	and	these	worldview	structures	did	not	automatically	
suggest	a	bias.	For	example,	our	literature	began	to	understand	that	the	much-praised	
liberal	democracy	was	itself	an	ideology.	A	political	scientist	writing	in	1942,	for	
example,	approvingly	called	the	Monroe	Doctrine	an	"ideological	fence	against	fascism"	
(Wilcox	1942).	So,	we	have	two	different	usages	of	ideology	being	used	side-by-side	in	
the	World	War	2	period:	the	"blinding	worldview"	and	the	"worldview	system."	I	want	
to	note	in	passing	that	both	usages	are	still	wreathed	in	the	idea	of	conflict	between	
world-views.	Also,	again,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	"ideology"	was	still	a	relatively	
uncommon	subject	in	political	science	literature	through	the	1930s	and	into	the	1940s	
(Knight	2006,	619-620).		
Ideology	continued	to	evolve	through	the	1940s	and	beyond,	gaining	new	
relevance	in	the	midst	of	all	the	"-isms"	of	the	post-war	era.	The	rise	of	“-isms”	as	a	
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powerful	force	in	the	global	political	environment	gave	rise	to	the	use	of	ideology	in	
political	science	literature.		Knight	notes	that	70	percent	of	articles	mentioning	ideology	
between	1947-1956	also	mentioned	communism	or	Marxism	(2006,	621).	Ideology	
continued	to	be	connected	to	"-isms"	into	the	McCarthyism	Cold	War	era	and	beyond,	
but	we	can	notice	that	political	science's	positivist	turn	seemed	to	have	contributed	to	
the	abandonment	of	the	"blinding	worldview"	usage	in	favor	of	the	"worldview	system"	
usage	(the	negative	connotation	of	"ideology"	remained,	however,	and	remains	to	this	
day—but	instead	of	a	blatant	accusation,	it	had	been	reduced	to	a	connotation	at	
worst).	For	one	example	of	the	"worldview	system"	usage	gaining	prominence,	we	can	
observe	that	Samuel	Huntington,	writing	in	1957,	defined	ideology	as	"a	system	of	ideas	
concerned	with	the	distribution	of	political	and	social	values	and	acquiesced	in	by	a	
significant	social	group"—a	clean,	clinical	definition	of	what	was	once	used	in	
uproarious,	accusatory	political	speeches	a	hundred	years	prior.	Knight	notes	this	
transition:	"although	the	coherent	and	relatively	stable	set	of	beliefs	or	values	has	
remained	constant	in	political	science	over	time,	the	connotations	associated	with	the	
concept	have	undergone	transformation"	(625).		
Even	in	this	later	era,	however,	the	new	and	more	neutral	usage	of	ideology	as	
"worldview	system"	still	had	a	broad,	complex,	and	sometimes	contradictory	usage	
within	the	discipline	(Gerring	1997).	There	was	confusion	as	to	the	proper	level	of	study	
for	ideology;	it	could	be	variably	applied	to	states,	governments,	institutions,	groups,	or	
the	individual	(Minar	1961).	Minar,	writing	in	1961,	summarized	the	then-current	usage	
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of	ideology	as	"particularly	vulnerable	to	vagueness	and	overgeneralization,"	but	
nonetheless	noted	with	admiration	that	"the	complete	study	of	ideology	is	perhaps	
necessarily	eclectic	as	to	level	and	technique,	as	the	best	in	the	traditions	of	the	
discipline	of	political	science	has	tended	to	be"	(331).	Interestingly,	Minar's	review	of	
ideology	appears	to	have	predicted	Converse's	later	work	on	ideology:	Minar	illustrates	
the	importance	of	using	psychological	methodology	to	study	ideology	(329)	and	
suggests	that	the	difficulty	of	understanding	ideology	"perhaps	be	avoided	when	
hypotheses	are	developed	at	a	'finer'	level,	i.e.	when	analysis	proceeds	on	an	individual	
psychological	basis"	(329).	Minar	directly	influences	Converse's	groundbreaking	study	
(and,	highlights	once	again	the	"borrower"	nature	of	political	science).		
It	was	in	the	1960s	that	political	science	began	to	more	narrowly	and	
consistently	define	ideology	as	a	value-neutral	theoretical	construct.	The	discipline's	
contemporary	use	and	conception	of	political	ideology	begins	with	Phillip	Converse	
(2006[1964]).	Converse	himself	initially	avoided	using	the	term	"ideology"	because	it	
was	"thoroughly	muddled,"	preferring	the	term	"belief	structures"	in	order	to	narrow	
down	one	particular	facet	of	ideology	he	believed	especially	worthwhile	for	study	(3).	In	
essence,	he	was	trying	to	separate	out	two	terminological	uses	of	ideology	in	order	to	
focus	on	a	third	use,	ideology	as	a	belief	structure.	In	other	words,	he	was	culling	the	
blinding	worldview	and	worldview	system	usage.	Knight	remarks	"it	is	important	to	see	
Converse's	contribution	in	the	context	of	the	times.	By	proposing	that	ideology	was	
reflected	in	the	representation	of	preferences	on	a	liberal-conservative	continuum,	the	
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spatial	definition	removed	the	negative	implications	of	bias	or	false	consciousness"	
(2006,	623).	"Belief	structure"	continues	to	be	used	in	political	science	to	this	day,	but	as	
Converse	explains,	the	"obvious	overlap"	between	belief	structures	and	ideology	are	
apparent	and	hard	to	separate	functionally	(3).	In	contemporary	research,	when	political	
scientists	speak	of	ideology	they	are	nearly	always	speaking	of	a	kind	of	belief	structure,	
and	consequently,	terminology	has	converged	(see	Knight	2006).	It	converged	for	
Converse,	too;	even	as	he	was	trying	to	avoid	the	muddled	usage	of	ideology,	he	still	
used	the	term	interchangeably	with	belief	structure	(2006[1964],	3).	In	the	very	same	
article	that	Converse	shies	away	from	using	the	term	ideology,	he	nonetheless	finds	
himself	using	it	again.	He	writes	that	"belief	systems	that	have	relatively	wide	
ranges...are	broadly	called	ideologies	and	we	shall	use	the	term	for	aesthetic	relief	
where	it	seems	most	appropriate"	(2006[1964],	5).		
Seemingly	following	Minar's	suggestions,	Converse	proposed	what	Gerring	
(1997)	and	Knight	(2006)	have	called	the	core	definition	of	ideology:	ideology	as	
coherence	and	issue	constraint.	The	field	followed	Converse	on	this	choice.	Gerring	
writes,	"if	all	the	senses	of	the	term	ideology	are	attended	to,	I	would	argue	that	only	
one	trait	meets	[the	criterion	of	universality].	The	importance	of	coherence—aka	
'consistency'	or	'constraint'—is	virtually	unchallenged	in	the	social	science	literature"	
(1997,	980).	Knight	writes	in	agreement,	"this	consensus	is	reflected	in	the	'core	
definition'	of	coherence,	regardless	of	what	other	conceptual	baggage	might	be	
imposed	on	the	concept,	the	notion	of	ideology	remains	a	relatively	stable	set	of	
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interrelated	ideas"	(2006,	623).	Knight	also	mentions	the	connection	between	ideology	
and	conflict:	"beyond	this,	the	crucial	element	of	contrast—the	notion	that	one	set	of	
beliefs	competes	against	another—is	implicit	in	discussion	of	party	ideologies,	'ists,'	and	
'isms'"	(623).		
For	Converse,	the	central	defining	element	of	political	ideology	is	the	idea	of	
coherence,	which	is	operationalized	as	issue	constraint.	For	the	collection	of	attitudes	to	
have	an	underlying	structure	(a	"belief	system"	or	an	"ideology"),	outsiders	who	are	
given	one	attitude	as	a	starting	point	should	be	able	to	predict	additional	attitudes	held	
by	the	ideological	individual.	Holding	one	attitude	should	constrain	what	other	attitudes	
that	person	may	hold,	if	they	have	an	ideological	structure	to	their	political	attitudes.	
The	collection	of	attitudes	that	a	person	could	hold	would	be	interrelated	along	
ideological	lines.	In	contrast,	holding	a	random	collection	of	attitudes	without	any	
consistency	or	restraint	between	them	is	non-ideological—there	is	no	structure	to	the	
belief	system.	Knight	(2006)	identifies	this	as	the	core	definition	of	ideology	(despite	
widely	varying	usage	from	the	1800s	until	today)	and	she	also	offers	that	this	definition	
is	the	most	popularly	used	conception	in	political	science	since	the	1960s	due	to	
Converse's	influence	on	the	issue.	Converse's	work	on	defining	ideology	has	been	
tremendously	influential	in	political	science,	but	also	in	other	social	sciences	(Kinder	
2006,	Bennet	2006,	Jost	2006).	
From	Converse,	political	scientists	inherited	a	definition	of	ideology	that	they	
(and	other	social	scientists)	could	use	to	help	understand	belief	structures	in	the	mass	
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public.	As	noted	above,	over	50	percent	of	articles	in	the	flagship	journal	of	political	
science	make	a	mention	of	the	word	ideology	from	the	1970s	into	the	2000s	(Knight	
2006,	620),	demonstrating	the	importance	and	utility	of	the	Conversian	understanding	
of	ideology	for	political	scientists	both	past	and	present,	with	no	signs	of	slowing	down	
in	the	future.	
Structure	of	Ideology:	Left	and	Right	
Having	outlined	the	origins	of	political	ideology	in	political	science,	we	move	now	
to	an	examination	of	the	structure	of	ideology	today.		The	divide	between	the	political	
right	and	the	left	is	a	surprisingly	timeless	paradigm	for	politics.		From	the	Spartans	and	
Athenians	in	ancient	Greece	to	the	French	Revolution	and	beyond,	politically	interested	
human	beings	in	the	past	and	present	have	found	themselves	divided	on	questions	of	
tradition	versus	change,	security	versus	freedom,	and	hierarchy	versus	individualism.		
Human	beings	will	continue	to	have	these	conflicts	of	vision	no	matter	which	planet	we	
find	ourselves	inhabiting.		
One	part	of	what	makes	the	left-right	division	in	politics	so	striking	is	its	ubiquity.		
The	 left-right	 construct	 is	 not	 only	 useful	 to	 social	 scientists	 for	 describing	 political	
behavior—it	is	also	a	heuristic	that	is	popularly	used	by	the	public.	Political	scientists	have	
often	thought	of	ideology	as	a	continuum,	and	we	have	used	spatial	ideological	modeling	
to	great	effect	in	describing	political	agents	like	legislatures	(Poole	and	Rosenthal	2001,	
Poole	2005),	presidents	(Treier	2010)	and	courts	(Martin	and	Quinn	2002).		And,	even	in	
popular	media,	 one	 can	 hear	 frequent	 use	 of	 spatial	 concepts	 for	 organizing	 political	
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groups.	 	Presidential	candidates	appeal	 to	the	“wings”	of	their	party	 (the	more	radical	
party	members	figuratively	spread	out	from	the	center)	during	the	primary	election.		Once	
selected	by	 their	party,	 they	appeal	 to	“the	middle”	 towards	moderate	voters.	 	 In	 the	
2012	presidential	election,	Republican	Rick	Santorum	was	tied	to	the	“Far-Right”	for	his	
political	 beliefs	 on	 abortion,	 while	 Democrat	 Barack	 Obama	 was	 labeled	 by	 political	
opponents	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 “Far-Left”	 because	 of	 his	 universal	 health	 care	 plan.	
Republican	Mitt	Romney’s	primary	campaign	in	2012	was	described	as	a	way	to	“move	to	
the	 right”	 to	 appeal	 to	 more	 radical	 conservatives	 who	 were	 skeptical	 of	 Romney’s	
politically	 moderate	 tenure	 as	 governor	 of	 Massachusetts.	 	 Democratic-leaning	
independent	Bernie	Sanders	was	originally	a	“far-left”	protest	candidate	of	Democratic	
centrist	Hillary	Clinton’s	2016	presidential	campaign.	Politically	sophisticated	American	
citizens	and	media	use	these	terms	in	everyday	discussions.		As	Jost	(2006)	writes,	“even	
casual	observers	of	today’s	headlines,	newscasts,	and	late	night	talk	shows	cannot	escape	
the	feeling	that	ideology	is	everywhere”	(Jost	2006,	652).	A	Google	web	search	in	May	
2016	reveals	over	185	million	results	for	“liberal,”	137	million	results	for	“conservative,”	
and	49.3	million	results	for	“ideology.”	
What	does	it	mean	to	be	left	or	right	in	the	United	States?		Ellis	and	Stimson	
provide	excellent	summaries	of	the	popular	conception	of	the	two	political	ideologies	in	
Ideology	in	America	(2011).		In	the	United	States	and	in	some	other	places,	liberal	is	
associated	with	leftist	politics,	while	conservative	is	associated	with	rightist	politics.		To	
be	liberal	in	the	United	States	means	you	embrace	the	idea	of	equality	of	opportunity	
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for	all,	and	you	see	government	as	the	primary	tool	for	balancing	out	unequal	starts	
(Ellis	and	Stimson	2011,	3).		Liberals	believe	that	a	market	economy	provides	benefits	to	
society,	but	that	it	has	dangerous	outcomes	to	disadvantaged	groups,	thus	requiring	
government	to	be	a	firm	regulator	(4).		The	role	of	government	is	also	to	establish	
standards	for	the	social	order,	in	markets	and	for	public	goods	(4).		Liberals	embrace	
freedom	for	private,	non-economic	choices	in	lifestyle	and	religion,	with	religion	
considered	to	be	outside	the	proper	scope	of	government.		To	be	conservative	in	the	
United	States	means	that	you	believe	that	families	and	communities	are	the	driving	
forces	of	society,	not	government	(5).		Government	often	lacks	the	moral	imperative	
and	practical	feasibility	to	correct	market	failures	and	address	other	economic	
considerations	(5).		The	free	market	may	have	issues,	but	government	is	ill-equipped	to	
make	adjustments,	often	making	problems	worse	instead	of	correcting	them	(6).		
Conservatives	support	economic	freedoms	and	income	inequality,	believing	that	both	of	
these	tend	to	lead	towards	a	greater	economic	prosperity	for	society	over	time	(5).		
Government	should	be	limited,	but	they	do	have	responsibility	for	providing	safe	and	
effective	market	transactions,	as	well	as	help	enforce	property	rights	and	private	
contracts	(5).		In	terms	of	private	social	behavior,	conservatives	tend	to	split	into	two	
camps.		One	group	favors	a	strong	government	for	promoting	traditional	values,	
enforcing	order	in	society,	and	preserving	the	role	of	religion	in	public	life	(6).		A	
different	group	is	more	libertarian	in	outlook,	and	they	instead	desire	freedom	in	social	
affairs	in	parallel	with	freedoms	in	economic	life	(6).	
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Psychologist	John	Jost	has	studied	political	ideology	from	a	social	psychologist	
perspective,	focusing	on	the	psychological	factors	that	may	motivate	conservative	
beliefs.	Jost	and	colleagues	have	determined	two	primary	factors	divide	liberals	and	
conservatives	most	fundamentally:	(a)	advocating	versus	resisting	social	change	(as	
opposed	to	tradition)	and	(b)	rejecting	versus	accepting	inequality	(Jost	et	al.	2003,	Jost	
2006,	Jost	and	Amodio	2012).				
While	other	systems	have	made	interesting	contributions	to	the	study	of	political	
belief	structures	and	ideology	(for	example,	the	Moral	Foundations	Theory	of	Haidt	and	
Graham	2007,	Graham	et	al.	2009,	Haidt	et	al.	2009	and	the	Cultural	Cognition	Theory	of	
Gastil	et	al.	2011),	none	of	them	outright	reject	the	basic	liberal	versus	conservative	
pattern.		Generally	speaking,	the	liberal	versus	conservative	dichotomy	is	preserved	
quite	well	in	new	systems,	although	most	conceptualize	liberal	and	conservative	
differences	in	a	multidimensional	framework	instead	of	one-dimensional.		For	example,	
a	common	multidimensional	model	of	political	ideology	divides	social	issues	from	
economic	issues.		Even	with	two	dimensions,	one	can	see	the	liberal	versus	conservative	
conflict.		Social	liberals	conflict	with	social	conservatives	alongside	economic	liberals	and	
economic	conservatives.	We	can	increase	specificity	of	ideology	with	new	systems,	but	
the	left-right	divide	remains	surprisingly	intact.		Overall,	I	believe	the	ubiquitous	left-
right	divide	occupies	a	central	place	in	the	study	of	political	behavior	for	political	
scientists,	and	it	serves	as	good	common-ground	for	political	scientists	and	psychologists	
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to	meet.		However,	we	do	need	to	take	seriously	the	consequences	of	multiple	
dimensions	of	political	ideology.	We	take	up	this	conversation	in	the	next	section.		
Dimensions	of	Political	Ideology	
Typically,	political	scientists	and	researchers	in	related	fields	have	argued	for	a	
simple	one-dimensional	scale	of	general	liberalism	versus	conservatism.	Researchers	
have	articulated	ideology	as	a	one-dimensional	construct	(Knight	1999,	2006;	Jost	et	al.	
2009).	This	scale	has	served	the	research	literature	generally	well	over	time,	and	it	holds	
much	predictive	power	(Knight	1999;	2006;	Jost	et	al.	2009).	The	most	popular	scale	of	
measuring	political	ideology	is	self-identification	on	a	seven	point	Likert	scale	(see,	for	
example,	the	time-honored	American	National	Election	Studies).	In	this	scale,	individuals	
are	asked	to	place	themselves	on	a	seven	point,	fully	labeled	scale	from	“Very	liberal”	to	
“Very	conservative,”	with	the	midpoint	of	four	labeled	“moderate.”	However,	political	
scientists	focused	on	the		measurement	of	ideology	in	the	mass	public	have	often	found	
ideology	to	be	more	complex	than	this	simple	scale,	requiring	two	new	understandings.		
First,	ideological	appears	multidimensional,	and	the	dimensions	are	most	likely	
economic	policy	and	social	policy.	Second,	there	appear	to	be	differences	in	how	
ideology	manifests	in	elites	versus	the	mass	public.			
Political	elites	fit	the	one-dimensional	scale	well,	given	their	strong	attitudes	and	
their	well-sorted	party	identification	(Kritzer	1978;	Jennings	1992;	Fiorina	et	al.	2005;	
Abramowitz	and	Saunders	2008;	Lewis-Beck	et	al.	2008).	Additionally,	the	Conversian	
definition	of	ideology	as	attitudinal	constraint	seems	to	work	well	for	political	elites	
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(Kritzer	1978,	Jennings	1992,	Lewis-Beck	et	al.	2008).	However,	even	for	political	elites,	
we	have	some	cause	to	question	what	the	scale	is	actually	measuring	(see,	for	example,	
Conover	and	Feldman	1981).	It	is	plausible	that	the	one-dimensional	scale	is	descriptive	
of	whatever	current,	ongoing	elite	ideological	conflict	is	happening,	rather	than	a	stable	
grouping	of	values.		If	true,	conservatism	on	the	scale	may	not	be	defined	by	underlying	
or	abstract	conservative	values,	but	instead	by	whatever	self-described	conservative	
elites	have	packaged	together.		The	debate	over	same-sex	marriage	in	2013	within	the	
Republican	party	is	an	example	of	elites	trying	to	redefine	what	conservatism	is,	rather	
than	trying	to	define	their	position	against	a	static	benchmark	for	what	conservatism	
means	(see	Socarides	2013).			
The	validity	of	measuring	the	ideology	of	the	mass	public	on	a	one-dimensional	
scale	has	generated	a	lengthy	discussion	in	the	political	science	literature,	as	numerous	
researchers	both	past	and	present	have	argued	that	the	one-dimensional	model	is	
underspecified,	simplistic,	or	simply	empirically	absent	from	the	mass	public	(Stimson	
1975,	Conover	and	Feldman	1981;	Kerlinger	1984;	Peffley	and	Hurwitz	1985;	Page	and	
Shapiro	1992;	Jacoby	1995;	Kinder	1998;	Stimson	2004;	Jacoby	2009;	Haidt	et	al.	2009;	
Treier	and	Hillygus	2009;	Ellis	and	Stimson	2009,	2012;	Popp	and	Rudolph	2011;	
Carmines	et	al.	2012,	Hussey	2012).		Measuring	ideology	in	the	mass	public	has	been	of	
tremendous	interest	in	the	political	science	literature.		The	first	argument	about	the	
nature	of	belief	systems	in	the	mass	public	claims	that	the	public	is	mostly	non-
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ideological	(Converse	2006	[1964]);	consequently,	both	one-dimensional	and		
multidimensional	conceptions	are	equally	ill-suited	to	describing	the	public.		
A	secondary	argument,	however,	posits	that	the	mass	public	is	multidimensional	
in	its	belief	structures	(Treier	and	Hillygus	2009;	Hussey	2012;	Carmines	et	al.	2012),	and	
the	mismatch	between	elites	(who	are	one-dimensional)	and	the	mass	public	(who	are	
multidimensional)	creates	problems	for	measuring	belief	structures	in	the	mass	public.		
These	studies	note	the	special	challenges	of	being	a	cross-pressured	voter	in	a	political	
environment	where	elites	are	one-dimensional.	A	voter	who	is	liberal	on	one	dimension	
(e.g.	social	issues)	and	conservative	on	the	other	dimension	(e.g.	economic	issues)	
becomes	underrepresented	by	elites,	leading	to	lower	political	participation	(Hussey	
2012;	Carmines	et	al.	2012)	as	well	as	confusion	about	their	place	on	a	one-dimensional	
ideology	scale	(Treier	and	Hillygus	2009;	Hussey	2012).			
Here	is	an	example	of	that	potential	confusion.		Libertarian	voters	(socially	liberal	
but	economically	conservative)	have	trouble	answering	our	ideological	placement	
questions.	When	asked	by	the	American	National	Election	Studies	to	place	themselves	
on	a	one-dimensional	scale	of	liberalism-conservatism,	libertarians	are	conflicted.	Do	
they	circle	the	middle	reflecting	the	sum	of	their	diverse	attitudes?	This	is	problematic	
for	researcher	interpretation	because	self-placement	in	the	middle	could	also	imply	they	
are	apathetic,	moderate,	or	that	they	do	not	understand	what	the	labels	mean.	But	in	
this	case,	none	of	those	possible	explanations	are	true.		These	libertarian	voters	are	
both	politically	interested	and	fairly	radical	in	their	beliefs;	they	did	not	know	how	to	
		
31	
place	themselves	because	the	scale	simple	does	not	fit	their	belief	structure.	There	are	
other	problems,	too.		Libertarians	who	routinely	vote	Republican	may	self-place	
themselves	on	the	conservative	side	of	the	spectrum,	misinterpreting	that	the	surveyor	
is	asking	them	about	partisanship	or	perhaps	identifying	as	conservative	because	the	
label	is	politically	charged	at	the	moment	(think	of	the	Tea	Party	movement).			
The	conclusion	from	this	line	of	research	suggests	that	a	multidimensional	scale	
will	reduce	measurement	error.		If	the	mass	public	is	ideological	at	all,	that	is.		We	pick	
up	this	topic	in	the	next	section.			
Why	does	the	dimensionality	of	political	ideology	matter	for	the	current	research	
project?	First,	virtually	all	of	the	political	psychology	literature	on	the	connection	
between	ideology	and	various	psychological	factors	measure	ideology	on	a	one-
dimensional	scale.		Political	science	literature	suggests,	however,	that	using	a	one-
dimensional	scale	may	not	fit	the	public	very	well,	presenting	the	possibility	that	most	
work	on	this	subject	could	be	improved	by	introducing	multidimensionality	to	their	
measures.		Second,	having	difficulty	capturing	the	mass	public	on	a	one-dimensional	
scale	has	traditionally	been	interpreted	as	evidence	that	the	public	is	non-ideological,	as	
most	scholars	conclude	based	on	the	Conversian	tradition.		This	could	be	incorrect,	
however.	If	the	public	were	actually	multidimensional	in	their	political	ideology,	trying	
to	fit	them	on	a	single	dimension	would	similarly	fail.		Moving	forward,	to	study	ideology	
properly	requires	social	scientists	to	include	multidimensionality.	
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Political	Ideology	in	the	Mass	Public		
Does	the	mass	public	even	think	about	politics	in	ideological	terms	or	understand	
what	political	ideology	is?	If	political	ideology	is	having	a	relatively	stable	and	logically	
coherent	belief	system,	few	people	meet	that	standard,	according	to	Converse	(2006	
[1964]).	Using	American	National	Election	Study	data	from	1956	to	evaluate	the	public’s	
view,	Converse	estimates	that	only	about	12	percent	of	the	electorate	uses	ideological	
thinking	to	organize	their	political	beliefs,	based	on	the	attitudinal	constraint	definition	
of	ideology.	
Converse	finds	that	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	mass	public	organizes	their	
political	beliefs	according	to	broad	and	abstract	principles.		So,	then,	how	do	they	
organize	their	beliefs,	if	at	all?	Converse	grouped	survey	responses	into	five	categories	
of	attitude	structures:	ideologue,	near-ideologue,	group	interests,	nature	of	the	times,	
and	no	issue	content.		Ideologues	are	people	who	exhibit	some	evidence	of	ideological	
thinking,	by	articulating	abstract	principles	and	using	conceptual	dimensions	to	evaluate	
political	actors.		Near	ideologues	are	those	who	used	ideological	thinking	in	a	brief	or	
incomplete	way,	yet	did	make	at	least	a	minimal	appeal	to	abstract	principles.		Group	
interests	were	people	who	did	not	use	ideological	precepts	and	instead	made	
evaluations	based	on	the	favorable	or	unfavorable	treatment	of	groups	in	society	
(working	against	“the	common	man,”	favoring	“big	business”).		Nature	of	the	times	
describes	people	who	praised	or	blamed	political	actors	based	on	the	actors’	association	
with	either	good	times	or	bad	times	in	the	recent	past.		Finally,	there	is	a	residual	
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category	for	respondents	who	had	virtually	no	structure	to	their	political	attitudes	and	
were	unable	to	articulate	an	organization	for	their	beliefs	at	all.	
This	data	is	from	one	study	in	the	1960s	and	no	matter	how	incredibly	influential	
this	piece	is,	we	ought	to	look	at	more	data.		Lewis-Beck	et	al.	(2008)	closely	followed	
Converse’s	methodology	on	attitude	structures	and	updated	observations	about	the	
mass	public	using	2000	and	2004	American	National	Election	Studies	data.		The	number	
of	people	who	are	ideologues	and	near-ideologues	had	increased	from	11.5	percent	to	
19.8	percent	of	the	population	since	Converse	published	his	research	in	1964.		20	
percent	of	the	population	is	twice	what	Converse	found,	although	it	still	remains	a	
minority	of	the	mass	public.			
Political	scientists	disagree	over	these	claims,	however.	Political	scientists	have	
tended	to	agree	that	political	elites	are	polarized	around	ideology	and	partisanship.		
Political	elites	are	broadly	defined	as	people	with	high	levels	of	political	knowledge,	
political	interest,	and	political	participation	(sometimes	this	group	is	also	called	political	
sophisticates	or	the	political	class).		High	levels	of	political	engagement	and	political	
sophistication	characterize	them,	and	they	also	have	strong,	durable	political	beliefs	
(Abramowitz	2010;	Claassen	and	Highton	2009;	Levendusky	2009).		Political	elites	can	
include	elected	government	officials,	but	it	can	also	refer	to	private	citizens	with	an	
intense	interest	in	political	affairs.		Political	scientists	are	in	agreement	that	political	
elites	are	polarized	along	the	Left-Right	continuum,	and	they	have	grown	more	
ideologically	polarized	over	time.		The	theme	of	elite	polarization	on	a	liberal-
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conservative	continuum	is	a	major	one	in	current	political	behavior	studies	
(Hetherington	2001;	Fiorina	et	al.	2005;	Lewis-Beck	et	al.	2008;	Abramowitz	and	
Saunders	2008;	Fiorina	and	Abrams	2008).			
While	political	scientists	agree	about	elites,	they	have	an	ongoing	(and	
passionate)	debate	about	political	polarization	in	the	mass	public.		A	popular	and	
influential	book	by	Morris	Fiorina	(Culture	War?,	2005)	argues	that	while	elite	
polarization	is	dangerously	increasing	over	time,	everyday	citizens	themselves	have	
virtually	no	ideological	polarization.		In	Fiorina’s	analysis,	he	demonstrates	relatively	
small	differences	in	opinion	between	red	states	and	blue	states	(49),	as	well	as	only	mild	
differences	in	opinion	between	self-placed	Republicans	and	Democrats	on	
contemporary	political	issues	(65).		Claassen	and	Highton	(2009)	find	support	for	Fiorina,	
and	they	suggest	that	party	elite	polarization	has	been	increasing	and	that	the	public	
still	continues	to	be	unmotivated	to	become	politically	aware.		RePass	joins	in	this	
debate	on	the	side	of	Fiorina,	demonstrating	in	his	analysis	that	only	7.4	percent	of	
potential	voters	in	the	United	States	were	found	to	be	both	strongly	conservative	and	
strongly	Republican,	while	only	3.2	percent	were	both	strongly	liberal	and	strongly	
Democratic	(2008).		RePass	also	reports	that	62.4	percent	of	the	American	public	is	
functionally	non-ideological,	meaning	they	do	not	adhere	to	abstract	ideological	
principles	on	either	the	left	or	the	right	(2008).		This	line	of	argument	tends	to	lead	
towards	Conversian	conclusions	about	the	mass	public—regular	people	simply	are	not	
animated	by	ideological	principles.		Fiorina’s	work	describes	a	mass	public	that	is	
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distinctly	moderate	and	characterized	by	rather	strong	agreement	about	the	issues	
(instead	of	being	locked	in	ideological	conflict).			
Abramowitz	and	Saunders	(2008)	disagree	intensely	with	Fiorina,	arguing	that	a	
substantially	large	segment	of	the	mass	public	is	ideological	and	growing	more	
ideological	over	time.		Abramowitz	and	Saunders	find	little	evidence	of	polarization	in	
the	least	politically	engaged	third	of	the	public	(agreeing	with	Fiorina	here)	but	they	find	
that	most	engaged	third	is	significantly	polarized	(2008,	546).	Moreover,	they	also	argue	
that	polarization	actually	has	some	benefits	for	increasing	political	interest	and	
participation,	by	energizing	voters	and	increasing	political	participation.	This	debate	
between	the	Fiorina	camp	and	the	Abramowitz	camp	continues	to	this	day	to	be	fairly	
spirited,	inspiring	new	research	(Fiorina	et	al.	2008;	Abramowitz	2010).		These	scholars	
all	agree	that	political	elites	are	sharply	polarized,	and	have	grown	more	polarized	over	
time.		They	disagree	over	the	ideological	polarization	of	the	mass	public.			
Arguments	over	the	polarization	the	public	may	give	us	suggestions	about	
whether	the	public’s	attitude	structures	are	ideological	in	nature,	but	it	does	not	fully	
satisfy	the	basic	Conversian	project	of	exploring	whether	the	mass	public	adheres	to	
ideological	belief	systems	because	political	polarization	does	not	require	political	
ideology	but	could	be	dependent	mostly	on	partisan	identity	(or	even,	as	recently	
suggested	by	Iyengar	and	colleagues,	by	emotional	affect	(Iyengar	et	al.	2012);	see	also	
Huddy	et	al.	2015).	The	most	direct	evidence	we	have,	therefore,	is	from	the	studies	of	
Converse	and	followers	(Lewis-Beck	et	al.	2008;	see	also	McGuire	1986;	Tedin,	1987).		In	
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his	original	work,	Converse	demonstrated	that	few	in	the	mass	public	thought	about	
politics	in	terms	of	ideology,	but	there	has	been	a	strong	growth	of	ideological	thinkers	
in	more	recent	time,	according	to	Lewis-Beck	and	colleagues	(who	have	deliberately	
replicated	Converse’s	methodology	as	closely	as	possible).		Overall,	it	seems	that	
political	scientists	mostly	agree	that	the	number	of	people	in	the	mass	public	who	fully	
structure	their	political	attitudes	according	to	ideological	principles	is	small	but	perhaps	
growing.	Political	science	is	not	the	only	social	science	to	look	at	political	ideology,	
however,	and	we	will	see	that	political	psychologists	and	social	psychologists	have	
interesting	insights	that	political	scientists	have	overlooked.		
In	a	2006	retrospective	on	his	work,	Converse	eagerly	commented	on	the	view	
born	from	his	work	that	citizens	mostly	have	nonattitudes	and/or	are	non-ideological	
(Converse	2006).		Converse	quickly	addresses	the	issue	as	a	strawman	argument	of	the	
worst	kind.		He	states,	“to	my	eye,	the	worst	common	misinterpretation	of	the	essay	
attributes	to	me	the	claim	that	most	citizens	have	only	"nonattitudes"	on	questions	of	
public	policy.	It	is	my	contention,	I	am	told,	that	"real"	policy	opinions	are	in	very	short	
supply”	(300).	In	his	own	words,	he	states	a	viewpoint	that	the	public	has	many	
ideological	beliefs,	with	only	22	percent	of	his	original	sample	have	completely	non-
political	viewpoints	(301).		He	says,	“In	short,	I	have	found	it	very	hard	to	understand	
this	misreading	about	few	in	the	electorate	holding	any	"real"	policy	attitudes.	It	is	
almost	as	though	the	misreader	believes	our	argument	to	be	that	citizens	must	be	either	
full	ideologues	or	near	to	it	(12	percent	of	the	electorate)	or	else	that	they	have	no	
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"real"	policy	attitudes.	This	is	quite	unimaginable	to	me”	(303).	Converse	himself	
believes	that	“full	ideologue”	is	perhaps	a	very	tall	bar	to	leap	for	the	mass	public,	and	a	
failure	to	hit	that	threshold	does	not	indicate	that	people	are	completely	nonideological.			
Indeed,	is	it	possible	that	these	scholars	have	simply	“defined	away”	ideology	by	
making	its	requirements	too	steep?	(Jost	2006,	653).		Converse	had	a	tremendous	
impact	on	psychologists	studying	political	ideology,	effectively	closing	down	the	study	of	
political	ideology	(651).	“The	deadening	impact	of	these	conclusions	on	the	study	of	
ideology	in	social,	personality,	and	political	psychology	can	scarcely	be	exaggerated”	
(Jost	2006,	651-652).		Jost	criticizes	the	entire	group	of	ideology	scholars	for	having	a	
standard	for	ideological	thinking	that	was	too	strict,	with	too	many	prerequisites	(650-
652).			
Following	Tedin	1987,	Jost	proposes	the	definition	of	political	ideology	is	better	
thought	of	as	an	interrelated	set	of	moral	and	political	attitudes	possessing	cognitive,	
affective,	and	motivational	components	(Jost	2006,	653).		This	standard,	more	flexible	
and	broader	than	Converse’s,	“gives	ordinary	citizens	a	reasonable	chance	of	empirically	
satisfying	the	criteria	of	being	ideological”	(654)	and	allows	Jost	to	issue	a	call	for	
psychologists	and	political	scientists	to	reopen	the	study	of	political	ideology.		Jost	
points	us	to	Kerlinger	(1984)	who	writes	as	if	to	summarize	this	point:		
Whether	conservatism	and	liberalism	are	typically	conceptual	tools	for	
the	man-in-the-street	is	not	the	central	point.	For	the	scientist,	too,	
liberalism	and	conservatism	are	abstractions	like	any	other	abstract	
concepts	he	works	with:	introversion,	intelligence,	radicalism,	
achievement,	political	development	and	the	like.		To	be	sure,	most	
people	don’t	recognize	their	abstract	nature	and	certainly	don’t	use	them	
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as	social	scientists	do.		Nevertheless,	they	are	quite	familiar	with	their	
behavioral	and	environmental	manifestations.	(217)	
	
Political	scientists	have	been	primarily	concerned	with	the	question	of	whether	
elites	and	the	public	organize	their	politics	around	ideological	principles	and	how	
consistent	they	are	in	the	expression	of	those	principles—thus	emphasizing	defining	and	
measuring	ideology	instead	of	explaining	why	individuals,	groups,	or	societies	gravitate	
towards	ideological	persuasions	(Jost	2006,	654).		The	insight	of	Jost	and	Kerlinger	is	
that	human	beings	do	not	have	to	intellectually	understand	ideological	thinking	in	order	
to	be	found	using	it.		When	looking	at	the	most	influential	work	from	political	scientists	
on	this	question,	Jost’s	charge	seems	fair—Converse	and	his	followers	have	frequently	
defined	ideological	thinking	in	terms	of	whether	citizens	can	explain	what	ideology	is,	
whether	they	can	accurately	frame	their	opinions	in	ideological	terms,	and	whether	they	
can	accurately	place	political	actors	on	a	political	ideology	continuum.		These	are	
important	questions	worthy	of	continued	analysis.		However,	just	because	people	do	
not	understand	political	ideology	does	not	mean	they	are	not	ideological.		Moreover,	as	
Sullivan	and	colleagues	taught	us	about	the	mass	public	and	ideology,	people	are	highly	
sensitive	to	the	method	of	measurement	employed	(Sullivan	et	al.	1978).	Ask	questions	
as	Converse	did,	and	the	public	largely	looks	non-ideological.		However,	change	the	
questions	as	Nie	and	colleagues	did	(Nie	and	Anderson,	1974;	Nie	et	al.	1976),	and	
ideology	in	the	mass	public	swells	to	much	higher	rates.	In	this	respect,	ideology	is	
similar	to	religious	belief—it	is	difficult	to	parse	out,	but	there	is	little	doubt	that	
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religiosity	varies	widely	among	the	population	and	can	be	a	driving	force	in	some	
people’s	lives.			
Jost	(2006)	marshals	some	empirical	support	for	the	claim	that	the	mass	public	is	
more	ideological	today	than	in	the	quieter	1950s-60s	when	Converse	was	collecting	his	
data.	First,	note	that	Stimson	(1975)	argued	that	more	than	a	majority	of	the	actual	
electorate	had	evidence	of	an	ideological	belief	structure	according	to	Conversian	
definition	(414).	Second,	Judd	and	Milburn	(1980)	analyzed	data	from	the	1970s	and	
found	it	to	“pose	a	substantial	threat	to	Converse’s	original	hypothesis	that	the	attitude	
responses	of	the	public	at	large	are	unstable,	nearly	random	responses”	(82).	In	an	
analysis	of	ANES	data	conducted	by	Jost,	he	finds	that	over	two-thirds	of	respondents	
since	1972,	and	over	three-fourths	since	1996	were	willing	to	place	themselves	on	a	
scale	of	liberalism-conservatism,	even	when	provided	explicit		“don’t	know”	answer	
item	options.	Overall,	self-placement	on	the	scales	are	reasonably	accurate	(Conover	&	
Feldman,	1981;	Evans,	Heath,	&	Lalljee,	1996;	Feldman,	2003;	Knight,	1999).	
Additionally,	the	scale	has	tremendously	strong	predictive	usefulness,	explaining	85%	of	
the	variance	in	presidential	vote	choice	(Jost	2006,	658).		
Some	political	scientists	have	joined	this	chorus	as	well.		In	their	book	
Predisposed,	authors	Hibbing,	Smith,	and	Alford	write:	“Ideology	is	not,	as	Converse	and	
his	many	followers	claimed,	merely	the	ability	to	describe	currently	popular	labels	or	to	
endorse	collections	of	positions	that	meet	with	the	approval	of	political	scientists”	
(2014,	56).	Like	Jost,	they	argue	that	ideological	thinking	is	a	core	part	of	human	nature:	
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“Ideology	is	us”	(56).		Ideological	thinking	is	due	to	bedrock	social	and	political	problems	
that	draw	roots	from	our	evolutionary	heritage.		“The	[political]	division	is	real	and	
unavoidable,	and	it	centers	on	distinct	orientations	to	mass-scale	social	life…ideology…is	
not,	as	the	‘end	of	ideology’	school	asserted,	a	concept	that	just	popped	out	fresh	and	
new	from	Renaissance	thought,	only	to	fade	from	sight	with	the	end	of	the	Cold	War”	
(55-56).			
Ellis	and	Stimson	(2012)	similarly	reject	Conversian	claims	about	ideology,	
writing	that	“whatever	the	well-documented	weaknesses	and	randomness	of	individual-
level	political	opinions	(see	Converse	1964	for	the	still	authoritative	treatment),	we	
expect	to	find	power	and	simplicity	when	we	look	at	the	summary	preferences	of	the	
whole	electorate	over	time”	(37).		In	their	analysis,	Ellis	and	Stimson	find	that	large	
segments	of	the	population	that	can	be	categorized	into	four	ideological	groups	
(operationally	vs.	symbolically,	liberal	vs.	conservative).	Ellis	and	Stimson	easily	concede	
that	the	voters	may	not	be	capable	of	articulating	their	own	underlying	belief	structure,	
but	the	big	picture	of	the	data	tells	a	clear	story.		For	example,	in	their	most	recent	year	
of	data	(2006)	they	find	that	25%	of	the	public	is	operationally	liberal	but	symbolically	
conservative	(Figure	5.5,	98).		This	“mismatched”	ideological	specification	would	have	
failed	Converse’s	test,	effectively	labeling	a	quarter	of	the	population	non-ideological	
under	his	terms.		But,	in	reality,	this	group	has	a	consistent	set	of	professed	values	
(typically	conservative)	and	also	a	consistent	design	for	how	they	want	government	to	
function	(typically	liberal).	It	is	not	a	contradiction	or	a	confusion.	They	are	church-
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going,	gun-owning	patriots	who	support	minimum	wage	and	believe	it	is	the	role	of	
government	to	provide	housing	for	the	poor	(Table	5.5,	105).		They	may	be	conflicted	
conservatives	(Ellis	and	Stimson	2012,	111)	but	they	are	consistently	so	in	their	attitudes	
about	social	life	and	government	prerogatives.		
Jost,	Hibbing,	and	other	political	psychologists	propose	that	ideological	thinking	
plays	a	critical	role	in	social	cognition—the	way	human	beings	encode,	store,	process,	
and	retrieve	social	information.		Studies	from	these	researchers	reveal	meaningful	
political	and	psychological	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	that	co-vary	
with	dispositional	and	situational	variables.		Political	ideology	is	tied	more	deeply	into	
the	human	experience	than	we	may	have	realized,	and	this	area	deserves	more	
attention	from	political	scientists.		
Next,	we	turn	to	new	research	in	political	science	and	political	psychology	that	
explores	the	psychological	and	physiological	correlations	to	political	ideology.		Two	large	
theories	have	emerged	to	describe	the	underlying	mechanical	structures	of	a	host	of	
various	studies	on	the	psychological	and	physiological	traits	of	political	adherents.		We	
outline	these	two	theories	and	point	to	an	area	of	the	literature	that	needs	better	
specification	in	order	for	us	to	understand	how	liberals	and	conservatives	differ	from	
each	other	in	their	traits	and	dispositions.			
New	Approaches	to	the	Study	of	Political	Attitudes	
The	study	of	biological	origins	of	politics	could	be	considered	to	have	started	
shortly	after	the	discipline	itself	was	founded	(Aristotle's	famous	"man	is	a	political	
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animal").	In	the	modern	state	of	the	discipline,	E.O.	Wilson's	writings	on	sociobiology	
(Wilson	1979)	kickstarted	an	intense	debate	over	biological	determinism	that	appears	to	
have	resulted	in	a	cooling	of	the	entire	research	program.	More	recently,	renewed	
interest	from	political	scientists	and	psychologists	have	reinvigorated	the	field	of	study.	
They	have	faced	less	criticism	from	other	academics	compared	to	the	earlier	generation,	
perhaps	partially	because	of	increased	scientific	literacy	across	fields,	or	perhaps	due	to	
increasing	tolerance	for	other	methodologies,	or	perhaps	partially	because	of	a	
concerted	effort	by	these	new	wave	biopolitical	scientists	to	express	the	unification	of	
nature	and	nurture,	instead	of	being	ambivalent	or	depicting	them	as	opposing	forces.	
Very	recently,	scholars	have	begun	to	connect	some	of	the	dots	between	political	
science	and	biology	by	calling	for	a	new	look	at	the	evolutionary	origins	of	politics	
(Hatemi	and	McDermott	2011).	
What	is	“biopolitics”	as	a	subfield	of	political	behavior?	Somit	and	Peterson	
define	biopolitics	as	a	“short-hand	term	used	to	describe	the	approach	of	those	in	the	
profession	who	believe	that	biological	concepts—especially	evolutionary	theory,	which	
treats	behaviour	as	the	product	of	both	nature	and	nurture—and	biological	research	
techniques	can	help	us	study	and	understand	political	behaviour	better”	(1999,	559).		
Alford	and	Hibbing	write	“a	biological	approach	to	political	science	is	hardly	new…	in	
fact,	biopolitics	stretches	back	nearly	as	far	as	behavioral	politics;	both	approaches	
found	their	first	enthusiastic	practitioners	in	the	behavioral	revolution	of	the	1960s”	
(2008,	184).	The	first	review	of	the	biopolitics	literature	was	published	in	1972,	
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summarizing	the	findings	and	theoretical	underpinnings	of	forty	articles	(Somit	1972).	
Biopolitics	received	formal	disciplinary	recognition	in	1973	when	the	IPSA	Research	
Committee	on	Biology	and	Politics	was	formed	(560).		The	Association	for	Politics	and	
Life	Sciences	was	formed	in	1981	and	launched	a	dedicated	journal,	Politics	and	the	Life	
Sciences,	in	1983	(560).	By	1998,	Somit	and	Peterson	note	that	the	biopolitics	literature	
had	increased	to	over	1200	articles	(1998,	560).		
However,	the	state	of	biopolitics	research	in	political	science	proper	has	always	
been	questionable	even	as	it	was	growing.	Somit	and	Peterson	note	the	vast	majority	of	
this	literature	was	featured	in	journals	outside	of	political	science,	and	the	top	tier	
journals	were	largely	abandoning	the	publishing	of	biopolitics	work	(1998,	561).	Somit	
and	Peterson	(1999)	express	disappointment	in	the	lack	of	biopolitics	research	in	
political	science	of	that	time,	and	they	attribute	this	dearth	of	research	to	(a)	losing	
shared	theoretical	space	with	rational	choice,	(b)	residual	distaste	for	ill-founded	social	
Darwinism	accusations	and	implications	of	racist	associations	with	earlier	biopolitics	
work,	and	(c)	hesitation	of	new	scholars	to	engage	the	work	because	of	negative	career	
implications.	Alford	and	Hibbing	note	the	departure	in	methodology	between	early	
behaviorists	and	early	biopolitics	researchers:	behaviorists	took	an	empirical	approach	
where	instead	“biopolitics	[had]	remained	largely	theoretical,	descriptive,	and	
speculative”	(Alford	and	Hibbing	2008,	184).		Even	the	negative	associations	with	social	
Darwinism	aside,	biopolitics	appears	to	have	stagnated	because	political	science	grew	
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increasingly	interested	in	empirical	study,	and	early	biopolitics	researchers	did	not	share	
this	interest,	or	had	methodological	difficulty.	
This	changed	in	the	2000s.	A	groundbreaking	study	by	Alford	et	al.	(2005)	used	
twin	data	to	reveal	the	surprising	inheritability	of	political	attitudes	and	party	
identification.		Fowler	and	colleagues	followed	swiftly	afterward	with	two	studies	
demonstrating	the	heritability	and	genetics	of	political	participation	(Fowler	et	al.	2008;	
Fowler	and	Dawes	2008).		These	studies	were	published	in	top	tier	journals	and	were	
empirical	in	methodology.		They	opened	a	floodgate	of	empirical	biopolitics	work	within	
the	pages	of	political	science’s	top	journals	(including,	also,	high-profile	criticism;	see	
Charney	2008;	Charney	and	English	2012).				
Why	Biological	Models?	
Political	behavior	researchers	have	traditionally	used	two	approaches	for	
explaining	human	action	in	politics—situational	and	individual	(Hatemi	and	McDermott,	
2011,	13).	Socialization	models	exemplify	the	situational	approach,	positing	that	the	
environment	creates,	shapes,	and	reinforces	the	political	behavior	of	the	individual	that	
ascends	from	that	environment.	The	individual	approach,	in	contrast,	is	exemplified	by	
rational-choice	modeling,	which	asserts	that	individual	behavior	responds	to	changing	
incentive	payoff	schedules.	As	Hatemi	and	McDermott	note,	"in	their	most	reduced	
form,	behavioral	models	argue	that	all	behavior	results	from	social	conditioning	
(Campbell	et	al.	1960),	while	rational-choice	models	assume	preferences	are	exogenous,	
fixed,	and	given,	and	remain	agnostic,	if	not	unconcerned,	about	their	source	(Bueno	de	
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Mesquita	1983)"	(Hatemi	and	McDermott,	2011,	13).	Both	of	these	perspectives	are	
environmental	in	the	sense	that	environmental	changes	drive	all	of	the	important	
effects	in	the	models.	Changing	socioeconomic	status	or	changing	the	payoffs	for	
defecting	is	proposed	to	substantially	change	the	behavior	of	subjects.	
Models	from	both	approaches	have	had	a	huge	impact	on	the	discipline	of	
political	science	as	a	whole,	and	they	continue	to	be	productive	lines	of	research	that	
increase	understanding	and	knowledge	of	political	behavior.	Over	time,	however,	many	
other	scientific	disciplines	challenged	the	assumptions	of	both	socialization/behavioral	
models	and	rational-choice	models	(Green	and	Shapiro	1994;	Robson	and	Kaplan	2003).	
Hatemi	and	McDermott	note	that	"numerous	challenges	from	economics,	psychology,	
neuroscience,	and	other	fields	have	found	that	not	all	people	are	socialized	to	act	the	
same	way;	rational-choice	models	also	hold	limited	explanatory	capacity	by	remaining	
almost	exclusively	focused	on	choices	motivated	by	unrealistically	narrow	conceptions	
of	self-interest	(Dawes	and	Thaler	1988;	Tversky	and	Thaler	1990;	Fehr	and	Gächter	
2000;		Gintis	2000;		Henrich	et	al.	2001,	Fehr	and	Fischbacher	2004).”		
These	environmental	models	necessarily	are	silent	on	the	human	being	prior	to	
interaction	with	the	environment.	This	is	not	a	fundamental	flaw	to	the	research	
program,	but	we	no	longer	need	to	treat	the	pre-environment	psychological/biological	
being	as	a	black	box	to	be	ignored.		We	already	intuitively	understand	that	humans	do	
not	enter	into	the	environment	as	blank	slates.	People	within	a	common	environment	
(say,	a	small	community)	can	have	rather	divergent	opinions	on	politics,	or	could	have	
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very	different	preferences	for	monetary	inducements.	Race,	gender,	social	class,	and	
culture	have	powerful	effects	on	political	behavior,	but	within	these	subgroups	is	
disagreement	about	political	candidates	and	political	issues.	Even	within	families	there	
is	a	surprising	diversity	of	opinion—two	siblings	raised	in	the	same	household	have	an	
environment	in	common	and	yet	regularly	hold	different	political	beliefs.		The	point	here	
is	that	the	environmental	effects	are	not	universal—every	human	reacts	differently	to	
every	environmental	effect.		We	are	beginning	to	fashion	the	tools	we	need	to	start	
understanding	why	and	how	people	are	different	prior	to	the	important	environmental	
effects.			
Given	our	evolutionary	history,	purely	economic	models	of	human	behavior	
seem	dubious	as	explanations	for	the	sum	of	human	political	behavior.	"The	process	of	
natural	selection	is	based	upon	adaptive	traits	beginning	at	a	much	earlier	period	in	
human	development,	where	pure	economic	power-seeking	and	self-interest	were	not	
the	only	potential	adaptive	traits,	if	such	traits	were	adaptive	at	all.	Certainly	many	
important	human	social	and	political	traits,	including	detecting	kin,	selecting	mates,	
foraging	for	food,	avoiding	predators,	and	detecting	cheaters,	evolved	in	a	context	prior	
to	modern	market	conditions"	(Hatemi	and	McDermott	2011,	13).	We	should	not	be	
surprised	that	it	takes	an	exceptionally	large	monetary	incentive	to	get	human	beings	to	
defect	from	those	who	share	close	kinship,	given	how	central	such	an	impulse	seems	to	
be	to	our	evolutionary	psychology	(Trivers	1971;	Kruger	2003;	Axelrod	and	Hamilton	
2006).	Economic	models	also	seem	to	be	unable	to	explain	our	tendency	to	want	to	
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punish	defectors	even	when	it	costs	us	personally	to	do	so,	and	we	expect	to	not	
recover	the	costs	of	punishment	(Gintis	2003).		
Biological	models	have	the	potential	to	contribute	to	the	existing	sociological	
and	economic	behavioral	models	in	political	science	by	offering	a	theoretical	
explanation	for	these	behavioral	effects	that	the	other	models	consider	paradoxes	
(Hatemi	and	McDermott	2011).		But	even	more	centrally,	evolutionary	political	science	
offers	to	investigate	a	large	paradox	in	the	study	of	political	behavior:	"simply	put,	our	
current	theories	and	examinations	largely	assume	that	all	people	are	biologically	the	
same	when	it	comes	to	politics,	which	is	a	radical	notion	considering	how	remarkably	
diverse	humans	are	in	virtually	every	other	domain”	(Hatemi	and	McDermott	2011,	18).			
With	these	insights	in	mind,	calls	for	an	ambitious	program	of	political	
neuroscience	began	in	the	2000s	from	a	number	of	researchers	connected	closely	to	
biopolitics	in	political	science	(Marcus	et	al.	1998,	McDermott	2004,	Schreiber	2006,	
Fowler	and	Schreiber	2008,	McDermott	2009;	Hatemi	and	McDermott	2011;	Schreiber	
2011)	as	well	as	in	political	psychology	(Lieberman	and	Schreiber	2003,	Cacioppo	and	
Visser	2003,	Amodio	and	Jost	2007,	Jost	and	Amodio	2012).		As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	
section,	political	neuroscience	offers	new	methodological	tools	to	study	our	core	
questions	about	political	ideology.		For	the	present	study	of	political	ideology,	biological	
investigations	promise	to	be	revealing—political	ideology	is	likely	an	evolutionary	
adaptation	that	human	beings	evolved	in	response	to	the	social	nature	of	human	groups	
(Thornhill	and	Fincher,	2007;	Hatemi	and	McDermott,	2011;	Fincher	et	al.	2008).		
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Two	Psychological	Theories	Emerge	
The	recent	reawakening	of	the	biopolitics	and	political	attitudes	research	
program	in	political	science	has	been	coupled	with	a	similar	revival	of	interest	in	political	
ideology	in	social	psychology.	While	there	is	a	myriad	of	studies	in	the	literature	tying	
various	psychological,	physiological,	neurological,	and	endocrinological	factors	to	
political	attitudes,		two	overarching	theories	have	emerged	for	explaining	why	these	
differences	are	there.		First,	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	posits	that	
differences	in	psychological	factors	(traits,	dispositions,	cognitive	styles)	suggest	
conservatives	(compared	to	liberals)	are	more	motivated	by	needs	to	reduce	
uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	and	disgust	(Jost	et	al.	2003).		Second,	the	Negativity	Bias	
Theory	argues	that	conservatives	have	more	sensitivity	to	negativity	than	liberals,	
causing	them	to	register	greater	physiological	responses	to	such	stimuli	and	devote	
more	psychological	resources	to	them.	Considerable	cross-citation	exists	between	the	
two	theories	and	much	common	ground.		Below,	I	outline	the	two	theories	and	their	
findings.		We	are	on	the	precipice	of	additional	theoretical	development	(see,	for	
example,	unpublished	work	by	Tritt	et	al.	on	the	arousal	model	of	political	
conservatism).	However,	the	two	major	theories	represent	the	most	well-developed	and	
empirically	supported	literature	that	we	have	today.		
Having	established	a	history	of	research	on	political	ideology,	the	next	chapter	
outlines	a	research	program	designed	to	improve	our	understanding	of	the	two	major	
theories	of	political	ideology	from	a	political	psychology	perspective.		It	also	introduces	
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the	work	and	ideas	of	Jeffrey	Allen	Gray,	an	influential	psychologist	who	can	help	specify	
and	clarify	the	psychological	processes	studied	by	the	teams	from	Hibbing	and	Jost.			
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CHAPTER	THREE	
THEORY	
This	chapter	builds	the	theoretical	foundations	for	the	empirical	investigation	in	
the	remainder	of	the	dissertation.	The	motivating	question	for	this	dissertation	is	as	
follows:	do	conservatives	and	liberals	have	differing	sensitivities	to	avoidance,	
inhibition,	and	negative	emotion?	Do	psychological	factors	beneath	our	conscious	
awareness	underlie	the	political	ideologies	we	embrace?		
As	reviewed	in	the	last	chapter,	there	are	two	major	theories	concerning	the	
psychological	differences	between	political	liberals	and	conservatives.		Psychologist	John	
Jost	and	his	colleagues	formulated	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory.	This	theory	
posits	that	conservatives	are	motivated	by	behavioral	avoidance.		In	Jost’s	terminology,	
conservatives	are	more	motivated	by	needs	to	reduce	uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	
and	disgust	(Jost	et	al.	2003),	which	is	due	to	differences	in	dispositional	traits	
(compared	to	liberals).	The	second	theory,	from	John	Hibbing	and	colleagues,	posits	that	
conservatives	have	more	sensitivity	to	negative	emotion.		I	term	this	the	Negativity	Bias	
Theory.			
This	chapter	provides	theoretical	and	literature	justification	for	my	
characterization	of	these	two	theories.		It	is	important	to	recognize	that	these	two	
theories	are	not	competing	theories—I	argue	they	are	interested	in	different	
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psychological	processes.	Jost’s	work	has	an	affinity	with	a	psychological	disposition	
called	avoidance	sensitivity,	while	Hibbing’s	work	focuses	instead	on	negative	emotion.	
By	the	end	of	this	chapter,	we	will	see	that	Jeffrey	Allen	Gray’s	theories	on	behavioral	
motivation	have	a	direct	connection	to	both	avoidance	sensitivity	and	negativity	bias.	
His	theories,	and	the	neuroscience	related	to	them,	can	considerably	aid	the	research	
program	of	understanding	political	ideology	from	a	psychological	perspective.		Thus,	the	
goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	articulate	these	two	theories,	integrate	Gray’s	theoretical	
insights	to	this	project,	and	explain	why	neuroscience	methodology	is	essential	to	
sorting	all	of	this	out.		
The	Negativity	Bias	Theory	
Hibbing,	Smith,	and	Alford	(2014)	present	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	as	a	
summation	of	a	decade	of	research	into	the	physiology	of	political	ideology.	These	
scholars	have	been	the	primary	progenitors	of	the	modern	“rediscovery”	of	the	biology	
and	politics	research	program,	a	revival	that	begins	in	the	mid	2000s.		In	summarizing	
the	entire	empirical	biopolitics	literature	in	political	science,	as	well	as	drawing	deeply	
from	the	political	psychology	literature,	Hibbing	and	colleagues	hypothesize	that	
conservatives	have	a	stronger	negativity	bias	than	liberals.		Negativity	bias	means	that	
“negative	events	are	more	salient,	potent,	dominant	in	combinations,	and	generally	
efficacious	than	positive	events”	(Rozin	&	Royzman	2001,	297).			
Human	beings,	on	average,	tend	to	have	negativity	bias.		People	in	general	are	
more	sensitive	to	negative	faces,	words,	and	social	information,	and	biological	systems	
		
52	
tend	to	have	measurably	higher	levels	of	activation	in	response	to	negative	than	positive	
stimuli	(Rozin	&	Royzman	2001).		However,	Hibbing	and	colleagues	note	that	this	
sensitivity	is	measurably	stronger	in	conservatives	than	liberals	and	this	theory	explains	
nearly	all	of	the	hundreds	of	political	psychological	studies	of	correlates	to	political	
attitudes.			
Consequently,	not	only	do	political	positions	favoring	defense	spending,	
roadblocks	to	immigration,	and	harsh	treatment	of	criminals	seem	naturally	to	mesh	
with	heightened	response	to	threatening	stimuli	but	those	fostering	conforming	unity	
(school	children	reciting	the	pledge	of	allegiance),	traditional	lifestyles	(opposition	to	
gay	marriage),	enforced	personal	responsibility	(opposition	to	welfare	programs	and	
government	provided	healthcare),	longstanding	sources	of	authority	(Biblical	inerrancy;	
literal,	unchanging	interpretations	of	the	Constitution),	and	clarity	and	closure	
(abstinence-only	sex	education;	signed	pledges	to	never	raise	taxes;	aversion	to	
compromise)	do	as	well.	Heightened	response	to	the	general	category	of	negative	
stimuli	fits	comfortably	with	a	great	many	of	the	typical	tenets	of	political	conservatism	
(23-24).	
The	evidence	for	increased	negativity	bias	in	political	conservatives	is	readily	
available	through	a	group	of	studies	focused	on	physiological	correlates	of	political	
ideology.		Oxley	et	al.	(2008)	present	evidence	that	conservatism	is	correlated	with	
physiological	reactions	to	non-political	stimuli.		In	a	group	of	non-student	participants	
with	strong	political	beliefs,	individuals	less	tolerant	of	sudden	noises	and	
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fearful/disgusting	visual	images,	tended	to	support	increased	defense	spending,	capital	
punishment,	patriotism,	and	the	Iraq	War.		Helzer	and	Pizarro	(2011)	find	that	asking	
research	participants	to	wash	their	hands	increased	their	stated	preferences	for	
conservative	positions.		Several	studies	have	found	that	threatening	stimuli	are	
consistently	more	distracting	for	conservatives	(Carraro,	Castelli	&	Macchiella	2011,	
McLean	et	al.	2013).	Negative	stimuli	such	as	angry	faces	attract	the	attention	of	
conservatives	more	than	they	do	liberals.	Dodd	et	al.	(2012)	found	conservatives	spent	
significantly	more	time	looking	at	negative	images	and	were	significantly	quicker	to	
“fixate”	on	those	images	(as	measured	by	eye-track	software)	as	well.			
The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	
Political	science	has	a	consensus	definition	of	political	ideology	as	attitudinal	
constraint,	and	the	discipline	makes	use	of	this	definition	to	explore	and	explain	political	
behavior.		As	mentioned	earlier,	however,	some	political	psychologists	have	used	a	
different	definition	and	conceptualization	of	ideology.		The	major	departure	in	theory	is	
that	political	scientists	have	put	abstract	principles	as	the	foundations	of	political	
ideology	while	these	political	psychologists	believe	root	psychological	needs	are	the	
foundation	for	the	abstract	principles.		So,	political	scientists	would	believe	a	person	is	a	
liberal	ideologue	because	they	endorse	certain	abstract	principles	about	fairness	and	
equality.	Endorsement	of	abstract	principles	leads	to	endorsement	of	political	attitudes	
in	an	ideological	way.	Psychologists	working	on	political	ideology	have	typically	taken	a	
different	perspective.	In	contrast,	they	would	believe	a	person	is	a	liberal	ideologue	
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because	they	have	psychological	needs	or	sensitivities	that	make	the	abstract	principles	
of	fairness	and	equality	appealing	to	the	individual.	Psychological	needs	lead	to	
endorsement	of	abstract	principles,	which	lead	to	endorsement	of	political	attitudes	in	
an	ideological	way.			
The	psychological	theory	has	the	potential	to	contribute	much	to	political	
science’s	understanding	of	political	ideology.		In	my	view,	the	constraint	theory	may	
describe	a	defensible	way	to	measure	the	presence	of	ideology,	but	it	simply	does	not	
speak	to	why.		Human	beings	seem	strangely	compelled	by	ideological	beliefs	and	
powerfully	animated	by	ideas.	Some	have	been	willing	to	kill	or	die	for	abstract	
principles,	committing	great	acts	of	atrocity	or	heroism	(Jost	and	Amodio	2012,	55).	The	
strength	of	these	endorsements	suggest	that	ideology	is	tied	deeply	to	the	self.		Even	
the	more	everyday	forms	of	ideological	thinking	can	fundamentally	bend	the	way	that	
we	are	exposed	to	information	and	bias	our	information	processing.			
Ideology	can	motivate	cognitive	processes	and	behavior	in	several	theoretical	
ways	(Jost	et	al.	2009).		First,	ideology	reduces	uncertainty	by	suggesting	preferences	
and	providing	a	framework	for	analyzing	new	and	old	contexts	and	situations.		Second,	
ideologies	offer	existential	security,	a	way	to	cope	with	anxiety	about	death	(see	Becker	
1985,	also	Greenberg	et	al.	1986	on	terror	management	theory).	Third,	people	are	
drawn	to	ideologies	for	reasons	of	affiliation,	for	belongingness	and	social	strength	as	
part	of	a	group.	People	take	an	ideological	perspective	in	politics	that	they	find	
appealing—political	scientists	will	not	find	that	controversial—but	they	do	so	in	part	
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because	the	ideology	itself	appeals	to	psychological	dispositions	and	cognitive	processes	
within	the	individual.		Ideology	offers	“certainty,	security,	and	solidarity”	(Jost	and	
Amodio	2012).		Political	scientists	may	find	this	controversial,	or	they	may	not,	but	it	is	
certainly	the	case	that	this	angle	is	understudied	in	mainstream	political	science	
literature.	
One	of	Jost’s	central	arguments,	however,	is	that	not	all	ideologies	are	the	same,	
and	not	all	ideologies	will	satisfy	the	same	needs.		There	are	likely	important	
psychological	differences	between	varying	ideologies,	although	researchers	have	not	yet	
ventured	outside	of	studying	conservatism	contrasted	with	liberalism	(but	see	Iyer	et	al.	
2012	for	a	look	at	libertarianism).			Jost	and	his	colleagues	have	focused	on	the	left-right	
divide	between	political	liberals	and	political	conservatives	(in	contrast	to,	say,	religious	
ideologies	or	social	ideologies	such	as	Social	Dominance	Orientation	(Sidanius	and	
Pratto	1999),	but	there	are,	no	doubt,	other	ideological	belief	structures.		In	terms	of	
political	ideology,	political	psychologists	have	mostly	followed	political	scientists	and	
accepted	the	unidimensionality	of	political	ideology.		
The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	comes	directly	from	Jost	and	colleagues	
(Jost	et	al.	2003).		In	an	extensive	meta-analytic	review	of	88	studies	in	12	countries,	Jost	
et	al.	(2003)	found	evidence	that	political	conservatives	exhibit	more	death	anxiety,	are	
less	tolerant	of	ambiguity,	have	less	openness	to	new	experiences,	have	less	tolerance	
for	uncertainty,	have	more	need	for	order,	structure,	and	closure,	and	have	more	fear	of	
threat	and	loss	when	compared	to	political	liberals.			
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Jost	and	colleagues	are	not	alone	in	their	study	of	the	psychological	
underpinnings	of	political	ideology.		Other	researchers	have	suggested	that	
conservatives	have	an	increased	wariness	of	out-groups	that	may	be	related	to	
heightened	feelings	of	threat	in	certain	contexts	(see	Skitka	&	Mullen	2002,	119;	de	St.	
Aubin	1996;	Stone	&	Schaffner	1988).	Right-wing	authoritarianism	has	a	long	history	of	
being	correlated	with	and	being	activated	by	threat	(Lavine	et	al.	2002;	Lavine	et	al.	
2005).		Nail	and	McGregor	(2009)	observed	a	movement	towards	conservative	political	
stances	in	eight	of	eight	items	in	two	independent	surveys	of	adults,	one	taken	before	
9/11	and	one	taken	afterwards.		Survey	respondents	reported	increased	support	for	
conservatives,	George	W.	Bush,	and	increasing	military	spending,	and	less	support	for	
socialization	of	medicine.	Weber	and	Federico	(2007)	found	that	anxious	attachment	
styles	were	associated	with	right-wing	authoritarianism	and	mediated	by	belief	that	the	
world	was	a	dangerous	place.		They	also	found	that	avoidant	attachment	styles	were	
associated	with	social	dominance	orientation.		The	perception	of	a	dangerous	world	is	
correlated	with	right-wing	ideologies	(Jost	et	al.	2003),	and	it	is	especially	strong	among	
political	sophisticates	(Federico	et	al.	2009).		Hatemi	et	al.	(2013)	find	that	fear	
dispositions	have	a	modest	but	significant	relationship	with	conservatism	out-group	
attitudes.		Shook	and	Clay	(2011)	found	that	conservatives	were	more	susceptible	to	
conditioning	with	negative	stimuli	than	liberals,	and	conservatives	were	less	susceptible	
to	conditioning	with	positive	stimuli	compared	to	liberals.			
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These	correlations	suggest	conservatives	have	an	aversive	cognitive	style,	
behaviorally	motivated	to	avoidance,	and	in	particular,	avoidance	of	threat	and	the	
unknown	(see	also	Dodd	et	al.	2012).		This	evidence	highlights	the	distinct	possibility	
that	political	conservatives	have	a	more	avoidant	cognitive	style.	
Two	Theories	Measuring	Two	Different	Psychological	Constructs	
The	two	theories	discussed	above	have	much	common	ground.		Both	sets	of	
authors	tend	to	cite	each	other	in	support	of	their	respective	findings.		In	my	view,	
however,	it	is	clear	that	each	theory	is	focusing	on	a	specific	psychological	process	
distinct	from	the	rest.		We	would	benefit	from	sorting	these	mechanisms	that	underlie	
the	two	theories,	which	would	allow	us	to	gain	much	more	specificity	for	our	claims.		
It	is	valuable	to	understand	how	sensitivity	to	avoidance	(Motivated	Social	
Cognition	theory	findings)	impacts	political	attitudes.		It	is	also	valuable	to	understand	
how	sensitivity	to	emotional	negativity	is	correlated	to	political	attitudes	(Negativity	Bias	
theory	findings).		These	findings,	however,	have	different	underlying	mechanisms.		
Affect	is	not	the	same	as	personality	traits,	and	neither	are	the	same	as	cognitive	style.		
Yet,	research	in	this	field	tends	to	lump	all	the	findings	together	as	if	it	is	one	portrait	of	
conservatives.		
The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	posits	that	conservative	belief	structures	
are	motivated	by	psychological	needs	to	reduce	uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	and	
disgust	(Jost	et	al.	2003).		The	Negativity	Bias	Theory	argues	that	conservative	belief	
structures	are	correlated	with	sensitivity	to	negative	affect	(Hibbing	et	al.	2013).	Both	
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theories	have	consistent	empirical	support.	While	the	two	theories	frequently	cross-
reference	each	other,	there	is	little	explanation	for	why	both	theories	could	or	should	
co-exist.		Or,	put	another	way,	regardless	of	the	surface	similarities,	these	theories	are	
ultimately	describing	different	mechanisms	as	the	roots	for	these	correlations.		But	what	
are	those	mechanisms?	Is	a	disposition	towards	avoidance	the	same	as	a	dispositional	
sensitivity	to	negative	affect?	How	does	cognition	and	emotion	intersect	to	create	
behavioral	outcomes?		What	we	could	use	is	a	better	specified	theoretical	link	between	
these	two	profiles	of	political	conservatism.			
Gray’s	Theory	of	Behavioral	Motivations	
Jeffrey	Allen	Gray	offers	a	theory	of	behavioral	motivation,	which	he	envisioned	
as	two	complementary	systems	that	underlie	cognition,	emotion,	and	behavior.		The	
behavioral	activation	system	(BAS)	facilitates	behavior	towards	the	completion	of	a	
direct	objective	or	goal.	All	of	the	small	behaviors	we	take	during	a	day	are	for	some	
purpose,	some	goal.		The	goal	may	be	short-term,	fleeting,	poorly	considered,	or	it	may	
be	long-term	and	strategic.		Regardless	of	what	the	goal	is,	and	how	much	we	have	
considered	it,	we	act	because	we	desire	some	outcome.		BAS	facilitates	action.		In	
contrast,	the	behavioral	inhibition	system	(BIS)	halts	ongoing	behavior	in	response	to	
new	information.		This	is	our	monitoring	system,	designed	to	help	us	react	to	
unexpected	changes	in	our	environment.	The	behavioral	inhibition	and	activation	
systems	blend	our	cognition	with	our	emotion	in	order	to	generate	behavior.		
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Here	is	an	illustration	of	how	the	dual	systems	operate.		Sitting	down	with	our	
laptop	for	work,	we	decide	to	have	a	sip	of	coffee.		The	BAS	operationalizes	the	goal	
with	our	cognitive	processes.		We	reach	for	the	cup	of	coffee	and	bring	it	to	our	lips.		We	
experience	a	mild	sense	of	satisfaction,	mild	positive	affect,	which	helps	to	motivate	the	
action.	Our	goal	is	nearly	achieved,	something	that	we	planned	in	our	mind	that	was	
aided	by	emotion.		As	we	look	into	the	mug	near	our	lips,	however,	we	notice	that	a	
dead	fly	is	floating	on	top	of	the	coffee.		Seeing	the	fly	cues	a	disgust	reaction,	an	
arousing	negative	emotion,	and	we	immediately	halt	our	planned	action	to	drink	a	sip	of	
coffee.		This	is	the	BIS	facilitating	a	rapid	change	of	plans	by	interrupting	our	ongoing	
behavior	in	response	to	newly	detected	information.	Again,	the	BIS	integrates	both	
cognition	and	emotion	to	trigger	behavior.			
BAS	is	about	going	while	BIS	is	about	stopping.		BAS	is	connected	to	feelings	of	
positive	emotion,	while	BIS	is	associated	with	feelings	of	negative	emotion.		This	theory	
has	the	potential	to	articulate	the	mechanisms	underneath	both	theories	as	well	as	link	
them	together	directly.		Below,	we	examine	Gray’s	theories	in	more	depth	and	outline	
several	ways	to	study	dispositional	differences	of	political	ideologues.			
Researchers	in	psychology	have	a	number	of	tools	to	investigate	avoidance	
motivations	and	negativity	bias,	methods	that	can	be	used	to	help	illuminate	the	
psychological	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives.	Below,	I	describe	the	most	
commonly	used	framework	for	studying	emotion	and	behavioral	motivation	in	
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psychology,	and	then	outline	methodological	tools	from	cognitive	neuroscience	that	can	
be	used	to	explore	the	question	of	emotional	sensitivity	in	political	ideology.			
Gray’s	dual	behavioral	motivation	systems—the	Behavioral	Inhibition	System	
(BIS)	and	the	Behavioral	Approach	System	(BAS)—are	a	pair	of	heuristic	devices	
developed	to	help	explain	animal	and	human	behavior	(Gray	1972,	1978,	1981,	1988).		
BIS	can	be	thought	of	as	a	process	for	stopping	when	a	potential	threat	or	reward	is	
detected,	while	BAS	is	a	process	for	going	forward	to	enact	a	plan	of	action	(Demaree	et	
al.	2005).		Worded	another	way,	BIS	is	an	aversive	system,	while	BAS	is	an	appetitive	
system	(Carver	and	White	1994).	
BIS	is	thought	to	facilitate	attention	or	sensitivity	to	cues	of	punishment,	danger,	
avoidance,	and	novelty.		Gray	suggests	that	BIS	functioning	is	responsible	for	feelings	
such	as	fear,	anxiety,	frustration,	and	sadness	in	response	to	cues	(Carver	and	White	
1994;	Gray	1972,	1978,	1981,	1988).	BIS	functions	to	interrupt	current	behavior	in	order	
to	process	these	cues	in	preparation	for	a	response.	High	BIS	activation	is	associated	
with	enhanced	attention,	arousal,	vigilance,	and	anxiety,	and	very	strong	BIS	
corresponds	to	anxiety-related	disorders	(Fowles,	1988;	Quay,	1988).	
The	complementary	system	to	the	BIS	is	the	BAS,	which	represents	a	
motivational	system	sensitive	to	signals	of	reward,	nonpunishment,	and	escape	from	
punishment.		BAS	facilitates	approach	towards	a	reward	(going	toward),	but	also	
facilitates	active	avoidance	away	from	a	punishment	(going	away)	(Amodio	et	al.	2008).	
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BAS	has	been	associated	with	feelings	of	optimism,	joy,	aggression,	and	anger	(Gable	et	
al.	2000;	Gray	and	McNaughton,	2000;	Wingrove	and	Bond,	1998;	Harmon-Jones	2003).			
The	BIS	and	BAS	scales	developed	by	Carver	and	White	(1994)	have	been	used	
extensively	by	psychologists	to	measure	dispositions	for	behavioral	approach	and	
behavioral	inhibition,	as	well	as	emotion.		BIS,	in	particular,	is	associated	with	self-
regulation	(Amodio,	et	al.	2008)	but	has	not	been	examined	in	the	context	of	political	
ideology.		Marcus	et	al.	(2000)	use	Gray’s	BIS	and	BAS	systems	in	their	theory	of	
Affective	Intelligence,	which	demonstrates	that	anxiety	increases	political	learning	and	
enthusiasm	increases	political	participation.		They	do	not	connect	it	to	political	ideology,	
however,	which	presents	a	clear	opportunity	to	look	at	BIS	and	BAS	in	a	survey	
questionnaire	as	a	way	to	test	for	the	psychological	dispositions	that	Hibbing	and	Jost	
utilize	in	their	respective	theories.		
Hemispheric	Asymmetry	and	Psychological	Dispositions	
Neuroscience	has	contributed	in	a	significant	way	to	the	study	of	emotional	
affect	and	behavioral	motivation,	and	we	will	need	these	insights	in	order	to	explore	the	
psychological	dispositions	of	avoidance	sensitivity	and	negativity	bias.		By	borrowing	
some	of	these	methodologies,	many	grounded	directly	in	Gray’s	work,	we	can	find	new	
tools	to	study	how	political	ideology	may	be	related	to	emotion	and	behavioral	
motivations.			
One	such	tool	is	the	measure	of	hemispheric	asymmetry.	Tomarken	et	al.	(1990),	
found	that	participants	in	an	electroencephalography	(EEG)	experiment	who	had	greater	
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resting	right	frontal	activity	responded	with	more	intense	negative	affect	to	negatively-
valenced	film	clips,	particularly	those	involving	fear	or	threat	(see	also	Wheeler	et	al.	
1993).		Davidson	and	colleagues	(1993,	1998a,	and	1998b)	suggest	relatively	greater	left	
frontal	activity	corresponds	with	trait	tendencies	toward	a	general	withdrawal	or	
avoidance	system,	a	hallmark	of	Gray’s	behavioral	activation	system	(BAS).		This	finding	
has	been	empirically	verified	by	a	number	of	different	research	groups	(e.g.,	Carver	and	
White	1994;	Coan	and	Allen	2003,	2004;	Harmon-Jones	and	Allen	1997,	1998;	Sutton	
and	Davidson	1997).		Based	on	these	findings,	researchers	now	believe	that	the	pattern	
of	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry	is	a	biomarker	for	avoidance	motivations	and	
negativity	bias.		Yet,	they	were	not	able	to	distinguish	between	the	two	at	the	moment.	
As	demonstrated,	there	are	detectable	left/right	hemispheric	differences	in	the	strength	
of	EEG	signals	in	frontal	electrodes,	and	this	asymmetry	may	be	a	moderator	and/or	
mediator	of	emotions,	such	as	fear	and	anxiety	(Coan	and	Allen	2004).			
Coan	and	Allen,	writing	in	2004,	report	than	the	relationship	between	cortical	
asymmetries	and	emotion	had	been	established	by	over	70	studies	(2004,	7).	In	their	
review,	they	establish	that	resting	levels	of	neural	activity,	as	well	as	state-based	
activation,	in	the	prefrontal	cortex	are	correlated	with	trait	predispositions	and	changes	
in	emotional	state.	These	findings	suggest	that	brain	systems	tapped	by	frontal	EEG	
asymmetries	may	moderate	(in	the	case	of	activity)	and	mediate	(in	the	case	of	
activation)	emotional	responding.	The	consensus	in	this	literature	is	that	relatively	
greater	right	hemispheric	frontal	activity	is	associated	with	tendencies	toward	a	general	
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avoidance	or	withdrawal	system,	which	is	then	often	correlated	to	negative	affect	(Coan	
and	Allen	2003a;	Coan	and	Allen	2003b;	Davidson	1993;	Harmon-Jones	and	Allen	1997,	
Sutton	and	Davidson,	Davidson	1998a,b).	Davidson's	influential	approach/withdrawal	
motivational	model	of	emotion	proposes	that	left	frontal	activity	(either	as	state	or	as	
trait)	indicates	a	propensity	to	approach	or	engage	a	stimulus,	while	relatively	greater	
right	frontal	activity	indicates	a	propensity	to	withdraw	or	disengage	from	a	stimulus.			
Other	researchers	have	confirmed	this	relationship.		For	example,	Field	et	al.	
(1995)	and	Fox	et	al.	(1996)	found	evidence	that	children	with	greater	right	frontal	
activity	at	rest	were	more	inhibited	socially,	and	scored	lower	on	social	competency.	
Schmidt	and	Fox	(1994)	found	a	relationship	between	frontal	EEG	asymmetry	and	
measures	of	sociability	in	adults.	Those	scoring	low	on	measures	of	sociability	had	
relatively	greater	left	frontal	activity.		Schmidt	et	al.1999	found	shyness	had	greater	
right	frontal	activation.	All	of	these	studies	from	developmental	psychology	researchers	
suggest	a	relationship	between	avoidance	and	right	frontal	activity.		EEG	asymmetry	
promises	to	be	a	useful	tool	for	studying	avoidance	sensitivity	in	political	liberals	and	
conservatives.		Below,	I	briefly	discuss	political	ideology	as	studied	from	a	political	
neuroscience	perspective,	noting	that	no	research	has	yet	connected	EEG	asymmetry	
and	emotional	sensitivity	with	political	ideology.	
The	Go/No-Go	Task	and	Psychological	Dispositions	of	Conservatives	
To	date,	three	studies	have	explored	the	connection	between	dispositional	styles	
in	the	brain	and	political	ideology.		None,	yet,	directly	measure	avoidance	sensitivity	or	
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negativity	bias	for	liberals	and	conservatives,	which	is	the	project	that	this	dissertation	
picks	up.		Amodio	et	al.	2007	hypothesized	that	differences	in	the	cognitive	styles	of	
liberals	and	conservatives	might	reﬂect	basic	differences	in	information	processing	
mechanisms,	such	as	those	involved	in	conﬂict	monitoring—a	neurocognitive		process	
for	detecting	discrepancies	between	response	tendencies	and	one’s	higher-level	
intentions.	To	test	this	prediction,	Amodio	and	colleagues	compared	participants’	self-
reported	political	orientation	with	behavior	and	neural	activity	on	a	Go/No-Go	task	
(explored	in	detail	in	Chapter	Six).		Consistent	with	the	model	of	political	ideology	as	
motivated	social	cognition,	liberalism	was	associated	with	greater	behavioral	accuracy	
on	No-Go	trials	of	the	task.	Furthermore,	liberals’	EEG	signal	exhibited	significantly	
larger	event-related	potentials	(ERP),	indicative	of	greater	anterior	cingulate	cortex	
(ACC)	response	on	No-Go	trials	than	did	conservatives,	supporting	the	hypothesis	that	
political	orientation	may	be	linked	to	basic	neurocognitive	processes	for	dealing	with	
new	and	unexpected	information.	
Weissﬂog	et	al.	(2010)	also	assessed	ERP	responses	and	political	ideology,	this	
time	in	a	sample	of	Canadian	university	students	who	completed	the	Go/No-Go	task.	As	
in	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	study,	a	stronger	liberal	orientation	was	associated	with	larger	
No-Go	N2	amplitudes,	indicating	greater	conflict-related	ACC	response,	and	thus	
replicating	the	results	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007.	In	addition,	larger	No-Go	N2	and	Event-
Related	Negativity	(ERN)	amplitudes	in	these	college	students	were	correlated	with	
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greater	endorsement	of	egalitarian	values	and	lesser	endorsement	of	right-wing	
authoritarianism.	
Although	they	did	not	look	at	political	attitudes	or	ideology	directly,	Inzlicht	et	al.	
(2009)	indicated	that	higher	religiosity	was	correlated	with	smaller	ERNs	in	response	to	
errors	on	a	color-naming	Stroop	task	(1937).	As	Jost	and	Amodio	(2012)	note,	there	is	a	
strong	association	between	conservatism	and	increased	religiosity,	and	so	this	study	
may	also	be	considered	broadly	consistent	with	the	results	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007.	
The	intent	of	the	above	discussion	is	to	open	the	subject	matter,	but	more	
discussion	and	clarification	of	these	studies	is	explored	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	Six,	
which	explains	the	Go/No-Go	task	conducted	for	this	dissertation,	and	presents	a	
comprehensive	look	at	what	these	findings	mean	for	political	ideology.	In	sum,	this	
chapter	outlined	the	two	major	theories	of	the	political	psychology	of	ideology	as	being	
fundamentally	about	(a)	sensitivity	to	avoidance	and	(b)	negativity	bias.		Then,	it	
introduced	Gray’s	theory	of	behavioral	motivation.		By	using	tools	for	studying	Gray’s	
Behavioral	Inhibition	System	and	Behavioral	Activation	System,	such	as	survey	
questionnaires,	hemispheric	asymmetry	studies,	and	the	Go/No-Go	behavioral	task,	we	
will	be	able	to	focus	on	these	two	important	psychological	processes	and	improve	
political	science’s	understanding	of	the	political	psychology	of	ideology.	The	next	three	
chapters	present	empirical	studies	of	these	psychological	processes	in	a	sample	of	
liberals	and	conservatives,	through	a	survey	questionnaire	and	two	laboratory	
experiments.	
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
SURVEY	DATA	AND	DISPOSITION	ANALYSIS	
One	of	the	central	objectives	of	this	dissertation	is	to	expand	research	in	the	
area	of	root	physiological	differences	in	avoidance	sensitivity	and	negativity	bias	
between	liberals	and	conservatives	through	an	investigation	of	Gray’s	theories	of	
behavioral	motivation	systems.		This	chapter	furthers	this	goal	by	(a)	characterizing	my	
participant	pool	for	experiments	in	later	chapters	and	(b)	exploring	correlational	analysis	
between	political	ideology	and	self-reported	dispositions	towards	behavioral	inhibition	
and	behavioral	activation.		Later	chapters	go	beyond	questionnaire	self-reports	to	bring	
these	questions	into	the	lab.			
This	chapter	describes	and	characterizes	a	large	sample	(n	=	466)	of	non-student	
employees	drawn	from	Loyola	University	Chicago	who	completed	a	detailed	survey	
about	their	personality	traits	and	social-political	viewpoints.		From	this	larger	sample,	I	
drew	a	subsample	(n	=	51)	who	participated	in	two	behavioral	neuroscience	
experiments	that	become	the	focus	of	this	dissertation	in	later	chapters.		Therefore,	this	
sample	becomes	an	important	starting	place	for	characterizing	the	group	of	participants	
who	go	on	to	complete	the	lab	experiments.		Overall,	we	find	that	this	sample	is	not	
nationally	representative	and	skewed	towards	liberals,	although	a	meaningful	minority	
of	participants	do	hold	deeply	conservative	beliefs.	This	sample	is	considerably	more	
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representative	than	a	typical	sample	of	college	undergraduates.		Additionally,	as	
introduced	in	the	last	chapter,	Carver	and	White	(1994)	have	developed	a	questionnaire	
that	allows	researchers	to	estimate	dispositional	sensitivity	to	behavioral	inhibition	and	
behavioral	activation,	which	will	help	us	investigate	avoidance	sensitivity	differences	
between	liberals	and	conservatives	in	a	large	sample	size.		
Behavioral	motivation	is	an	interesting,	important	psychological	and	
physiological	process	that	could	be	of	importance	for	political	ideology.		Borrowing	
heavily	from	the	theories	of	Gray	(1990;	Gray	and	McNaughton	2000),	psychologists	
Carver	and	White	(1994)	devised	a	questionnaire	to	tap	into	behavioral	motivations	with	
a	survey	instrument.		This	measure	has	become	a	seminal	contribution,	with	over	4,000	
citations	and	continuing	to	grow	in	influence.	While	behavioral	motivations	will	always	
be	best	measured	through	experimental	manipulation	and	observation	of	actual	
behavior,	there	are	numerous	situations	where	a	survey	can	provide	important	
information	in	a	cost	effective	way.		Experimental	costs	for	a	large	sample	may	be	
prohibitive,	and/or	time	available	for	experiments	may	be	scarce.				A	survey	instrument	
can	be	issued	quickly,	at	lower	cost	of	time	and	effort.		Finally,	observational	data	from	a	
survey	can	serve	as	an	effective	way	to	assess	personality	dispositions	towards	
behavioral	inhibition	and	approach	in	a	large	sample.		Observational	data	about	self-
described	personality	traits	can	be	useful	to	investigators.			
The	rest	of	this	chapter	follows	from	these	goals.		Primarily,	this	chapter	details	
the	social,	political,	and	demographic	characteristics	of	the	large	sample,	which	itself	will	
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serve	as	the	participant	pool	for	two	behavioral	experiments	in	subsequent	chapters.		
Additionally,	this	survey	collected	observational	data	on	sensitivity	towards	Gray’s	dual	
systems	of	inhibition	and	activation,	which	is	hypothesized	to	be	related	to	political	
ideology.	By	combining	the	observational	data	in	this	chapter	with	the	experimental	
data	in	later	chapters,	we	use	a	multiple	method	approach	to	answering	the	central	
question	of	the	relationship	of	Gray’s	BIS/BAS	systems	to	political	ideology.		
Behavioral	Inhibition	and	Activation	
J.A.	Gray	hypothesized	that	two	general	motivational	systems	for	behavior	
underlie	our	emotional	and	cognitive	processing	(1990;	Gray	and	McNaughton	2000).	
The	behavioral	activation	system	(BAS)	facilitates	action	in	pursuit	of	a	desired	outcome.		
The	behavioral	inhibition	system	(BIS)	is	a	surveillance	system,	intended	to	monitor	the	
environment	for	unexpected	changes	that	may	threaten	or	change	our	goal-directed	
behavior.		
As	described	in	the	past	chapters,	BAS	is	about	going	while	BIS	is	about	stopping.		
Additionally,	research	has	demonstrated	that	increased	BAS	has	been	connected	to	
feelings	of	positive	affect,	and	increased	BIS	is	associated	with	feelings	of	negative	
affect.		BAS	is	a	process	for	going	forward	to	enact	a	plan	of	action	while	BIS	interrupts	
when	a	potential	threat	or	reward	is	detected.		For	these	reasons,	Carver	and	White	
(1994)	describe	the	BAS	as	an	appetitive	system,	while	BIS	is	an	aversive	system.		BIS	
draws	attention	to	cues	of	punishment,	danger,	and	novelty,	and	is	theorized	by	Gray	to	
be	responsible	for	negative	emotions	of	fear,	anxiety,	frustration,	and	sadness.	BAS	
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motivates	behavior	towards	a	reward	or	a	desired	interaction	and	is	associated	with	
feelings	of	optimism,	joy,	aggression,	and	anger.	Recall	from	earlier	discussions	that	
approach	can	be	positively	valenced	(optimism,	joy)	or	negatively	valenced	(aggression,	
anger)	as	long	as	the	emotions	motivate	engagement	with	a	stimulus	instead	of	
avoidance.			
I	have	argued	in	past	chapters	that	Gray’s	dual	systems	underlie	two	of	the	most	
prominent	theories	about	the	political	psychology	of	political	ideology.	First,	the	
Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	(of	John	Jost	and	colleagues)	is	built	upon	the	theory	
that	conservatives	are	motivated	by	a	constellation	of	psychological	factors	related	to	
fear,	threat,	and	reducing	uncertainty.		These	core	psychophysiological	functions,	
especially	of	fear	and	threat,	are	a	kind	of	behavioral	avoidance	clearly	rooted	in	Gray’s	
behavioral	inhibition	system.	While	it	is	true	that	uncertainty	avoidance	is	not	purely	the	
same	psychological	construct	as	behavioral	inhibition,	the	overlap	is	substantial.		As	Jost	
and	colleagues	write,	uncertainty	avoidance	in	conservatives	is	part	of	a	general	
predisposition	towards	caution	and	general	avoidance	(Jost	et	al.,	2003;	Jost	et	al.,	
2009).	Jost	and	colleagues	also	frequently	mention	a	study	of	children	that	describes	
“inhibited”	preschoolers	as	growing	up	to	become	political	conservatives	(Block	and	
Block	2006;	as	cited	in	Jost	et	al.,	2009;	Jost,	2009).		Given	that	motivational	avoidance	
and	inhibition	have	substantial	overlap,	and	Jost’s	theories	find	great	empirical	support	
for	the	claim	that	conservatives	are	more	avoidant,	we	can	also	predict	that	
conservatives	would	be	more	inhibitory	as	well.		
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According	to	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	conservatives	exhibit	stronger	reactions	
to	negativity,	and	focus	more	visual	attention	to	negative	stimuli	(Hibbing	et	al	2014).		
Negative	affect	includes	many	different	emotions,	such	as	fear,	threat,	sadness,	and	
anger.		(The	connection	between	discrete	emotions	and	political	ideology	is	picked	up	
with	force	in	Chapter	Five	of	this	dissertation.)	Negativity	bias	is	also	connected	to	
feelings	of	fear	and	threat,	and	they	motivated	behavioral	avoidance	of	the	stimulus	
that	triggers	the	negative	emotion.		
Hypotheses	
In	sum,	the	key	hypothesis	for	how	Gray’s	dual	systems	may	be	related	to	
political	ideology	is	that	conservatives	should	have	greater	behavioral	inhibition.		Jost’s	
work	on	conservatives	and	avoidance	and	Hibbing’s	work	on	negative	emotions	each	
point	to	this	conclusion.			
Behavioral	activation	predictions	are	less	clear,	and	will	be	approached	as	
exploratory	in	this	work.		Behavioral	activation	is	related	to	sensitivity	to	approach,	as	
well	as	positive	emotion.		Because	being	sensitive	to	negative	emotion	cannot	speak	to	
whether	someone	is	also	sensitive	to	positive	emotion,	we	do	not	have	direct	
hypotheses	from	current	work.			There	is	nothing	in	the	Jost	or	Hibbing	theories	that	
suggest	conservatives	or	liberals	have	a	relationship	to	behavioral	approach	or	positive	
emotion.		Behavioral	inhibition	and	behavioral	approach	are	conceptually	separate	from	
each	other,	not	two	ends	to	the	same	phenomena.		Positive	and	negative	emotion,	too,	
are	not	inverses	of	each	other,	but	separate	constructs.		
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Method	
Participants	
Participants	were	recruited	from	the	campus	staff	of	Loyola	University	Chicago	
from	February	2012	until	November	2012.		This	recruitment	method	was	inspired	by	
Kam	et	al.	2007	as	a	good	convenience	sample	to	utilize	when	an	undergraduate	sample	
poses	research	problems.	As	Sears	1986	noted,	college	aged	students	are	likely	to	have	
more	weakly	held	social	and	political	attitudes	(522)	and	may	exert	more	cognitive	
effort	than	the	typical	person	due	to	the	emphasis	on	accuracy	in	a	school	setting	(525).	
Of	particular	importance	is	their	young	age	and	their	(understandable)	lack	of	broad	life	
experiences	compared	to	national	populations.			
I	sent	1144	emails	to	non-student	adults	employed	by	Loyola	University	Chicago,	
inviting	them	to	take	our	online	survey	on	political	attitudes	and	personality.		The	survey	
was	created	and	administered	on	Opinio	software	
(http://www.objectplanet.com/opinio)	with	access	provided	by	Loyola	University	
Chicago.	My	outreach	included	all	employees	at	the	Lake	Shore	Campus	or	the	Water	
Tower	campus,	except	those	who	were	academic	faculty	or	higher-level	administrators	
(above	the	title	of	“director”).			Three	follow-up	attempts	were	made.		First,	a	reminder	
email	was	sent	after	30	days.		Second,	I	also	mailed	physical	copies	of	the	survey	
through	interdepartmental	mail	approximately	three	months	after	my	initial	email	
contact.		Third,	I	sent	a	final	email	reminder.		Overall,	I	received	a	total	of	466	completed	
surveys	(40.3%	response	rate).		I	did	not	offer	compensation	for	completing	the	survey;	
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however,	the	materials	mentioned	that	successful	completion	of	the	survey	may	make	
one	eligible	for	a	follow-up	neuroscience	study	which	would	pay	more	than	$40/session.	
280	of	those	who	completed	the	survey	(60%)	also	volunteered	to	be	considered	for	the	
follow-up	study	in	the	lab.		Eventually,	a	selection	of	51	of	these	volunteers	became	
subjects	of	the	behavioral	and	neuroscience	studies	in	later	chapters	of	this	dissertation.	
Participant	demographic	background.	This	sample	was	disproportionally	female	
(286	females,	176	males,	and	4	refused).	The	median	age	of	the	sample	was	38	years	
old,	and	age	ranged	from	20	to	93	years	old	(mean	=	41.33,	sd	=	13).		Ninety-three	is	not	
an	error:	a	small	number	of	participants	of	advanced	age	live	and	work	at	Loyola	
University	Chicago	in	various	departments,	but	are	especially	found	in	numerous	Jesuit	
groups	and	organizations	housed	on	campus.	72	percent	of	respondents	identified	as	
white,	11.6	percent	as	black,	6.3	percent	as	Asian,	and	10.1	percent	as	other/multiracial.	
The	sample	was	disproportionally	educated	compared	to	the	national	population,	which	
is	to	be	expected	given	these	are	workers	employed	by	a	university.	38	percent	hold	a	
bachelor’s	degree	and	36	percent	hold	a	master’s	degree.	8	percent	of	the	sample	had	a	
professional	degree	or	Ph.D.		Only	16.8	percent	of	the	sample	did	not	have	at	least	a	
bachelor’s	degree.			
Party	identification.	Party	identification	fit	expectations	(Kam	et	al.	2007)	that	
the	campus	staff	would	largely	resemble	the	Democratic	politics	of	the	surrounding	
region	generally.		79	percent	of	the	respondents	identified	as	Democrats,	9	percent	as	
independents,	and	11	percent	as	Republicans.		These	numbers	include	those	who	said	
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they	leaned	toward	a	party.	Only	11	participants	in	the	entire	sample	considered	
themselves	“strong	Republicans”	(2.4	percent),	an	exceptionally	low	amount	compared	
to	the	national	population.		This	sample	skewed	heavily	Democratic,	an	expected	result	
for	a	university	located	in	Chicago.	
Measurement	
Broadly,	this	survey	questionnaire	addressed	two	categories	of	attitudes:	
political	ideology	and	behavioral	motivations.		Full	question	wording	is	provided	in	
Appendix	A.			
Political	ideology.	Three	different	question	sets	were	used	to	assess	political	
ideology,	with	each	designed	to	tap	into	a	different	conceptual	element	of	political	
ideology.		Much	previous	research	has	relied	on	the	7-point	self-identification	Likert	
scale.		Following	the	standard	set	by	the	American	National	Election	Studies,	
participants	are	asked	to	place	themselves	on	a	7-point	scale	between	“very	liberal”	and	
“very”	conservative,	with	the	middle	labeled	“centrist.”		Self-placement	on	this	scale	is	
strongly	predictive	of	party	identification	as	well	as	vote	choice	in	national	elections.		
The	self-placement	scale	also	allows	a	measure	of	how	the	individual	sees	their	own	
political	ideology,	providing	a	summary	judgment	of	how	the	individual	would	self-
classify	their	own	belief	structure.		However,	there	are	some	potential	weaknesses.	
First,	the	respondent	must	have	a	sense	of	what	the	terms	conservative,	liberal,	and	
centrist	mean,	which	requires	a	certain	amount	of	political	knowledge.		Second,	like	all	
self-reports,	there	are	a	number	of	opportunities	for	purposeful	and	inadvertent	
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misrepresentation.		Third,	this	scale	presumes	a	one-dimensional	ideological	spectrum,	
which,	as	discussed	in	prior	chapters,	may	be	problematic.		
To	compensate	for	weaknesses	with	the	self-report,	I	also	used	a	variation	of	the	
Wilson-Patterson	Conservatism	scale	of	political	ideology	(1968),	which	asks	
respondents	for	their	opinion	on	a	variety	of	contemporary	public	policy	topics	and	then	
aggregates	the	results	into	an	overall	ideology	score.		Political	ideology	has	often	been	
conceptualized	as	the	summary	of	your	various	political	attitudes—after	all,	if	you	take	
the	liberal	view	on	most	political	arguments,	you	are	probably	liberal.		One	way	to	
measure	political	orientation,	thus,	may	be	to	ask	your	opinion	on	a	variety	of	political	
topics	and	then	see	what	the	aggregate	picture	is.		The	Wilson-Patterson	scale	has	been	
a	popular	measure	of	political	orientation	by	using	the	summation	of	various	political	
attitudes	on	political	issues	of	the	day.		These	question	items	need	to	be	updated	to	the	
contemporary	political	setting,	and	so	I	adopted	the	modified	Wilson-Patterson	battery	
utilized	by	Smith	et	al.	(2011).		Twenty	questions	are	included	in	the	Smith	et	al.	variant.		
Additionally,	although	the	theoretical	conception	of	political	ideology	should	be	
universal	to	human	beings,	there	is	little	question	that	answers	to	contemporary	
political	ideology	question	batteries	are	going	to	be	bounded	by	cultural	and	national	
contexts.	This	sample	is	drawn	from	the	United	States,	and	the	question	sets	listed	
above	have	been	primarily	used	on	subjects	in	the	United	States.		To	broaden	our	reach,	
I	use	four	questions	adopted	from	the	World	Values	Survey	that	offer	attitudes	on	
competition,	income	inequality,	public	ownership,	and	private	responsibility.		These	
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questions	have	been	used	reliably	across	the	globe	to	look	at	attitudes	toward	political	
economy	issues,	especially	concerning	economic	justice.		These	questions	are	useful	as	a	
way	to	measure	collectivism	versus	individualism	in	economic	policy,	and	they	offer	a	
more	diverse	measuring	stick	with	applications	outside	of	the	United	States.	This	scale	is	
referred	to	as	the	World	Values	Survey	Economic	Justice	scale.			
Multidimensional	ideology.	The	Wilson-Patterson	items	collected	here	are	
usually	utilized	as	a	measure	of	unidimensional	ideology,	running	from	liberal	to	
conservative.		However,	the	underlying	items	of	the	scale	could	be	analyzed	along	
additional	dimensions.		Commonly,	ideology	is	broken	into	two	dimensions:	economic	
and	social	(Treier	and	Hillygus	2009;	Ellis	and	Stimson	2012).		Economic	(or,	fiscal)	
conservatism	suggests	a	strong	preference	for	free	markets	and	opposition	to	
government	regulation	and	taxation.		In	contrast,	social	conservatism	is	a	skepticism	
towards	social	changes	and	preference	for	more	traditional	social	mores,	such	as	the	
traditional	family	structure.		Splitting	ideology	in	two	dimensions	allows	for	a	better	
measurement	of	libertarian	(economically	conservative,	socially	liberal)	and	
authoritarian	(economically	liberal,	socially	conservative)	ideological	archetypes.		
I	account	for,	and	anticipate,	multidimensional	ideology	in	two	ways	in	this	
chapter.		First,	I	utilize	factor	analysis	below	to	determine	how	well	multidimensional	
ideological	values	fit	this	sample.		Second,	however,	as	this	sample	is	not	nationally	
representative,	it	would	not	have	been	appropriate	to	use	the	factor	analysis	to	derive	
dimensions.		There	is	no	guarantee	that	employees	of	Loyola	University	Chicago	would	
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represent	the	normal	dimensions	of	political	ideology	(social	and	economic	factors).		So,	
I	created	two	subscales	designed	to	tap	into	economic	and	social	dimensions	based	on	
the	well-known	and	reliable	Wilson-Patterson	scale	and	prior	researchers	(Treier	and	
Hillygus	2009).	The	economic	conservatism	subscale	includes	these	items:	welfare	
spending,	tax	cuts,	small	government,	and	foreign	aid.		The	social	conservatism	subscale	
items	chosen	were:	prayer	in	school,	legal	pornography,	illegal	immigration,	death	
penalty,	the	Patriot	Act,	biblical	truth,	gay	marriage,	and	legal	abortion.		These	two	
subscales	are	theoretically	derived,	based	on	researchers	work	on	the	
multidimensionality	of	political	ideology	(Treier	and	Hillygus	2009;	Ellis	and	Stimson	
2012).		
Behavioral	Inhibition	and	Behavioral	Activation	Scales.		BIS	and	BAS	were	
assessed	in	the	conventional	manner	described	in	Carver	and	White	(1994).		All	BIS/BAS	
questions	ask	the	respondent	to	say	whether	they	strongly	agree,	somewhat	agree,	
somewhat	disagree,	or	strongly	disagree	with	the	statement.		These	question	batteries	
assess	an	individual	disposition	towards	each	motivational	system	(aversive	and	
appetitive.)	BIS	has	a	seven	items	and	BAS	has	thirteen.		Specific	items	are	listed	in	
Appendix	A	with	the	rest	of	the	survey.		
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Results	
Descriptive	Statistics	
Table	1.	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Survey	Measures.	
	
Table	1	displays	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	major	variables	of	interest.		The	
varying	sample	sizes	of	the	statistics	reflect	the	existence	of	missing	data	from	the	
survey	instrument.			
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Figure	1:	Survey	Data	Compared	to	National	Sample	
	
The	self-report	ideology	scale	(mean	=	3.04,	median	=	3)	skews	leftward,	
reflecting	greater	self-described	liberalism	in	the	sample.	While	the	seven	point	scale	
has	representation	at	each	score,	extreme	conservatives	are	scarce.	Figure	1	illustrates	
how	the	distribution	of	ideology	differs	from	a	nationally	representative	survey.		The	
American	National	Election	Study	of	2012	includes	the	same	survey	question	that	I	
utilize	to	generate	a	self-report	of	political	ideology	on	a	seven	point	scale.		
The	Wilson-Patterson	Conservatism	scale	has	a	similar	left-ward	skew	(mean	=	
6.7,	median	=	6.25).		The	theoretical	range	goes	from	0	to	20,	but	the	most	conservative	
members	of	this	sample	cap	at	16.5.		(Participants	that	answered	neither	“support”	nor	
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“oppose”	are	scored	as	a	0.5,	as	per	Smith	et	al.	2011.)	As	with	the	self-report	measure,	
moderate	liberals	and	strong	liberals	are	overrepresented	while	conservatives	are	
underrepresented.		Both	of	the	Wilson-Patterson	subscales	follow	similar	patterns	as	
the	full	scale,	except	the	sample	is	far	more	socially	liberal	than	economically	liberal.	
The	World	Values	Survey	Economic	Justice	Scale	is	considerably	more	moderate	
than	the	other	measures,	reflecting	two	insights.		First,	the	WVS	is	written	for	a	global	
audience,	and	Americans	are	more	economically	conservative	than	most	countries.		
Second,	this	scale	has	no	social	conservative	elements	in	it,	and	thus,	the	very	liberal	
viewpoints	on	social	issues	does	not	weigh	the	measure	toward	the	left	in	this	scale	as	
much	as	others.		This	scale	features	of	mean	of	19.51	and	median	of	19,	on	a	0	to	36	
point	scale,	and	participants	in	the	survey	had	values	at	both	poles	of	the	scale.		While	
there	is	a	left-ward	skew	to	the	data,	attitudes	about	economic	justice	are	not	as	
strongly	left	as	the	other	ideological	measures,	suggesting	that	the	sample	may	be	more	
socially	liberal	than	it	is	economically	liberal	(which	is	consistent	with	the	story	told	by	
the	Wilson-Patterson	Social	conservatism	scale,	which	has	a	median	value	of	2,	with	a	
scale	maximum	of	8).			
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Figure	2.	Distribution	of	Political	Ideology.	
	
Figure	2	visually	represents	the	distribution	of	ideology	in	the	survey	sample	
across	the	three	ideological	measures	of	self-placement,	Wilson-Patterson	Conservatism	
scale,	and	the	World	Values	Survey	Economic	Justice	scale.		Note	that	the	range	of	all	x-
axes	are	drawn	from	the	scale	minimum	to	the	scale	maximum,	not	the	observed	range	
of	the	data	from	this	sample.		For	example,	although	no	subject	scored	a	maximum	of	
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20	(100	percent	conservative)	on	the	Wilson-Patterson		scale,	the	x-axis	includes	that	
maximum	value	of	20.	Drawing	x-axes	to	the	scale	dimensions	facilitates	better	visual	
interpretation	of	the	ideological	preferences	of	the	sample	within	each	plot,	as	well	as	
comparison	between	each	plot.		
Figure	3.	Distribution	of	BIS/BAS	Scales.	
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Figure	3	demonstrates	the	distribution	of	Carver	&	White’s	BIS/BAS	scales	of	
behavioral	motivation	in	the	sample.		Both	shapes	are	essentially	normally	distributed	
around	the	middle	of	each	respective	scale,	with	few	outliers	and	zero	extreme	values	
to	the	far	left	or	right.			
Correlation	Matrix	
Table	2.	Correlation	Matrix	of	Important	Variables.	
	
Table	2	displays	the	correlation	matrix	for	the	variables	of	interest	in	this	study,	
with	Pearson’s	correlation	tests.	Below	is	a	visualization	of	these	relationships.		
	 	
		
83	
Figure	4.	Correlation	Matrix	Visualization	
	
These	relationships	can	also	be	clearly	seen	in	Figure	4.	The	darkness	of	the	
shading	and	the	size	of	circle	both	indicate	the	strength	of	the	correlation,	with	blue	
coloration	representing	a	positive	correlation	and	red	being	negative.	Any	relationship	
that	is	not	statistically	significant	to	the	p	=	0.05	standard	is	represented	with	a	blank	(all	
white)	space	on	the	matrix.		As	can	be	observed,	all	relationships	between	the	variables	
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do	reach	statistical	significance,	except	for	those	between	the	BAS	measure	and	any	
political	ideology	measure.			
The	table	and	visualization	demonstrate	that	all	five	ideological	measures	are	
tightly	correlated,	forming	a	strong	cluster	of	related	measures.		Additionally,	all	
measures	of	ideology	are	negatively	correlated	with	the	behavioral	inhibition	scale	
measure,	with	mild	strength.		In	contrast,	BAS	has	no	relationship	with	any	ideological	
measure,	and	only	a	mild	positive	relationship	with	BIS.			
Scale	Reliability		
Often,	social	science	research	relies	on	a	bundle	of	questions	that	are	used	to	
approximate	some	kind	of	underlying	construct.		For	example,	some	researchers	believe	
that	political	ideology	cannot	be	accurately	assessed	by	the	simple	question,	“what	is	
your	political	ideology?”		Participants	may	not	be	consciously	aware	of	their	political	
ideology,	they	may	not	know	what	political	ideology	means,	they	may	be	overly	
influenced	by	a	negative	association	with	a	political	label,	or	for	various	other	reasons	
may	misrepresent	or	miscalculate	their	own	political	ideology.		Researchers	facing	this	
challenge	may	wish	to	employ	a	battery	of	questions	such	as	the	Wilson-Patterson	scale,	
which	attempts	to	assess	political	ideology	by	asking	twenty	questions	about	
contemporary	political	issues.			By	looking	at	the	big	picture	of	these	twenty	issues,	it	
may	be	possible	to	triangulate	the	political	ideology	of	a	person	without	needing	to	rely	
on	the	subject’s	self-assessment.		In	these	cases,	it	would	be	useful	for	researchers	to	
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know	(and,	also,	to	demonstrate	to	reviewers)	that	the	bundled	items	were	
appropriately	chosen	to	estimate	the	latent	construct.		
In	situations	like	this,	social	scientists	have	come	to	rely	on	Cronbach’s	alpha	to	
measure	the	internal	consistency	of	a	scale.		Cronbach’s	alpha	is	a	coefficient	that	
examines	to	what	degree	the	items	are	related	as	a	group.		A	higher	alpha	coefficient	
signifies	more	internal	consistency,	meaning	that		the	items	are	more	closely	measuring	
the	same	thing.		In	practice,	researchers	frequently	employ	Cronbach’s	alpha	to	justify	
their	scale	as	assessing	a		single	unidimensional	latent	construct,	a	practice	that	has	
been	widely	criticized	in	the	psychometric	literature.		Psychometric	researchers	have	
established	that	Cronbach’s	alpha	cannot	determine	the	dimensionality	of	the	
underlying	construct,	but	instead	merely	the	degree	to	which	the	items	are	consistently	
related	to	the	construct	(Green	et	al.	1977;	Schmitt	1996).	The	underlying	construct	may	
be	unidimensional	or	multidimensional	and	still	yield	a	high	alpha	score.		
Interpreting	alpha	scores	is	based	on	consensus	and	rules	of	thumb,	much	like	
assessing	p-values.	The	general	practice	is	that	an	alpha	score	greater	than	0.70	is	
“acceptable,”	with	0.80	considered	“good,”		and	greater	than	0.90	to	be	“excellent”	
(George	and	Mallery	2003).	These	are	guidelines	and	not	hard	rules,	however.	Alpha	
scores	of	0.60	are	sometimes	used	with	caution,	particularly	if	the	scale	has	been	
validated	elsewhere	in	a	more	nationally	representative	sample.		It	is	not	unusual	for	
studies	with	non-representative	samples	to	have	a	weaker	Cronbach’s	alpha	coefficient.	
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Such	studies	can	still	justify	the	use	of	a	scale	if	it	has	empirical	support	from	more	
definitive	articles	with	more	complete	samples.		
Table	3.	Cronbach	Alpha	Scores	of	Scale	Measures.	
	
Table	3	lists	the	Cronbach’s	alpha	scores	for	the	scales	employed	in	this	study.			
The	Wilson-Patterson	Full	Scale,	and	the	twin	behavioral	motivation	scales	of	Carver	and	
White	(1994)	all	maintain	healthy	alpha	scores	of	around	0.80,	signifying	“good”	internal	
reliability.		All	three	scales	are	widely	used	in	academic	research,	and	so	it	is	not	a	
surprise	that	they	replicate	well	with	this	sample.		The	two	Wilson-Patterson	subscales	
derived	from	theoretical	perspectives	have	more	questionable	alpha	scores,	with	0.611	
and	0.764.		Prior	literature	has	not	attempted	to	derive	an	economic	conservatism	and	a	
social	conservatism	factor	structure	from	the	Wilson-Patterson	battery,	and	these	alpha	
scores	suggest	caution	when	interpreting	findings.		As	this	sample	is	not	nationally	
representative,	we	might	not	be	surprised	to	discover	that	the	theoretical	factor	
structure	of	economic	and	social	conservatism	does	not	fit	well	the	liberal	denizens	of	
the	workforce	of	Loyola	University	Chicago.		(We	will	see	shortly	that	economic	
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conservatism	is	not	so	clear	cut	in	this	sample	according	to	factor	analysis.)	Because	of	
the	clear	utility	in	investigating	ideology	with	these	two	factors,	this	work	will	proceed	in	
utilizing	the	two	scales,	but	interpretation	will	be	exploratory	and	cautious.		Finally,	the	
World	Values	Survey	Economic	Justice	scale	is	also	novel	to	this	work.		With	an	alpha	
score	of	0.700,	it	hovers	in	the	“acceptable”	range	of	internal	consistency.			
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Figure	5.	Distribution	of	Individual	Wilson-Patterson	Items.	
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Earlier,	we	have	already	viewed	the	distribution	of	aggregate	Wilson-Patterson	
scores	in	this	sample.	Figure	5	explores	the	ideological	polarization	of	the	sample	on	a	
per-item	basis	within	the	Wilson-Patterson	scale.		Each	item	was	labeled	simply	with	the	
labels	on	the	y-axis	(e.g.	“Prayer	in	Schools”	and	“Gay	Marriage”)	and	participants	are	
directed	to	either	“support”	or	“oppose”	the	topic	by	choosing	the	answer	that	is	closest	
to	their	belief.		These	answers	are	coded	as	liberal	(or	conservative)	if	they	support	a	
liberal	(or	conservative)	belief.	For	example,	welfare	spending	is	traditionally	a	liberal	
belief—if	a	participant	chose	“support”,	that	would	be	coded	as	a	liberal	answer.		
Items	in	Figure	5	are	arranged	from	the	item	which	received	the	greatest	
proportion	of	conservative	responses	(patriotism)	through	the	item	that	received	the	
greatest	proportion	of	liberal	responses	(women’s	equality).		Overall,	there	is	
considerable	political	diversity	across	the	span	of	issues,	although	there	is	a	noticeable	
left-ward	skew	to	the	attitudes	reported.		Only	three	items	had	more	conservative	
support	than	liberal	support	(patriotism,	free	trade,	and	small	government).		On	the	17	
other	items,	the	liberal	viewpoints	is	endorsed	by	a	majority	of	respondents.	Although	
failing	to	capture	the	majority	on	most	issues,	a	healthy	conservative	minority	is	readily	
apparent	in	most	of	the	remaining	items.		
There	are	three	exceptions,	however—three	issues	that	have	very	little	support	
for	the	traditional	conservative	position	in	this	sample.		Gay	marriage,	pollution	control,	
and	equality	for	women	each	feature	95%	of	the	sample	taking	the	liberal	side	of	the	
issue.		While	women’s	equality	and	pollution	control	could	be	explained	by	changing	
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societal	attitudes	towards	women	as	well	as	the	largely	bipartisan	support	of	pollution	
control	in	a	major	American	city,	the	lack	of	political	diversity	for	the	issue	of	gay	
marriage	is	somewhat	puzzling.	Gay	marriage	is	one	of	the	most	polarizing	issues	
throughout	the	1990s	and	2000s,	defining	one	of	the	sharpest	cleavages	between	
liberals	and	conservatives.		It	is	possible	that	the	conservative,	educated	denizens	of	
Chicago	had	already	shifted	the	gay	marriage	argument	out	of	the	culture	wars,	in	
acknowledgement	that	times	have	changed	or	will	change	(this	survey	was	administered	
in	2012,	and	shortly	afterward	in	2015,	the	Supreme	Court	in	Obergefell	v.	Hodges	ruled	
that	gay	marriage	was	a	constitutional	right,	effectively	winning	that	pitched	battle	for	
the	liberals.)		More	likely,	though,	the	lack	of	conservative	opinion	about	gay	marriage	
reflects	the	dearth	of	social	and	religious	conservatives	in	my	sample.		
Overall,	the	distribution	of	Wilson-Patterson	items	helps	illustrate	the	left-ward	
skew	of	the	subjects,	but	also	note	that	conservative	viewpoints	are	still	represented.		
Below,	we	turn	to	a	factor	analysis	in	order	to	sort	out	the	dimensionality	of	the	Wilson-
Patterson	data.		
Wilson-Patterson	Factor	Analysis	
As	discussed	in	earlier	chapters,	political	scientists	increasingly	view	political	
ideology	as	multidimensional,	and	yet,	the	self-report	measure	and	the	political	issue	
attitude	battery	employed	here	are	unidimensional,	assuming	participants	to	be	either	
liberal	or	conservative,	or	somewhere	in-between.		Yet,	in	the	public,	we	know	this	
simple	picture	to	be	false.	There	are	some	in	the	public	who	are	socially	liberal,	yet	
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economically	conservative.		They	may	or	may	not	identify	as	political	libertarians,	or	
even	understand	what	that	term	means;	and	yet,	they	fit	a	profile	that	cannot	be	easily	
placed	on	a	bidirectional	scale.		
This	sample	is	not	nationally	representative,	so	an	exploration	of	the	underlying	
factor	structure	of	ideology	in	this	sample	cannot	easily	serve	to	teach	us	about	the	
multidimensionality	of	attitudes	in	the	general	public.		Based	on	prior	research	that	does	
use	representative	samples,	we	have	expectations	that	there	ought	to	be	an	economic	
factor	and	a	social	factor.		Earlier,	this	chapter	describes	how	I	developed	two	subscales	
of	the	Wilson-Patterson	battery	that	attempts	to	capture	those	two	elements.			
There	are	least	two	reasons	to	explore	the	underlying	factor	structure	of	this	
sample,	even	if	it	is	not	nationally	representative.		First,	we	ought	to	see	how	well	the	
theorized	social	and	economic	factor	structure	fit	this	sample.		Does	an	economic	factor	
emerge?	Is	a	social	factor	observable?	And,	second,	to	what	degree	are	there	any	latent	
ideological	factors	at	all	within	the	sample?		If	issue	attitudes	did	not	cluster	whatsoever	
in	this	sample,	it	would	suggest	that	Conversian	political	ideology	(where	issue	attitudes	
are	constrained	around	some	kind	of	latent	underlying	value	structure)	is	not	a	relevant	
issue.	
Confirmatory	factor	analysis	requires	the	researcher	to	stipulate	a	theory	for	
how	many	factors	should	be	present.	I	hypothesize	that	there	will	be	two	factors,	a	
social	and	an	economic	kind	of	conservatism,	based	on	contemporary	research	on	this	
subject.		My	confirmatory	factor	analysis	was	conducted	on	the	twenty	Wilson-
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Patterson	items,	utilizing	a	method	of	oblique	rotation	called	promax,	and	with	a	model	
specification	of	maximum	likelihood.		The	factor	analysis	was	performed	in	R	Statistics,	
using	both	the	base	package	native	to	R	as	well	as	the	supplemental	R	package	“psych”	
written	by	William	Revelle	of	Northwestern	University	(Revelle	2016).	This	factor	
analysis	procedure	will	yield	two	sets	of	loadings	(one	for	each	proposed	factor)	for	each	
item	of	the	Wilson-Patterson	scale.			
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Figure	6.	Factor	Analysis	Scatterplot.	
	
I	will	present	two	visualizations	that	help	illustrate	the	factor	structure	apparent	
in	this	sample.		First,	Figure	6	represents	the	factor	analysis	as	a	scatter	plot.	Each	axis	
represents	one	of	the	factors,	and	the	W-P	item	is	plotted	on	the	Cartesian	plane.	In	this	
figure,	you	can	observe	two	clear	clusters	of	attitudes	have	emerged	(I	have	colored	
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them	black	and	gray).		The	gray	circles	are	centered	at	the	factors’	mean	loadings,	and	
are	sized	to	help	visually	connect	the	clusters.		
The	black	items	load	very	strongly	on	Factor	Two	(y-axis),	while	being	fairly	weak	
on	Factor	One	(x-axis).		This	factor	includes	many	socially	and	religiously	conservative	
issues:	legal	pornography,	legal	abortion,	gay	marriage,	biblical	truth,	and	prayer	in	
school.	I	interpret	this	factor	as	a	good	representation	of	the	“social”	conservatism	
factor	we	expected	to	find.		Note	that	equality	for	women,	punishing	illegal	immigration,	
and	death	penalty	are	also	socially	conservative	viewpoints,	but	they	did	not	load	
strongly	on	Factor	Two	as	would	have	been	expected.		Equality	for	women	simply	had	
no	variability	in	this	sample,	and	so	the	factor	analysis	could	not	adequately	sort	this	
item.		On	the	death	penalty,	Illinois	has	had	extreme	problems	with	the	death	penalty	
for	decades,	with	a	Republican	governor	in	2000	declaring	a	moratorium	on	death	
penalty	cases	after	thirteen	people	were	found	wrongfully	convicted.	So,	while	the	
death	penalty	ought	to	be	in	this	factor,	the	context	of	living	in	Illinois	probably	altered	
the	normally	expected	factor	structure.		
The	gray	items,	in	contrast,	do	not	have	so	clear	a	theme.		These	issues	span	
from	international	affairs	and	national	defense,	to	free	market	economics,	to	
immigration	and	the	size	of	government.		Factor	One	does	not	appear	to	be	an	
economic	factor,	as	expected,	but	instead	it	is	a	kind	of	general	conservatism.	For	
example,	gun	control,	patriotism,	the	Patriot	Act,	and	the	death	penalty	are	not	
primarily	economic	issues.			
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Figure	7.	Factor	Analysis	Barplot.	
	
In	Figure	7,	the	loading	information	is	presented	in	a	different	form	which	will	
aid	in	demonstrating	how	cleanly	the	factor	analysis	divides	the	items.	The	length	of	the	
bar	represents	the	strength	of	the	loading.	Generally,	the	items	cleanly	position	in	one	
factor	and	not	the	other	(the	exception	being	free	trade	and	equality	for	women,	which	
had	almost	zero	variability	within	the	sample	anyway).			
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Overall,	we	find	support	for	the	idea	of	a	two-factor	system	of	political	ideology	
in	this	sample,	although	the	factors	are	not	cleanly	a	social	factor	and	an	economic	
factor.			
Ideology	and	Behavioral	Motivations	
Lastly,	we	turn	to	Gray’s	behavioral	motivation	systems,	the	behavioral	inhibition	
system	and	the	behavioral	activation	system.		This	is	an	active	test	of	my	hypotheses	in	
this	chapter,	where	I	expect	conservatives	to	have	more	self-reported	inhibition	
compared	to	liberals.	Utilizing	Carver	and	White’s	(1994)	scale,	we	compare	how	much	
behavioral	inhibition	and	activation	is	self-reported	by	liberals	and	conservatives	in	the	
sample.			
Figure	8.	Behavioral	Inhibition	and	Two	Measures	of	Ideology.		
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We	observe	a	modest	negative	correlation	between	behavioral	inhibition	and	
political	ideology,	with	conservative	participants	reporting	less	behavioral	inhibition.		
This	is	precisely	the	inverse	of	what	we	would	hypothesize,	given	the	theories	of	Hibbing	
and	Jost.		Contrary	to	expectations,	it	is	the	liberals	in	this	sample	who	self-report	having	
a	disposition	towards	behavioral	inhibition.	
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Figure	9.	Behavioral	Activation	and	two	Measures	of	Ideology		
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For	exploratory	purposes,	we	also	investigated	how	self-reported	disposition	
towards	behavioral	activation	may	be	related	to	political	ideology.		As	observed	in	
Figure	8,	there	is	a	robust	null	finding	for	this	relationship.		
Discussion	
This	chapter	contributed	to	the	larger	dissertation	project	in	two	ways.		First,	this	
chapter	detailed	the	politics	and	traits	of	the	larger	sample	from	which	experiments	in	
the	next	two	chapters	will	draw	their	participants.		Second,	this	chapter	explores	the	
correlation	between	various	measures	of	political	ideology	and	Gray’s	behavioral	
inhibition	system	and	behavioral	activation	systems	by	way	of	the	Carver	and	White	
(1994)	questionnaire.	Future	chapters,	which	investigate	experimental	findings	from	lab	
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work,	have	a	smaller	sample	size	than	what	was	presented	here.		Thus,	this	survey	work	
allows	a	test	of	the	hypotheses	about	avoidance	motivations	and	negative	affect	in	a	
large	sample	before	moving	to	smaller	ones.		
The	hypothesis	for	the	behavioral	inhibition	system	did	not	go	as	expected.	
Contrary	to	expectations	gleaned	from	Hibbing	and	Jost,	behavioral	inhibition	(at	least,	
the	self-report)	appears	to	be	associated	with	political	liberals	in	this	sample.		Also,	
behavioral	approach	appears	unrelated	to	political	ideology.		Future	chapters	will	
continue	exploring	these	hypotheses	by	going	beyond	the	survey	questionnaire	and	into	
the	laboratory.		 	
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CHAPTER	FIVE	
HEMISPHERIC	ASYMMETRY	ANALYSIS	
This	chapter	focuses	on	dispositional	differences	between	liberals	and	
conservatives	in	terms	of	their	trait	avoidance	and	trait	emotional	sensitivity.	A	trait	is	a	
relatively	stable	disposition	that	gives	the	individual	a	propensity	to	act	in	a	certain	way.		
Our	personality	is	comprised	of	thousands	of	traits.	We	can	readily	think	of	examples	of	
personality	traits	such	as	careful,	trusting,	or	pessimistic.	A	more	trusting	individual	has	
a	propensity	to	trust,	independent	of	context.		Traits	often	lead	to	behavior,	but	they	
are	not	determinative.	They	only	prejudice	behavior,	not	dominate	it.	There	are	many	
situations	where	even	a	trusting	person	will	choose	not	to	trust.	All	other	things	being	
equal,	however,	a	person	with	the	trusting	trait	would	be	more	likely	to	trust.		Thus,	
traits	are	conceptually	independent	from	circumstances.	Interactions	like	context,	
environment,	mood,	and	stimuli	are	temporary	and	fleeting	(experiencing	a	“state”),	
while	the	trait	is	an	enduring	characteristic	of	the	individual.	A	state	is	a	temporary	
experience,	while	a	trait	is	a	core	disposition	to	the	individual.		
My	overarching	argument	is	that	approach-avoidance	processes	and	emotional	
processes	need	to	be	better	separated	in	order	to	distinguish	and	judge	the	two	
mainstream	theories	of	psychological	political	ideology.	As	described	in	an	earlier	
chapter,	although	both	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	and	the	Negativity	Bias	
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Theory	often	rely	on	the	same	evidence	and	have	common	ground,	they	actually	make	
two	separate	claims	about	conservatives.	The	psychological	processes	of	interest	in	this	
chapter	are	trait	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives,	specifically	trait	
avoidance	and	trait	negative	affectivity.	These	individual	dispositions	are	related	to	
everyday	behavior,	and	both	theories	make	predictions	for	how	these	traits	ought	to	be	
related	to	political	attitudes.		Below	I	describe	the	predictions	each	theory	would	make	
for	these	traits.		
Recall	that	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	argues	that	conservatives	are	
more	motivated	by	needs	to	reduce	uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	and	disgust	(Jost	et	
al.	2003).		Conservatives	are	sensitive	to	avoidance	signals,	and	this	sensitivity	biases	
how	they	view	the	world,	turning	them	towards	a	politically	conservative	belief	
structure.	One	way	to	explore	conservative	sensitivity	to	avoidance	is	by	using	
electroencephalography,	measuring	electrical	signals	from	the	scalp.		Cognitive	
neuroscientists	believe	that	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry,	a	pattern	of	neural	activity	
in	the	brain,	is	correlated	with	avoidance	sensitivity.		Thus,	trait	avoidance	may	be	a	
biomarker	of	being	politically	conservative.		
The	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	on	the	other	hand,	actually	makes	a	different	
argument	about	trait	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives.		These	scholars	
argue	conservatives	are	more	sensitive	to	negative	emotions	than	liberals,	which	causes	
stronger	physiological	reactions	and	focuses	greater	attention	on	such	stimuli	(Hibbing	
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et	al.	2014).		Thus,	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	posits	that	negative	affectivity	may	be	a	
biomarker	of	being	politically	conservative.	
This	distinction	between	trait	avoidance	and	trait	negative	affectivity	seems	
subtle,	but	it	has	deep	ramifications	for	what	we	believe	is	the	psychological	origins	of	
political	ideology.		Trait	avoidance	is	a	disposition	that	moderates	tendencies	to	avoid	
and	withdraw	from	novel	stimuli.	Trait	avoidance	is	behavioral,	not	specifically	
emotional.		A	person	with	strong	trait	avoidance	will	have	a	relatively	greater	propensity	
to	avoid.		This	propensity	may	manifest	in	myriad	ways,	such	as	faster	response	times	to	
disengage	or	more	awareness	or	alertness	to	dangers	in	the	environment.		Trait	
avoidance	is	a	low-level	behavioral	process,	a	reaction	that	insects	or	small	mammals	
could	have.		Reacting	to	smelling	a	predator	or	inhibiting	the	consumption	of	a	piece	of	
bread	about	to	go	into	your	mouth	because	you	see	mold	are	both	examples.			
This	behavior	is	different	than	higher	order	level	reasoning.		Anticipating	the	foul	
mood	of	a	work	colleague	and	deciding	to	avoid	interrupting	them	for	a	coffee	break	
may	appear	to	be	“behavioral	avoidance.”		In	fact,	it	may	indeed	be	a	kind	of	behavioral	
avoidance,	in	some	sense,	but	it	is	a	far	more	sophisticated	kind	of	cognitive	processing	
than	the	prior	examples.	It	is	less	automatic	and	less	instinctual.		Only	humans	have	
relationships	with	work	colleagues,	and	only	humans	are	capable	of	the	higher	cognition	
to	anticipate	and	avoid	their	foul	moods.	Behavioral	avoidance,	as	I	mean	it,	is	a	kind	of	
fundamental	reaction	that	all	multi-cell	organisms	possess	and	utilize	hundreds	to	
thousands	of	times	a	day.		
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While	trait	avoidance	is	a	motivational	proclivity,	encouraging	behavior,	trait	
negative	affectivity	is	an	emotional	sensitivity,	encouraging	a	feeling.		Emotions	serve	
the	purpose	of	facilitating	behavior,	but	they	are	not	behavior	themselves.	Trait	
negative	affectivity	is	a	disposition	that	enhances	tendencies	to	feel	negative	affect,	
giving	a	tendency	to	experience	a	broad	range	of	negative	emotions	in	response	to	
environmental	stimuli.		A	person	with	greater	trait	negative	affectivity	will	experience	
emotions	like	anger,	disgust,	and	anxiety	more	regularly	than	others,	and	will	have	
relatively	more	negative	affect	in	response	to	negative	stimuli.	Low	trait	negativity	
means	a	person	is	relatively	less	affected	by	negative	mood	states	and	negative	stimuli.	
Individuals	may	have	clinical	levels	of	trait	negative	affectivity,	resulting	in	anxiety,	
depression,	and/or	poor	self-concept	that	can	interfere	with	life.	Non-clinical	
populations	also	have	individual	variability	in	negativity	sensitivity.		For	example,	two	
individuals	who	watch	the	same	sad	movie	may	feel	differing	degrees	of	sadness.	If	one	
of	the	individuals	felt	greater	sadness	across	several	sad	movies,	they	may	have	stronger	
trait	negative	affectivity	than	in	the	companion.		Neither	individual	is	necessarily	
abnormal	in	this	example.		In	this	case,	negative	affectivity	is	simply	a	characteristic	of	
the	person,	one	of	thousands	of	personality	traits.			
Trait	avoidance	and	trait	negative	affectivity	overlap	in	psychological	political	
ideology	studies,	but	they	ought	to	be	considered	conceptually	distinct.		Tritt	and	
colleagues	argue,	for	example,	“political	psychology	research	may	have	similarly	
confounded	valence	and	arousal,	leading	to	the	false	conclusion	that	negative	valence	
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per	se	is	associated	with	conservative	political	beliefs.	The	confounded	nature	of	arousal	
and	valence	is	reflected	in	Hibbing	et	al.’s	interpretation	of	experimental,	
psychophysiological,	neurobiological,	and	personality	research”	(Tritt	et	al.	2014,	330).	
Many	negative	emotions	motivate	behavioral	avoidance.	However,	some	emotions	that	
are	negative	are	not	avoidant.	Valence	(the	feeling	of	positive	or	negative)	and	arousal	
(the	feeling,	or	lack	thereof,	of	energy	and	attention)	have	often	been	confused	in	
emotional	studies	(see	Harmon-Jones	et	al.	2010;	Tritt	et	al.	2013).		Harmon-Jones	and	
colleagues	stress	the	importance	of	differentiating	valence	from	arousal:	“By	exploring	
the	cortical	regions	underlying	emotion	processes,	the	research	has	suggested	the	
importance	of	delineating	emotional	experience	from	emotional	expression	and	
emotional	valence	from	motivational	intensity	and	direction”	(Harmon-Jones	et	al.	2010,	
459,	my	emphasis	added).	
One	important	case	study	might	illustrate	this	point.	Consider	the	emotion	of	
anger,	an	important	discrete	emotion	that	both	theories	fail	to	consider	fully.		If	
considered	more	fully,	in	fact,	the	two	literatures	would	have	opposing	hypotheses	
about	political	conservatives.	Anger	is	a	negative	emotional	state	that	motivates	
approach	behavior	like	yelling,	hostility,	confrontation,	and	even	violence	(Ekman	&	
Friesen	1975;	Plutchik	1980;	Berkowitz	1993;	Blanchard	&	Blanchard	1984;	Lagerspetz	
1969).	Harmon-Jones	and	colleagues	believe	“the	valence	of	the	emotion	may	be	
separable	from	the	motivational	direction	of	the	emotion,	so	that	negatively	valenced	
emotions	such	as	anger	can	be	approach	motivating”	(Harmon-Jones	et	al.	2010,	459).		
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The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	predicts	conservatives	to	be	avoidant,	
and	therefore	would	predict	conservatives	to	have	less	trait	anger	than	liberals	because	
anger	is	related	to	approach.		In	contrast,	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	posits	that	
conservatives	are	sensitive	to	trait	negative	affectivity.		As	anger	is	a	negative	emotion,	
the	theory	predicts	that	conservatives	have	more	trait	anger	than	liberals.		The	theories	
are	at	crossroads	on	anger,	and	this	example	illuminates	the	motivation	of	this	study	to	
examine	trait	avoidance	and	trait	negativity	affectivity	individually.		
Interestingly,	both	theories	mostly	avoid	discussions	of	anger,	not	integrating	it	
directly	with	their	respective	theories,	nor	discussing	anger	as	a	division	point	between	
Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	and	Negativity	Bias	Theory.		In	fairness,	of	course,	
studying	psychological	anger	as	a	discrete	emotion	is	very	new	to	political	science	(but	
see	Ryan	2012).	In	fact,	the	study	of	discrete	emotions	in	political	science	is	itself	fairly	
new	(but	see	Hatemi	et	al.	2013;	and	Clifford	and	Wendell	2015).	Hibbing	and	colleagues	
(2014)	include	only	a	glancing	mention	of	anger,	in	passing,	and	without	data	or	
consequence	to	their	argument.		They	write,	“when	‘emotionally	ambiguous’	faces	are	
shown	to	research	participants,	individuals	on	the	political	right	are	more	likely	to	report	
that	the	face	is	expressing	a	threatening	or	dominant	emotion,	such	as	anger.”	The	word	
anger	is	otherwise	absent	from	the	rest	of	the	article.	Consequently,	anger	is	not	given	
full	consideration	in	the	theory,	or	distinguished	from	other	negative	emotions.	Jost	et	
al.	2003	give	a	similar	treatment	to	anger.		Anger	is	mentioned	in	a	subheading	(361),	
but	merely	lumped	alongside	fear	and	threat.		Grouping	anger	with	fear	and	threat	is	
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problematic	because	while	all	are	negative	emotions,	fear	triggers	behavioral	avoidance	
while	anger	triggers	behavioral	approach.		These	discrete	emotions	have	the	same	
negative	valence,	but	they	motivate	completely	different	behavior.		Furthermore,	the	
evidence	marshaled	by	Jost	and	colleagues	is	exclusively	about	reacting	to	fear	and	
threat	(361).		There	is	no	direct	reference	to	anger	as	anything	other	than	a	synonym	of	
feeling	threat,	and	no	data	exploring	the	relationship	of	anger	to	ideology	whatsoever.	
Also,	arguably,	the	link	between	anger	and	ideology	that	they	explore	is	in	the	specific	
context	to	Right	Wing	Authoritarianism	and	parenting	styles	(and,	so,	not	emotional	
anger,	nor	broad	political	conservatism)	(Jost	et.	al	2003,	347;	see	also	Jost	et	al.	2009).			
The	discussion	above	on	anger	risks	being	taken	as	simply	a	cheap	shot	against	
two	big	targets—is	it	not	unfair	to	take	criticism	to	these	seminal	works	simply	because	
they	have	left	work	to	be	done?	Let	me	be	especially	clear	about	why	this	discussion	of	
anger	matters	to	the	present	work.	Anger	specifically	illustrates	the	potential	problems	
with	conflating	emotional	valence	for	behavioral	motivations	in	psychological	work.	
Anger	has	a	negative	valence,	and	yet,	also	encourages	behavioral	approach,	unlike	
most	other	negative	emotions.	But,	more	importantly,	the	discussion	of	anger	is	also	
serving	as	an	illustration	of	the	broad	consequences	of	being	too	vague	about	the	
underlying	psychological	factors	that	contribute	to	political	ideology.			
Right	now,	as	paradigmatic	and	ground-breaking	as	they	are,	the	theories	rely	on	
much	of	the	same	literature	but	Motivated	Social	Cognition	interprets	conservatives	as	
avoidant,	while	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	interprets	conservatives	as	sensitive	to	
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negativity.	Neither	theory	has	taken	up	the	challenge	of	sorting	out	whether	these	
conservatism	effects	are	(a)	behavioral	avoidance,	(b)	negative	affectivity,	(c)	both,	or	
(d)	neither.	It	is	time	to	dig	in	deeper	into	these	parallel	claims.		I	argue	that	trait	
avoidance	and	trait	negative	affectivity	are	two	different	psychological	dispositions,	and	
this	chapter	is	an	opportunity	to	evaluate	both	theories	on	their	own	appropriate	
claims.		
Thus,	it	is	clear	that	investigating	the	theories	based	on	their	claims	of	
conservative	dispositions	requires	two	different	(but	related)	investigations.	I	argue	that	
testing	baseline	dispositional	differences	is	an	important	way	to	draw	contrasts	between	
the	two	theories,	in	an	attempt	to	understand	better	these	psychological	differences	
between	liberals	and	conservatives.		Motivated	Social	Cognition	needs	to	test	trait	
avoidance,	as	it	posits	that	conservatives	have	more	trait	avoidance.		Negativity	Bias	
Theory	needs	to	test	trait	negative	affectivity,	as	it	posits	that	conservatives	have	more	
sensitivity	to	negative	affect.	This	chapter	tests	these	theories	in	two	ways:	first,	we	
examine	a	dispositional	difference	in	resting	brain	activity	that	has	been	linked	to	trait	
avoidance,	and	second,	we	compare	dispositional	differences	in	trait-based	negative	
affectivity.		
Frontal	Asymmetry	and	Trait	Avoidance	
Cognitive	neuroscientists	have	used	trait	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry	for	
more	than	25	years	to	investigate	approach	and	avoidance	sensitivities	in	human	beings.	
Today,	some	of	the	seminal	papers	on	trait	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry	from	
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Davidson	and	colleagues	have	over	900	citations	(Sutton	and	Davidson	1997,	Davidson	
1992).		Coan	and	Allen,	writing	in	2004,	report	than	the	relationship	between	cortical	
asymmetries	and	emotion	had	already	been	established	by	over	70	studies	(2004,	7).	In	
their	metareview,	they	establish	that	resting	levels	of	neural	activity	in	the	prefrontal	
cortex	appear	to	be	correlated	with	trait	predispositions	towards	emotions	and	
behavioral	motivations.	“Findings	from	numerous	studies	reflect	an	emerging	consensus	
that	relatively	greater	trait	left	frontal	activity	is	associated	with	trait	tendencies	toward	
a	general	appetitive,	approach,	or	behavioral	activation	motivational	system,	and	that	
relatively	greater	trait	right	frontal	activity	is	associated	with	trait	tendencies	toward	a	
general	avoidance	or	withdrawal	system”	(Coan	and	Allen	2004,	11).		Below	I	describe	
these	findings,	and	then	turn	towards	how	it	may	be	useful	in	evaluating	the	Motivated	
Social	Cognition	Theory	and	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory.		
Very	early	in	the	study	of	hemispheric	asymmetry—indeed,	of	all	neuroscience—
researchers	connected	hemispheric	activity	patterns	with	emotions.	Over	70	years	ago,	
World	War	I	soldiers	with	damaged	right	or	left	anterior	cortices	were	discovered	to	
have	differing	experiences	with	positive	and	negative	affect	(Goldstein	1939).		Subjects	
with	lesions	to	the	left	frontal	region	(leaving	the	left	side	malfunctioning	and	the	right	
side	intact)	were	more	likely	to	exhibit	depression	symptoms	(Black	1975,	Gainotti	1972;	
Robinson	and	Price	1982).			
These	earlier	efforts	with	clinical	populations	eventually	led	to	research	on	
normal	populations,	too.		Measuring	electroencephalography,	Tomarken	et	al.	(1990),	
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found	that	subjects	with	greater	resting	right	frontal	activity	responded	with	more	
intense	negative	affect	to	negatively	valenced	film	clips,	particularly	those	involving	fear	
or	threat.		Tomarken	and	colleagues	later	proposed	that	trait	positive	affect	is	
associated	with	greater	left	than	right	frontal	cortical	activity,	whereas	trait	negative	
affect	is	associated	with	greater	right	than	left	frontal	activity	(Tomarken	et	al.,	1992).	
Another	study	using	film	clips	similarly	revealed	that	having	more	right	frontal	activity	
led	to	more	intense	reports	of	negative	affect,	and	having	more	left	frontal	activity	led	
to	more	intense	reports	of	positive	affect	(Wheeler	et	al.	1993).		
The	relationship	between	hemispheric	asymmetry	and	emotional	sensitivity	had	
early	support,	but	is	now	challenged	by	contemporary	research.		Indeed,	these	early	
findings	were	real,	but	new	research	clarified	that	emotional	affect	may	have	been	a	
confound.	Davidson	and	colleagues	(1993,	1998a,	and	1998b)	pushed	the	study	of	
hemispheric	asymmetry	away	from	positive	and	negative	affect,	instead	suggesting	that	
hemispheric	asymmetry	corresponded	with	an	approach-avoidance	system,	a	hallmark	
of	Gray’s	theories	of	BIS/BAS	behavioral	motivation.		Several	follow-up	studies	by	
Davidson	and	colleagues	confirmed	the	relationship	(e.g.	Reuter-Lorenz	and	Davidson,	
1981;	Sutton	and	Davidson	1997;	Davidson	2004).		Harmon-Jones	and	colleagues	also	
found	support	for	the	approach-avoidance	theory,	noting	that	“past	research	had	
essentially	confounded	emotional	valence	with	motivational	direction,	and	researchers	
were	claiming	that	relatively	greater	left	than	right	frontal	cortical	activity	reflected	
greater	approach	motivation	and	positive	affect,	whereas	relatively	greater	right	than	
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left	frontal	cortical	activity	reflected	greater	withdrawal	motivation	and	negative	affect”	
(Harmon-Jones	et	al.	2010,	454-455).		Davidson’s	findings	have	been	empirically	verified	
by	a	number	of	different	research	groups	(e.g.,	Carver	and	White	1994;	Coan	and	Allen	
2003,	2004;	Harmon-Jones	and	Allen	1997,	1998;	Amodio	et	al.	2008).			
The	consensus	in	this	literature	is	that	relatively	greater	right	frontal	activity	is	
associated	with	tendencies	toward	behavioral	avoidance,	instead	of	emotional	affect	
(Coan	and	Allen	2003a;	Coan	and	Allen	2003b;	Davidson	1993;	Harmon-Jones	and	Allen	
1997,	Sutton	and	Davidson	1997,	Davidson	1998a,b;	Harmon-Jones	et	al.	2010).	Other	
researchers	have	confirmed	this	relationship.		For	example,	Field	et	al.	(1995)	and	Fox	et	
al.	(1996)	found	evidence	that	children	with	greater	right	frontal	activity	at	rest	were	
more	inhibited	socially,	and	scored	lower	on	social	competency.	Schmidt	and	Fox	(1994)	
found	a	relationship	between	low	adult	sociability	and	relatively	greater	right	frontal	
activity.		Schmidt	et	al.	1999	found	shyness	had	greater	right	frontal	activation.		
All	of	these	studies	from	developmental	psychology	researchers	suggest	a	
relationship	between	avoidance	and	right	frontal	activity.		Davidson's	
approach/withdrawal	motivational	model	of	emotion	also	proposes	that	left	frontal	
activity	(either	as	state	or	as	trait)	indicates	a	propensity	to	approach	or	engage	a	
stimulus,	while	relatively	greater	right	frontal	activity	indicates	a	propensity	to	withdraw	
or	disengage	from	a	stimulus.		Yet,	as	described	above,	testing	the	avoidance	
motivations	of	conservatives	would	appear	to	be	a	significant	part	of	the	larger	project	
of	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory.		(Also,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	the	
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Negativity	Bias	Theory	may	also	be	interested	in	these	results,	given	that	while	emotion	
is	technically	a	confound	in	these	hemispheric	studies,	it	can	still	be	instructive	because	
most	avoidance	motivations	are,	in	fact,	triggered	by	negative	emotions.)	Consequently,	
frontal	EEG	asymmetry	promises	to	be	a	useful	tool	for	studying	avoidance	sensitivity	in	
political	liberals	and	conservatives.		To	date,	no	study	has	looked	at	resting	hemispheric	
data	to	evaluate	whether	liberals	and	conservatives	have	more	approach	or	avoidance	
sensitivities.	This	chapter	thus	fills	a	lacuna	in	the	psychological	study	of	political	
ideology.	
PANAS-X	and	Sensitivity	to	Negative	Emotion	
To	examine	trait	differences	in	how	liberals	and	conservatives	experience	
emotion,	we	will	need	to	use	a	tool	designed	specifically	to	evaluate	trait	(not	state)	
emotions.		Recall	that	this	chapter	focuses	on	trait	dispositions,	or	the	characteristic	
propensity	to	feel	an	emotion	independent	of	context.		We	are	interested	in	trait	
negative	affectivity,	not	the	effect	of	putting	subjects	in	a	negative	state	condition.		One	
method	of	operationalizing	trait	negative	affectivity	is	by	having	participants	self-report	
how	often	they	experience	these	emotions	in	their	last	few	weeks.		The	Positive	and	
Negative	Affect	Schedule	(PANAS)	is	a	scale	developed	by	Watson	and	colleagues	
(Watson	et	al.	1988;	updated	to	PANAS-X	in	Watson	and	Clark	1994)	to	measure	positive	
and	negative	affect	in	contextual	(state)	and	characteristic	(trait)	ways.	The	scale	is	
extremely	popular	in	psychology	and	has	more	than	17,000	citations.	As	a	trait	measure,	
PANAS-X	has	been	shown	to	be	significantly	correlated	with	corresponding	judgments	
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made	by	well-acquainted	peers	(Watson	and	Clark	1994,	19).		Self-reporting	a	negativity	
bias,	for	example,	was	correlated	with	peers	claiming	that	you	were	sensitive	to	
negativity.		Additionally,	test-retest	scores	were	strongly	consistent,	and	PANAS-X	scores	
were	significantly	correlated	to	weekly	mood	ratings	in	a	sample	of	239	undergrads	
studied	for	a	minimum	of	seven	weeks	(Watson	and	Clark	1994,	19-20).			
Before	continuing,	what	exactly	is	positive	and	negative	affect?		Positive	affect	
represents	the	extent	to	which	an	individual	feels	enthusiastic,	active,	and	alert	(Watson	
et	al.	1988).	Higher	positive	affect	is	a	state	of	full	energy,	concentration,	and	pleasing	
engagement,	whereas	low	positive	affect	is	characterized	by	lack	of	energy	and	sadness	
(Watson	et	al.	1988).	Negative	affect	is	the	extent	to	which	a	person	feels	general	
distress	and	unpleasant	engagement.		It	includes	mood	states	such	as	anger,	contempt,	
disgust,	guilt,	fear,	and	nervousness,	while	low	negative	affect	is	a	state	of	benign	
calmness	(Watson	et	al.	1988).		It	is	worthwhile	to	note	here	that	positive	affect	and	
negative	affect	are	theoretically	(with	empirical	justification)	thought	of	as	separate	
emotional	factors	or	dimensions	(Watson	and	Clark	1994).		An	individual	could	have	a	
strong	trait	of	positive	affect	and	a	strong	trait	of	negative	affect,	together.	This	
individual	would	be	a	(relative)	roller-coaster	of	emotion—higher	highs	and	lower	
lows—compared	to	someone	with	low	affect	in	both	dimensions.		For	example,	the	
Negativity	Bias	Theory	states	that	conservatives	are	more	trait	negative.	This	does	not	
axiomatically	mean	the	theory	would	also	posit	that	conservatives	are	less	trait	positive.	
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The	dimensions	are	largely	independent	from	each	other	(Watson	et	al.	1988,	1064;	
Watson	and	Clark	1994,	1-3)	
As	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	posits	that	conservatives	are	more	sensitive	to	
negative	affect,	it	can	to	be	tested	via	the	PANAS-X	scales.		Although	the	Motivated	
Social	Cognition	Theory	ultimately	makes	a	different	claim	than	conservatives	have	
more	negative	affect,	the	results	of	this	study	would	still	prove	useful	to	that	study.		
Affect	and	behavioral	motivations	have	much	in	common,	even	though	they	are	
commonly	conflated.			
Hypotheses	
Thus,	the	two	major	theories	of	psychological	political	ideology	have	predictions	
for	trait	dispositions	related	to	avoidance	and	negativity	bias	(see	Table	4,	below).	
Concerning	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry	and	trait	avoidance,	the	Motivated	Social	
Cognition	Theory	posits	that	conservatives	should	have	greater	right-side	asymmetry,	
reflecting	a	greater	sensitivity	to	avoidance	compared	with	liberals	(H1).		The	Negativity	
Bias	Theory	agrees	that	conservatives	should	have	more	avoidance	sensitivity,	but	as	I	
have	argued,	this	is	technically	confounding	avoidance	sensitivity	for	negativity	bias.		
Consequently,	a	better	test	of	the	negativity	bias	would	be	measuring	trait	negative	
affectivity.		The	Negativity	Bias	Theory	predicts	that	conservatives	should	have	more	
trait	negative	affectivity	than	liberals	(H2).		Additionally,	in	terms	of	the	discrete	
emotion	subscales,	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	predicts	that	conservatives	should	have	
more	trait	fear	(H3)	and	trait	sadness	(H4)	than	liberals.	Again,	the	Motivated	Social	
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Cognition	Theory	does	not	necessarily	dispute	H2,	H3,	or	H4.	After	all,	there	is	
substantial	overlap	between	trait	avoidance	and	trait	negative	affectivity.		However,	
interestingly,	we	can	use	trait	hostility	(anger)	as	a	differentiator	between	the	theories.		
Anger	is	both	affectively	negative	but	motivationally	approaching,	where	the	other	
emotions	are	affectively	negative	and	motivationally	avoiding.		Motivated	Social	
Cognition	Theory	predicts	conservatives	should	have	less	trait	hostility	(anger)	than	
liberals,	while	Negativity	Bias	Theory	predicts	conservatives	should	have	more	trait	
hostility	(anger)	(H5).			
Both	theories	remain	agnostic	about	positive	emotion	scales.	As	mentioned	
above,	positive	and	negative	affect	sensitivity	are	independent	from	each	other	(positive	
affect	is	not	simply	the	absence	of	negative	affect,	but	instead	is	its	own	emotional	
dimension).	Although	Hibbing	and	colleagues	(Dodd	et	al.	2012)	find	that	liberals	have	
increased	sensitivity	to	positivity	compared	to	conservatives,	this	finding	is	not	
emphasized	or	explored	in	Hibbing	et	al.	2014,	the	foundational	paper	of	the	Negativity	
Bias	Theory	of	political	ideology,	and	so	is	not	emphasized	here,	either.			 	
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Table	4.	Disposition	Hypotheses.	
	
Method	
Participants	
466	adults	employed	by	a	large	university	in	the	Midwest	completed	a	screening	
survey	of	their	political	attitudes	and	personality	dispositions.		Details	about	this	survey	
are	in	Chapter	Four	of	the	dissertation.		Four	months	later,	a	subsample	of	51	was	
selected	to	perform	laboratory	behavioral	experiments.	As	the	original	pool	was	
substantially	skewed	towards	liberals,	this	sample	was	screened	for	political	attitudes	in	
order	to	promote	political	diversity	in	the	sample.		The	screening	was	simply	a	random	
selection	of	20	liberals,	15	moderates,	and	20	conservatives,	determined	by	a	
combination	of	their	self-reported	ideology,	and	the	aggregation	of	their	political	
attitudes	on	various	issues	(the	Wilson-Patterson	scale,	detailed	in	full	in	Chapter	Four).			
If	an	invitation	was	declined	or	ignored,	a	new	random	participant	of	their	group	would	
receive	an	invitation.		Over	the	next	six	months,	20	liberals,	14	moderates,	and	17	
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conservatives	agreed	to	the	additional	testing	session	and	came	into	the	laboratory.	
(More	detailed	political	characteristics	of	this	sample	are	of	direct	interest	to	this	
chapter,	and	will	be	described	in	additional	detail	below.)			
Fifty-one	adults	(age	24-52	years,	mean	=	30.7,	sd	=	5.8)	served	as	participants	
(32	female,	19	male).	Participants	self-described	as	right-handed	(49	selected	
“somewhat”	or	“strongly”	right-handed).			Although	it	is	speculated	that	handedness	
may	be	related	to	hemispheric	asymmetry	patterns,	and	most	research	consequently	
selects	right-handed	participants	only,	differences	in	handedness	have	no	impact	on	the	
findings	of	this	chapter.		The	testing	session	averaged	less	than	two	hours	and	30	
minutes,	including	breaks	and	capping	preparation	(described	below).	Participants	
completed	four	tasks	during	the	session,	and	had	short	breaks	of	5	minutes	between	
tasks.	Participants	were	permitted	to	stand	up	and/or	leave	the	testing	room,	but	were	
encouraged	to	avoid	doing	so	because	of	the	tedious	capping	process.		As	it	happens,	no	
participants	left	or	required	to	be	recapped	during	their	testing	session.		Participants	
were	compensated	at	a	rate	of	$20/hour,	with	a	minimum	payment	of	$40	and	a	
maximum	of	$50	for	the	session.			
Procedure	
After	arriving	at	the	laboratory,	participants	were	briefed	on	the	tasks,	and	asked	
to	sign	consent	forms.		Electroencephalography	requires	wearing	a	tight	fitting	cap	that	
includes	a	set	of	sensor	nodes	for	reading	electrical	signals	from	the	scalp.		The	capping	
process	requires	between	20-40	minutes	of	preparation	time,	as	electrode	nodes	are	
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first	gelled	with	a	saline	solution	to	increase	conductivity,	then	snapped	into	the	cap	one	
at	a	time,	and	then	finally	the	readings	system	is	tested.	The	electrodes	do	not	break	the	
skin	or	provide	any	discomfort	to	the	participants.		While	being	capped,	but	before	the	
experiments	began,	participants	completed	a	brief	questionnaire	about	personality	as	
well	as	the	PANAS-X	trait	and	state	emotional	batteries	(Watson	and	Clark	1994).		
Participants	first	completed	three	tasks	and	had	several	breaks	for	approximately	110	
minutes.		Then,	they	began	the	resting	electroencephalography	task	that	is	the	subject	
of	this	chapter.		Resting	electroencephalography,	a	reading	of	electrical	signals	from	the	
scalp	while	the	participant	was	at	rest,	was	recorded	while	participants	sat	quietly	in	a	
sound-attenuated	room	for	an	8-minute	resting	period	(alternating	one	minute	blocks	of	
eyes-open	and	eyes-closed	in	a	counterbalanced	pattern,	as	is	the	convention).		The	
activity	lasted	about	10	minutes	in	total,	and	it	was	the	final	activity	completed	by	
participants	before	they	were	dismissed	from	the	session.		
Measuring	Alpha	Asymmetry	
Resting	alpha	waves	were	collected	in	a	64	channel	system	designed	by	Biosemi.	
Alpha	waves	are	one	variety	of	brain	waves	that	can	be	detected	by	
electroencephalography.		Alpha	waves	appear	to	originate	from	the	occipital	lobe	
during	an	awake,	but	resting,	state.		According	to	Coan	and	Allen,	“evidence	suggests	
that	activity	within	the	alpha	range	(typically	8–13	Hz)	may	be	inversely	related	to	
underlying	cortical	processing,	since	decreases	in	alpha	tend	to	be	observed	when	
underlying	cortical	systems	engage	in	active	processing”	(Coan	and	Allen	2004,	9).		The	
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detection	of	more	alpha	waves,	thus,	represents	less	cortical	processing.		Measuring	
alpha	is	therefore	an	indirect	way	to	measure	cortical	processing.		As	our	goal	is	to	
assess	the	degree	to	which	one	hemisphere	may	be	more	active	while	at	rest,	like	all	
other	frontal	asymmetry	researchers,	we	need	to	measure	alpha	waves	in	order	to	infer	
cortical	activity.			
Alpha	was	collected	in	the	frequency	range	between	8-13	Hz,	in	0.5	Hz	bands.	
The	raw	data	was	collected	by	the	Biosemi	system	(compiled	in	a	BDF	file	format	for	
each	participant)	and	manually	checked	for	eye	movement	artifacts	using	BESA	
Research,	Windows-based	software	designed	to	analyze	digitally	recorded	EEG.		
Electroencephalography	is	hyper	sensitive	to	muscle	movements,	and	the	slightest	
twitch	of	the	eye	can	result	in	a	noticeable	data	artifact	which	needs	to	be	removed	
from	analysis	(as	individuals	have	different	propensities	to	blink).		In	order	to	reduce	
volume	conduction	contributions	to	EEG,	data	were	transformed	to	a	current	source	
density	(CSD)	Laplacian	27-	channel	virtual	montage	(Allen	&	Reznick,	2015;	Stewart	et	
al.,	2014).	The	application	of	a	CSD	montage	has	been	recommended	to	yield	a	stable,	
localized	estimate	of	frontal	alpha	(Stewart	et	al.,	2014).		
One	challenge	for	comparing	results	between	labs	is	keeping	consistent	
electrode	placement,	and	only	careful	work	in	the	lab	with	measuring	tape	can	minimize	
these	differences	between	subjects.	Another	complication	is	that	different	EEG	systems	
today	use	varying	electrode	node	schemes	over	time,	with	most	systems	today	having	
32,	64,	or	128	channels.		Consequently,	researchers	use	virtual	channels	to	allow	
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comparison	of	results	between	labs.		Whether	EEG	signals	are	measured	with	a	32,	64,	
or	128	channel	system,	software	can	be	used	to	convert	these	measurements	to	a	
common	cranial	mapping	system	called	the	10-20	system.		Thus,	our	64	channels	of	
recorded	data	were	converted	to	virtual	channels	corresponding	to	the	traditional	10-20	
system,	thus	allowing	comparison	to	other	asymmetry	literature.		10-20	refers	to	the	
fact	that	the	actual	distances	between	adjacent	electrodes	on	the	scalp	are	either	10%	
or	20%	of	the	surface	area,	creating	a	spreading	pattern	where	electrodes	are	
equidistant	from	each	other.	
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Figure	10.	The	10-20	System	and	Hemispheric	Asymmetry.	
	
As	observed	in	Figure	10,	each	site	has	a	letter	to	identify	the	lobe	(Frontal,	
Temporal,	Parietal,	or	Occipital)	or	to	signify	that	it	is	Centrally	located.		Numbers	are	
used	with	the	letters	to	designate	the	hemisphere	location,	with	even	numbers	on	the	
right	and	odd	numbers	on	the	left.	A	"z"	(zero)	is	used	for	an	electrode	on	the	midline.	
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The	codes	“A”,	“Pg”	and	“Fp”	identify	the	earlobes,	nasopharyngeal	and	frontal	polar	
sites	respectively.			
The	first	step	of	capping	correctly	is	to	note	two	anatomical	landmarks:	first,	the	
nasion	which	is	the	distinctly	depressed	area	between	the	eyes,	just	above	the	bridge	of	
the	nose;	and	second,	the	inion,	which	is	the	lowest	point	of	the	skull	from	the	back	of	
the	head	and	is	normally	indicated	by	a	bump.	From	these	landmarks,	researchers	can	
determine	the	sizing	of	the	cap,	and	the	placement	of	the	cap	on	the	head,	to	ensure	
that	electrical	nodes	are	consistently	arranged	from	subject	to	subject.		
Electroencephalography	data	needs	to	be	referenced	(all	signals	recorded	are	
necessarily	relative,	and	so	there	is	need	for	a	base	reference).		In	this	system,	all	sites	
were	referenced	to	the	mastoids.		To	filter	electrical	interference	from	the	signal,	a	band	
filters	of	0.01	Hz	and	60	Hz	was	applied,	as	is	standard	convention.	Cortical	hemispheric	
asymmetry	is	measured	with	frontal	electrodes	(placement	of	these	electrodes	are	
noted	with	color).	Following	conversion	to	the	virtual	channels,	amplitudes	were	natural	
logged	by	site,	and	then	asymmetry	scores	were	calculated	the	conventional	way	(see	
Coan	and	Allen	2004),	by	subtracting	the	left	score	from	the	right	score	at	each	frontal	
node	pairing	(FP2	–	FP1,	F4	–	F3,	F10	–	F9,	and	F8	–	F7).	The	original	idea	for	creating	a	
difference	score	comes	from	the	theory	that	the	two	hemispheres	inhibit	each	other,	so	
a	greater	difference	in	resting	state	scores	suggests	one	hemisphere	is	more	dominant	
(and	there	are	approach-avoidance	consequences	for	this	dominance).		The	subtraction	
also	takes	into	account	individual	differences	in	skull	mass	or	other	physical	factors,	
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creating	a	metric	that	accounts	for	the	relative	asymmetry	of	that	individual.	After	the	
creation	of	the	node	subtractions,	all	four	were	averaged	into	an	aggregate	frontal	
asymmetry	subtraction	score.		
Table	5.	Frontal	Asymmetry	Score	Interpretation.	
	
For	the	remainder	of	the	chapter,	we	will	use	the	frontal	asymmetry	score	to	
measure	and	discuss	the	findings	of	this	experiment.		Table	5	summarizes	
interpretation.	The	frontal	asymmetry	score	represents	the	relative	activity	of	the	right	
and	left	hemispheres,	with	a	score	of	zero	meaning	symmetrical	activity.	In	interpreting	
this	scale,	a	positive	frontal	asymmetry	score	means	more	alpha	waves	on	the	right-
side,	more	left	frontal	activity,	and	increased	approach	sensitivity.	A	negative	frontal	
asymmetry	score	means	relatively	more	alpha	waves	on	the	left-side,	more	right	frontal	
activity,	and	increased	avoidance	sensitivity.		
Measuring	Trait	Emotions	
The	PANAS-X	revised	scale	was	administered	to	all	participants	in	order	to	assess	
the	degree	to	which	they	are	sensitive	to	emotions.		PANAS-X	questions	allow	emotional	
sensitivity	to	be	assessed	dimensionally—positive	affect	and	negative	affect.		Each	
participant	uses	a	five	point	scale	to	self-report	how	much	they	have	felt	a	discrete	
emotion	over	the	past	couple	of	weeks	(trait),	or	how	much	they	feel	it	now,	in	the	
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moment	(state).	A	total	of	30	discrete	emotion	items	are	included	(see	appendix	for	full	
list).	
Positive	affect	and	negative	affect	are	themselves	comprised	of	a	factor	
structure	of	discrete	emotions.	In	their	creation	and	analysis	of	the	PANAS-X	scale,	
Watson	and	Clark	(1994)	identify	a	number	of	subscales	for	each	affective	dimension.		
Positive	Affect	is	comprised	of	Joviality,	Self-Assurance,	and	Attentiveness.		Negative	
affect	includes	Fear,	Hostility,	and	Sadness.		A	summary	of	the	two	dimension	scales,	the	
six	discrete	emotion	subscales,	and	the	individual	emotion	items	that	comprise	each	
scale	is	included	in	Table	6.		
Table	6.	PANAS-X	Scale	Compositions	
	
As	can	be	observed	in	Table	6,	discrete	emotions	are	aggregated	into	two	
general	dimensional	scales,	negative	affect	and	positive	affect.		For	example,	fear,	
hostility,	and	sadness	are	all	negatively	valenced	discrete	emotions,	while	joviality,	self-
assurance,	and	attentiveness	are	all	positively	valenced	discrete	emotions.	An	individual	
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with	greater	trait	negative	affectivity	would	be	expected	to	react	more	strongly	to	
negative	emotions,	and	would	do	so	independently	from	state-based	contextual	factors,	
such	that	would	trigger	an	emotional	response.		If	two	people	both	had	an	emotional	
response	triggered	by	the	environment,	the	one	with	greater	trait	negative	affectivity	
would	be	expected	to	react	more	strongly	to	that	trigger,	all	else	being	equal.		PANAS-X	
also	allows	the	creation	of	several	subscales	of	interest,	as	well.		As	noted	above,	
discrete	emotions	like	fear,	hostility	(anger),	and	sadness	are	commonly	invoked	by	the	
Negativity	Bias	Theory	and	other	emotion	researchers	working	in	political	psychology.	
Measuring	Ideology	
Political	ideology	questions	were	asked	to	all	participants	several	weeks	prior	to	
the	laboratory	experiment.		Below	are	the	five	ways	ideology	was	measured	in	this	
sample,	and	the	samples	distributions	on	those	scales.		Cronbach’s	alphas	reported	in	
subsequent	paragraphs	are	from	the	full	survey	sample	of	466	participants,	as	alphas	
from	the	smaller	sample	of	51	include	more	random	variability	and	are	not	as	
conceptually	useful.		That	said,	alphas	from	the	smaller	sample	did	not	differ	in	a	
meaningful	way	from	the	numbers	reported	below.		Other	details	about	the	scale	
construction	and	measure	validity	are	described	in	Chapter	Four.	
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Table	7.	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Lab	Participants.	
	
Self-reported	ideology	is	the	conventional	seven-point	scale	used	by	the	
American	National	Election	Studies,	spanning	“Very	liberal”	(1)	to	“Very	conservative”	
(7)	with	“Moderate”	(4)	being	the	middle	anchor.		Liberals	range	from	1	to	3,	moderates	
are	4s,	and	conservatives	range	from	5	to	7.		Although	some	literature	has	pointed	to	
interesting	alternatives	for	self-reports	(Wood	and	Oliver	2012),	this	is	still	the	dominant	
way	of	measuring	ideology	in	a	survey.		Also,	this	scale	(and	a	10	point	variant	of	it)	is	
used	almost	exclusively	by	psychologists	doing	work	in	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	
Theory	area	(e.g.	Jost	et	al.	2003,	Jost	and	Amodio	2012).			
The	Wilson-Patterson	scale	of	political	attitudes	(Wilson	1968;	updated	by	Smith	
et	al.	2011)	is	a	battery	of	twenty	issue	attitude	items,	which	are	additively	combined	
into	a	general	conservatism	scale	(α	=	.80).	As	ideology	is	sometimes	conceptualized	as	
multidimensional,	I	also	created	social	conservatism	(α	=	.76)	and	economic	
conservatism	(α	=	.61)	subscales	based	off	of	the	Wilson-Patterson	scale	detailed	above.	
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A	full	description	of	how	these	subscales	were	constructed	is	available	in	Chapter	Four.	
In	short,	however,	these	two	subscales	are	based	on	theoretical	grouping,	and	based	on	
general	multidimensional	work	(e.g.	Treier	and	Hillygus	2009).		Social	conservatism	
includes	school	prayer,	legal	pornography,	illegal	immigration,	death	penalty,	the	Patriot	
Act,	biblical	truth,	gay	marriage,	and	abortion.		Economic	conservatism	includes	welfare	
spending,	tax	cuts,	small	government,	and	foreign	aid.	More	research	needs	to	be	done	
on	the	psychological	underpinnings	of	multidimensional	ideology	(Hibbing	et	al.	2014),	
and	some	evidence	points	to	the	idea	that	ideology	is	not	a	singular	concept	(see	
Chapter	Two	for	more	details).		It	will	be	useful	here	to	see	how	social	and	economic	
conservatism	might	differ,	and	this	is	an	important	way	that	political	scientists	can	
improve	on	the	work	of	psychologists	in	the	study	of	the	psychology	of	political	
ideology.			
Finally,	I	used	the	World	Values	Survey	asks	four	Likert-style	questions	about	
economic	justice.	(Exact	question	wording	is	available	in	the	appendix.)	These	items	
have	been	combined	into	the	World	Values	Survey	Economic	Justice	battery,	which	
measure	attitudes	about	income	redistribution	and	economic	inequality	(α	=	.70).			
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Results	
Table	8.	Correlation	Matrix	of	Emotional	Measures.		
	
The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	predicted	that	conservatives	would	have	
more	trait	avoidance	compared	to	liberals	(H1),	which	is	operationalized	in	this	study	as	
a	lower	frontal	asymmetry	score.		However,	I	find	no	significant	relationship	between	
frontal	asymmetry	and	self-identified	political	ideology,	and	it	trends	in	the	opposite	
direction	than	predicted	(r	=	0.23,	p	=	0.11).		I	also	find	that	the	Wilson-Patterson	
conservatism	scale	is	correlated	positively	with	the	frontal	asymmetry	score	(r	=	0.36,	p	
=	0.01),	exactly	the	opposite	of	the	expectations.			This	finding	also	holds	for	the	W-P	
social	conservatism	scale	(r	=	0.35	,	p	=	0.01),	and	it	trends	in	the	same	pattern	for	the	
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economic	issue	subscale	(r	=	0.24,	p	=	0.10).	The	economic	justice	subscale	of	the	World	
Values	Survey,	which	focuses	on	liberal-conservative	beliefs	about	economic	inequality,	
is	not	correlated	with	frontal	asymmetry	(p	=	0.49).		Whether	ideology	is	self-reported	
or	survey-determined,	there	is	no	evidence	that	conservatives	have	more	trait	
avoidance	based	on	frontal	asymmetry	measures.		If	anything,	these	results	suggest	
liberals	have	the	neural	correlates	for	having	more	trait	avoidance.	
What	about	trait	sensitivities	to	negative	emotions?	No	statistically	significant	
relationship	was	found	between	self-identified	conservatism	and	trait	negative	
affectivity	(H2)	(p	=	0.59).		No	statistically	significant	relationship	was	found	between	
the	Wilson-Patterson	ideology	scale	(p	=	0.27),	the	W-P	social	conservatism	subscale	(p	=	
0.58),	or	the	W-P	economic	conservatism	subscale	(p	=	0.3).		The	World	Values	Survey	
Economic	Justice	scale	does	have	a	surprise	negative	correlation	to	trait	negative	
affectivity	(r	=	-0.36,	p	=	0.01),	which	suggests	that	more	trait	negative	affectivity	is	
correlated	with	political	liberalism	(not	with	conservatism,	as	was	expected).			
Trait	fear	appears	mostly	unrelated	to	political	ideology,	with	a	trending	finding	
on	economic	conservatism,	and	a	statistically	significant	relationship	on	the	World	
Values	Scale,	where	once	again	the	relationship	directions	are	contrary	to	theoretical	
expectations	(H3).		Self-reported	ideology	(p	=	0.20),	W-P	scale	(p	=	0.26),	or	W-P	social	
conservatism	(p	=	0.84)	yield	no	relationship.		Again,	the	Wilson-Patterson	subscale	for	
economic	conservatism	trends	towards	having	a	relationship	to	trait	fear,	but	in	
precisely	the	opposite	direction	than	expected	(r	=	-0.24,	p	=	0.09),	with	it	being	
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associated	with	political	liberalism.		Economic	conservatives	in	this	sample	may	have	
moderately	less	trait	fear	sensitivity.		
Trait	sadness	(H4)	and	trait	hostility	(H5)	have	essentially	no	relationship	to	any	
measurement	of	political	ideology	in	this	sample	(p	values	range	from	0.27	to	0.95	for	
both	trait	sadness	and	trait	hostility,	see	Table	8).	Early	in	this	chapter,	I	mentioned	that	
trait	hostility	(anger)	may	prove	to	be	an	interesting	dividing	point	between	the	
Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	and	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	but	as	it	turns	out,	
both	theories	fail	their	hypotheses	here.		
Although	both	theories	are	agnostic	about	the	relationship	of	political	ideology	
to	positive	affect,	we	have	the	data	to	explore.		First,	recall	that	Watson	and	Clark	1994	
posited	trait	negative	and	positive	affectivities	ought	to	be	considered	separate	
dimensions	(and	not	two	sides	of	the	same	construct).	In	this	data,	I	find	that	the	two	
characteristics	are	only	weakly	negatively	correlated	(r	=	-0.26,	p	=	0.06),	confirming	
their	research.		Second,	in	terms	of	the	relationship	of	trait	positive	affectivity	to	
political	ideology,	I	find	rather	strong	evidence	of	no	relationship	whatsoever	(see	Table	
8).	One	correlation	manages	to	catch,	as	economic	conservatives	have	more	trait	self-
assurance	(r	=	0.30,	p	=	0.03).		We	should	be	careful	about	extrapolating	too	much	on	
that	finding,	given	that	it	was	precisely	one	significant	result	of	twenty	tests	(exactly	5%	
of	the	tests)	of	trait	positive	affect.	Self-assurance	has	two	trending	relationships,	both	
in	the	opposite	direction	to	expectations.		
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Discussion	
This	chapter	focuses	on	ideological	differences	in	trait	avoidance	and	trait	
negative	affectivity.		These	individual	dispositions	are	related	to	everyday	behavior,	
used	by	human	beings	from	dozens	to	hundreds	of	times	a	day.		We	investigate	the	
claims	of	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	and	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	being	
especially	sensitive	to	the	idea	that	the	theories	subtly	posit	different	psychological	
undercurrents	for	political	ideology	(albeit,	processes	that	are	quite	related).			
Recall	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	argues	that	conservatives	are	more	
motivated	by	needs	to	reduce	uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	and	disgust	(Jost	et	al.	
2003).		Conservatives	are	thought	to	be	sensitive	to	avoidance	signals,	biasing	their	
beliefs	towards	political	conservatism.	I	use	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry	to	test	the	
idea	that	trait	avoidance	may	be	a	biomarker	of	being	politically	conservative.		
The	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	on	the	other	hand,	argues	conservatives	are	more	
sensitive	to	negative	emotions,	causing	stronger	physiological	reactions	to	negativity	
(Hibbing	et	al.	2014).		I	used	a	battery	of	survey	questions	that	tap	into	emotions	to	test	
the	idea	that	trait	negative	affectivity	may	be	a	biomarker	of	being	politically	
conservative.	
The	results	are	surprising	in	every	possible	way.	The	data	show	there	is	virtually	
no	evidence	that	liberals	and	conservatives	hold	trait	differences	in	trait	avoidance	or	
sensitivity	to	negative	emotion.		In	fact,	if	anything,	liberals	in	this	sample	appear	to	be	
more	sensitive	to	avoidance,	which	stands	out	from	the	vast	majority	of	political	
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psychology	work	on	this	subject.	Where	I	had	hoped	to	contribute	by	parsing	out	two	
different	psychological	processes	(behavioral	motivations	like	avoidance	from	negative	
affect)	in	order	to	clarify	our	two	main	theories,	instead	I	fail	to	find	evidence	that	
supports	either	theory.			
Overall,	ideology	was	measured	in	five	ways,	and	in	no	form	of	measurement	is	
there	a	relationship	between	trait	emotional	sensitivity	and	ideology.		These	results	urge	
caution	moving	forward	for	both	psychological	theories	of	political	ideology,	and	begs	
further	work	to	establish	where	the	psychological	differences	noted	by	Jost,	Hibbing,	
and	colleagues	are	emerging.		Those	results	have	strong	support	over	dozens	of	papers,	
yet,	my	work	here	does	not	support	their	claims.		The	next	chapter	continues	the	
investigation	of	how	avoidance	sensitivity	and	negativity	bias	may	be	different	between	
liberals	and	conservatives.			 	
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CHAPTER	SIX	
GO/NO-GO	BEHAVIORAL	INHIBITION	ANALYSIS	
This	chapter	expands	our	investigation	of	dispositional	differences	between	
liberals	and	conservatives	by	looking	at	conflict	monitoring	in	the	brain.	Conflict	
monitoring	is	the	cognitive	process	that	helps	resolve	issues	between	goal	directed	
behavior	and	our	ever	changing	environment,	allowing	us	to	detect	potential	conflicts	
and	facilitate	behavior	to	resolve	detected	conflicts.		Conflict	monitoring	is	part	of	a	
behavioral	surveillance	system,	with	the	central	purpose	of	resolving	a	conflict	between	
desired	outcomes	and	a	habituated	response.		
Conflicts	between	goals	and	ongoing	behavior	occur	regularly	in	human	
experience.		For	one	silly—but	instructive—example,	consider	the	children’s	game,	Red-
Light-Green-Light.		In	the	game,	one	child	plays	as	the	Stop-light	and	the	rest	are	at	a	
starting	line	some	distance	away.		The	game	begins	when	the	Stop-light	yells,	“Green	
light!”		At	this	cue,	the	children	at	the	starting	line	race	towards	the	Stop-light	at	high	
speed.		However,	at	any	time,	the	Stop-may	call	out,	“Red	light!”	which	forces	the	
children	to	immediately	halt	moving.	Children	who	cannot	successfully	stop	are	
removed	from	that	round	of	the	game.	As	the	game	continues,	the	Stop-light	alternates	
between	calling	for	green	light	and	red	light	in	an	attempt	to	get	the	dashing	kids	to	
make	errors	and	drop	out	of	the	game.	The	first	child	to	tag	the	Stop-light	without	
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violating	the	red	light	signal	is	the	winner.	The	Stop-light	wins	if	they	can	successfully	
force	errors	in	all	the	runners,	leaving	no	runners	remaining	on	the	field.		
What	makes	Red-Light-Green-Light	difficult	for	children	(and	their	32	year	old	
uncle)	is	that	the	players	have	a	common	goal	that	is	difficult	to	achieve.	They	want	to	
be	the	first	to	touch	the	Stop-light,	which	is	accomplished	by	running	more	quickly	than	
the	other	players.	However,	the	runners	must	simultaneously	monitor	changing	signals	
in	the	environment	to	stay	“safe”	in	the	game.		Failure	to	stop	immediately	after	the	red	
light	signal	results	in	disqualification.	A	runner	in	this	game	needs	to	be	goal-directed,	
but	also	needs	to	remain	constantly	aware	of	changing	signals	in	the	environment.		And,	
if	your	niece	really	wanted	to	see	her	uncle	out	of	the	game,	she	could	yell	out,	“Green	
lightning!”	which	falsely	impersonates	a	green	light	signal	to	begin	running	again.	(Do	
not	underestimate	the	strategic	shrewdness	of	your	nieces.)		To	succeed	in	this	game,	
you	need	constant	surveillance	paired	with	fast	footwork.	The	challenge	of	the	game	is	
in	successfully	reaching	your	goal	rapidly	while	being	alert	to	unexpected	signals	that	
threaten	immediate	failure.		
Red-Light-Green-Light	is	a	metaphor	for	conflict	monitoring	in	animal	behavior.	
We	are	constantly	engaged	in	small	goal-oriented	behavior,	while	also	simultaneously	
being	constantly	vigilant	for	new	signals	in	the	environment.	Conflict	monitoring	is	a	
cognitive	process	that	allows	humans	to	detect	potential	conflicts	between	behavior	
and	goals	as	well	as	instigate	new	behavior	to	resolve	the	conflict.		Our	conflict	
monitoring	processes	are	constantly	vigilant,	and	may	trigger	dozens	of	times	per	day,	at	
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many	different	scales.		You	reach	down	for	an	apple	at	the	grocery	store,	and	place	it	in	
your	basket.		You	repeat	this	twice	more.		However,	when	you	reach	down	for	the	
fourth	apple,	your	eyes	catch	the	sheen	of	dusty	green-brown	mold.		Your	goal	to	place	
this	apple	in	your	basket	was	interrupted	by	a	new	signal	in	the	environment.		Conflict	
monitoring	is	the	process	that	halts	your	habituated	behavior	in	response	to	this	new	
information.		Other	day-to-day	examples	are	numerous.	While	briskly	walking	through	a	
cafeteria	towards	a	vender,	you	suddenly	need	to	halt	because	another	person	walks	
into	your	path	without	seeing	you.	You	might	be	taking	notes	during	a	phone	call	and	
realize	that	the	pen	you	are	using	has	run	out	of	ink,	requiring	you	to	shift	attention	
from	the	phone	call	to	the	drawer	under	your	desk	for	the	backup	pen.	Your	conflict	
monitoring	processing	is	what	helps	you	identify	when	a	shift	in	attention	and	behavior	
may	be	required,	especially	in	circumstances	when	the	ongoing	behavior	is	prepotent,	
habitual,	or	intuitive.		We	need	our	conflict	monitoring	process	the	most	when	we	are	
not	concentrating	or	focusing	on	what	we	are	doing,	and	the	behavior	is	routine.	
Conflict	monitoring	is	broadly	categorized	by	researchers	as	part	of	the	
behavioral	inhibition	system,	which	has	been	a	theme	of	this	dissertation.	As	a	reminder	
from	earlier	chapters,	behavioral	inhibition	is	the	system	that	triggers	motivation	to	halt	
ongoing	behavior	in	response	to	the	environment,	especially	concerning	negative	stimuli	
and	events	that	cause	punishment,	frustration,	and	anxiety	(Gray	1982;	Gray	&	
McNaughton	2000).	The	behavioral	inhibition	system	is	a	broad	psychological	construct	
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that	involves	numerous	other	cognitive	processes,	of	which	conflict	monitoring	is	one	
example.			
This	chapter	follows	recent	cognitive	psychology	work	by	looking	at	conflict	
monitoring	in	the	brain,	examining	behavioral	and	neural	data	responses	on	a	Go/No-Go	
task.	I	record	electroencephalography	to	measure	how	the	brain	reacts	when	it	detects	
a	conflict	between	goal	and	behavior.	Our	key	question	for	this	chapter	is:	are	there	
individual	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	in	conflict	monitoring	
processing?		
As	we	will	see,	only	limited	attention	has	been	given	to	the	question	of	whether	
liberals	and	conservatives	would	be	expected	to	have	differences	in	conflict	monitoring	
processes.	Much	like	personality	differences,	we	might	expect	some	individuals	to	have	
a	stronger	conflict	monitoring	response	than	others,	allowing	them	to	make	fewer	
response	errors	to	simple	behavioral	tasks.	This	chapter	is	a	direct	replication	of	a	study	
by	David	Amodio,	John	Jost,	Sarah	Master,	and	Cindy	Yee	(2007),	which	hypothesizes	
that	because	liberals	are	more	cognitively	flexible,	they	ought	to	have	stronger	conflict	
monitoring	systems.	This	study,	cited	more	than	350	times,	is	a	seminal	contribution	to	
the	area	of	inquiry	sometimes	called	political	neuroscience	(Jost	and	Amodio	2012),	and	
seeks	to	bolster	and	extend	Jost’s	extremely	popular	theory	of	conservatism	as	
motivated	social	cognition.		Replication	of	this	study	is	important	because	the	paper	
itself	is	important	to	the	project	of	biology	and	politics.	When	political	scientists	and	
political	psychologists	defend	the	utility	of	neuroscience	for	studying	political	attitudes,	
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the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	paper	is	always	cited,	and	it	is	sometimes	the	only	such	paper	
cited	in	a	review	paper.		
Prior	chapters	in	this	dissertation	have	raised	more	questions	about	the	
psychological	roots	of	political	ideology	than	answers—indeed,	results	so	far	from	this	
sample	have	largely	failed	to	support	the	idea	of	significant	differences	between	liberals	
and	conservatives	in	psychological	factors	of	root-level	emotional	sensitivity	and	
approach	and	avoidance	motivations.	Chapter	Four	dealt	with	self-reported	behavioral	
inhibition	and	behavioral	activation	in	survey	data,	finding	a	few	unexpected	
relationships	but	mostly	a	host	of	null	results.	Chapter	Five	moved	beyond	self-report	
into	an	investigation	of	trait	level	differences	in	approach-avoidance	and	emotional	
sensitivity	by	the	reading	of	electrical	signals	off	the	scalp	in	search	of	brain	patterns	
connected	to	negative	and	positive	emotions.	These	results	suggested	very	few	
differences	in	emotional	sensitivity	between	liberals	and	conservatives,	which	goes	
against	expectations	from	virtually	any	researcher	working	on	the	political	psychology	of	
political	ideology.	In	this	chapter,	we	move	past	self-reported	traits	and	trait-level	
neurophysiological	patterns,	towards	actual	behavioral	data	on	a	behavioral	task.		
When	this	chapter	closes,	we	will	continue	to	find	a	counter-intuitive	(but	
robust)	story	of	no	significant	psychophysiological	differences	between	liberals	and	
conservatives,	this	time	in	the	context	of	conflict	monitoring	processes	during	a	Go/No-
Go	task.		I	also	address	the	replication	efforts	of	two	additional	studies—one	which	
intended	to	directly	replicate	Amodio	et	al.	2007	as	I	have	done,	and	one	which	
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collected	similar	data	to	Amodio	et	al.	2007	but	did	not	discuss	the	implications	of	their	
data.	Thus,	this	chapter	ultimately	looks	at	all	available	conflict	monitoring	in	the	brain	
of	liberals	and	conservatives	across	four	sets	of	researchers.		Amodio	et	al.	2007	are	
cited	frequently,	but	no	review	paper	has	yet	looked	at	the	aggregate	findings	across	all	
four	of	these	research	teams.			
At	the	close	of	this	chapter,	having	reviewed	new	and	old	evidence	of	conflict	
monitoring	and	political	ideology,	I	believe	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	findings	need	more	
attention	from	scholars.	The	original	data	presented	in	this	chapter,	on	a	sample	of	51	
non-student	adults,	do	not	replicate	any	part	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007	at	all.		One	study	
(Weissflog	et	al.	2013)	has	mixed	results	for	replication,	and	a	second	related	study	
(Inzlicht	et	al.	2009)	fails	to	replicate.		Implications	of	this	struggle	to	replicate	this	
important	work	are	discussed	at	the	conclusion	of	this	chapter.	
Conflict	Monitoring	and	Executive	Functioning	
To	think	and	act,	the	human	brain	must	engage	in	several	attentional	and	
monitoring	behaviors.		Cognitive	scientists	broadly	refer	to	these	processes	as	executive	
functioning.		Executive	functioning	is	a	set	of	cognitive	processes	that	are	necessary	for	
the	cognitive	control	of	behavior.	Executive	functioning	allows	people	to	identify,	
pursue,	retool,	and	resolve	goal-directed	behavior.		Some	of	these	executive	functions	
include	control	of	attention,	inhibition	control,	and	memory	processes.	Our	capacity	to	
plan,	problem	solve,	and	logically	reason	are	all	due	to	our	executive	functioning.	The	
broad	array	of	executive	functions	in	the	brain	are	tremendously	influential	on	behavior,	
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and	impairment	in	executive	functioning	is	linked	to	a	suite	of	cognitive	and	personality	
disorders.			
Executive	functioning	is	about	the	control	of	action,	where	“deliberate,	
conscious	control	of	activity	is	desired	rather	than	those	that	are	automatic”	(Norman	&	
Shallice,	1986,	1).	Norman	and	Shallice	(1986,	2)	posit	five	types	of	situations	that	
require	deliberate	attentional	resources:	
1. They	involve	planning	or	decision	making.	
2. They	involve	components	of	troubleshooting.		
3. They	are	ill-learned	or	contain	novel	sequences	of	actions.	
4. They	are	judged	to	be	dangerous	or	technically	difficult.	
5. They	require	the	overcoming	of	a	strong;	habitual	response	or	resisting	
temptation.	
	
In	common	between	these	situations	is	the	need	to	control	the	response	in	order	to	
avoid	error.		
Researchers	have	classified	the	cognitive	process	designed	to	identify	potential	
response	conflict	and	motivate	effective	performance	to	overcome	the	conflict	as	
conflict	monitoring	(Amodio	et	al.	2008;	Kerns,	2004).		Response	conflict	is	the	
occurrence	of	incompatible	response	tendencies,	or	an	instance	where	reflexive	or	
habitual	response	appears	to	conflict	with	the	individual’s	immediate	goals.	Conflict	
monitoring,	therefore,	helps	control	our	control	(Kerns,	2004).	Conflict	monitoring	in	
this	dissertation	is	synonymous	with	error	detection	and	behavioral	conflict	detection.	
One	of	many	behavioral	tasks	in	psychology	labs	known	to	tap	into	conflict	
monitoring	is	the	Stroop	color-naming	task,	one	of	the	most	famous	and	important	
experimental	tasks	ever	devised.			In	the	generic	variant	of	the	Stroop,	participants	view	
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a	printed	word	that	represents	a	color	(e.g.	“RED,”	or	“BLUE”),	and	they	are	tasked	with	
speaking	the	written	word	aloud.		This	task	is	relatively	simple	during	the	congruent	
trials,	where	the	word	“RED”	is	written	in	red	ink.		However,	incongruent	trials	are	
mixed	in,	where	the	word	“RED”	is	written	in	blue	link.		Incongruent	trials	require	the	
participant	to	suppress	the	reflexive	impulse	to	say	the	color	of	the	ink	in	order	to	
correctly	say	the	written	word	aloud.	Participants	take	longer	and	makes	more	errors	on	
incongruent	trials	because	of	the	increased	difficulty.			
The	Stroop	task	requires	individuals	to	engage	in	conflict	monitoring.		It	requires	
subjects	to	override	a	strong,	prepotent	response	in	order	to	accurately	complete	the	
trial.	Subjects	in	the	Stroop	task	are	habituated	to	quickly	viewing	a	word	and	quickly	
responding	by	naming	a	color.		Once	the	prepotent	response	is	established,	it	requires	
executive	control	to	step	in	and	inhibit	the	response.	Conflict	monitoring	is	about	
detecting	a	potential	conflict	between	goal	and	behavior,	and	cuing	the	brain	to	attempt	
to	resolve	the	conflict.		
The	Go/No-Go	task	is	another	behavioral	task	for	measuring	individual	
differences	in	conflict	monitoring.		Like	the	Stroop	color-naming	task,	the	Go/No-Go	task	
creates	a	habitual	prepotent	response	of	pressing	the	“Go”	button,	which	must	be	
unexpectedly	inhibited	when	the	rare	“No-Go”	signal	flashes	on	the	screen	in	place	of	
the	“Go”	signal.	This	chapter	utilizes	the	Go/No-Go	behavioral	task,	and	more	details	
about	the	experiment	are	below.	
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Although	accuracy	on	the	tasks	is	one	reasonable	measure	of	conflict	
monitoring,	researchers	have	also	expanded	the	scope	of	their	investigation	into	the	
neurocognitive	mechanisms	responsible	for	conflict	monitoring.	Cognitive	scientists	
studying	the	brain	have	learned	that	conflict	monitoring	largely	involves	the	anterior	
cingulate	cortex	and	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	(Botvinick	et	al.	2001;	Botvinick	
et	al.	2004;	Kerns	2004).		Neuropsychological	studies	of	lesion	patients	have	helped	
demonstrate	the	importance	of	ACC	related	executive	function	for	everyday	cognitive	
and	social	behavior	(Bush	et	al.,	2000;	Holroyd	&	Yeung,	2012).	Below,	we	outline	the	
role	of	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	as	it	relates	to	conflict	monitoring	in	more	detail.		
Anterior	Cingulate	Cortex	and	Psychological	Processes	
Conflict	monitoring	involves	functions	of	attention,	cognitive	control,	and	
memory.	Processes	like	this	are	virtually	never	fully	isolated	to	a	single	brain	region.	It	is	
important	to	understand	that	many	regions	of	the	brain	are	related	to	emotion	and	
cognition,	complexly	interweaving	many	different	brain	regions.	Strict	topographical	
understandings	of	brain	function	tend	to	underestimate	the	interplay	that	occurs	
between	many	regions	in	response	to	a	single	stimuli.	And,	of	course,	region-of-interest	
studies	(necessarily)	tend	to	downplay	the	role	of	the	whole-brain	in	favor	of	the	
particular	region	being	highlighted	and	investigated	in	a	particular	study.			
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Figure	11.	The	Anterior	Cingulate	Cortex.	
	
Those	warnings	understood,	research	has	nonetheless	demonstrated	a	
consistent	special	role	for	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	in	conflict	monitoring	and	
conflict	detection.	The	anterior	cingulate	cortex	is	the	frontal	area	of	the	cingulate	
cortex,	a	centrally	located	region	immediately	above	the	corpus	callosum	(see	yellow	
region	in	figure).	Over	the	past	few	decades,	researchers	have	broadly	understood	that	
the	ACC	is	related	to	cognition	and	emotion	in	the	human	brain,	with	particular	
specialization	in	attention	and	self-regulation	(Botvinick	et	al.,	2001;	Botvinick	et	al.,	
2004;	Bush	et	al.,	2000;	Kerns,	2004;	Van	Veen	&	Carter,	2002).	Research	also	suggests	
that	emotions	can	moderate	and	mediate	executive	action	and	attention,	as	well	
(Kanske	&	Kotz,	2011).		
		
143	
As	research	on	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	has	continued,	a	picture	has	been	
sketched	of	its	particular	specialization	in	emotional	and	cognitive	behavior.	
Researchers	have	found	the	ACC	is	particularly	active	compared	to	other	regions	when	
the	cognitive	processes	involve	attention,	detecting	errors,	and	self-regulation	(Amodio	
&	Frith,	2006;	Botvinick	et	al.,	2001;	Kanske	&	Kotz,	2011).		Additionally,	distinctive	ACC	
activity	spikes	when	individuals	engage	in	top-down	control	to	resolve	detected	conflicts	
during	information	processing	(Botvinick	et	a.	2001;	van	Veen	&	Carter	2002).			
Researchers	also	believe	that	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	has	a	broad	role	in	
directing	attention	during	behavioral	tasks	in	the	laboratory.	During	a	computerized	
behavioral	task	with	an	accuracy	component,	a	powerful	response	in	the	ACC	can	be	
observed	when	the	subject	realizes	that	they	have	made	an	error	when	attempting	to	
be	accurate.	This	error-detection	processing	appears	to	originate	from	the	ACC	(Gehring	
et	al.	1993),	and	researchers	have	also	found	general	conflict-monitoring	processing	also	
tied	to	the	ACC	(Luu	et	al.	2003).		In	theory,	the	ACC	serves	an	adaptive	purpose,	helping	
us	recognize	errors	between	our	passive	behavior	and	our	active	goals,	particularly	if	
our	current	habitual	behavior	needs	to	be	rapidly	interrupted	in	response	to	new	
information	or	a	new	threat.			
Additionally,	the	ACC	has	also	been	connected	to	modulation	of	autonomic	
activity	(Devinsky	et	al.	1995),	suggesting	a	role	in	subconscious	or	unconscious	behavior	
direction.		Lavin	et	al.	2013	note	that	neuro	activity	generated	in	the	ACC	is	produced	
when	subjects	process	conflicting	social	information,	as	well	as	detecting	pain.		Singer	et	
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al.	(2004)	and	Jackson	et	al.	(2005)	linked	ACC	activity	with	empathy	when	viewing	pain	
in	others.			
The	anterior	cingulate	cortex	has	also	been	connected	to	many	related	
psychological	processes,	including	self-regulation	and	anxiety.	Gray	and	McNaughton	
(2000)	looked	at	animal	models	of	mice,	lesion	studies	of	human	beings,	and	the	known	
effects	of	anxiolytic	drugs	(like	Xanax)	to	formulate	their	theory	of	anxiety	as	an	alarm	
system,	with	the	ACC	as	a	“cortical	alarm	bell”	(pg.	137).		The	ACC	alerts	the	mind	in	
response	to	states	of	uncertainty,	simultaneous	activation	of	conflicting	goals,	and	
erroneous	responding.		
Gray	and	McNaughton	2000	specifically	note	that	abstract	conceptual	goals	are	
likely	to	be	regulated	in	much	the	same	way	as	simple,	concrete	goals.	It	should	be	
expected,	according	to	them,	that	more	advanced	cognitive	processing	will	follow	the	
same	general	rules.		Anxiety	about	completing	a	dissertation	follows	the	same	broad	
neurocognitive	rules	of	anxiety	as	walking	into	an	ominous	cave	where	predators	may	
be	present.		
Research	continues	to	confirm	the	Gray	and	McNaughton	model	of	anxiety,	and	
the	role	that	the	ACC	plays	in	the	detection	of	states	that	trigger	anxiety.	The	ACC	is	
important	for	the	types	of	inhibited	responding	that	is	characteristic	of	anxiety	(Hajcak	
&	Foti	2008;	Hajcak	et	al.	2003)	and	for	the	minimization	of	prediction	errors	
(Ridderinkhof	et	al.	2004).		A	prediction	error	is	when	you	expected	an	outcome	but	you	
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turned	out	to	be	wrong.		This	concept	is	highly	compatible	with	the	idea	of	conflict	and	
error	detection	noted	above.	
The	ACC,	thus,	is	part	of	the	general	system	for	regulating	and	modifying	
behavior	by	signaling	when	control	is	needed,	usually	as	a	result	of	some	anxiety-
producing	event	such	as	the	commission	of	an	error	(Holroyd	&	Coles	2002),	the	
detection	of	conflict	(Yeung	et	al.	2004)	or	the	experience	of	uncertainty	(Critchley	et	al.	
2001;	Hirsh	&	Inzlicht	2008).	
You	can	see	that	researchers	are	still	triangulating	the	detailed	functions	of	the	
anterior	cingulate	cortex,	but	work	so	far	has	demonstrated	a	number	of	pathways	for	
how	the	ACC	affects,	facilitates,	or	mediates	a	particular	kind	of	attentional	information	
processing	concerned	with	making	mistakes	and	correcting	behavior.	In	other	words,	
the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	seems	to	play	an	especially	important	role	in	conflict	
monitoring.		
Below,	we	turn	to	the	Go/No-Go	behavioral	task	and	Gray’s	dual-systems	of	
behavioral	motivation,	to	try	to	understand	how	conflict	monitoring	is	related	to	Gray’s	
system	of	behavior	inhibition	and	what	this	could	mean	for	political	ideology.			
Go/No-Go	and	Gray’s	Behavioral	Motivation	Systems			
The	Go/No-Go	behavioral	task	has	been	used	by	researchers	as	a	measure	of	
individual	differences	in	behavioral	inhibition.	In	past	chapters,	I	argued	that	Gray’s	dual	
theory	of	behavioral	motivations	is	potentially	important	to	understanding	
psychophysiological	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives.	Below,	I	sketch	an	
		
146	
outline	for	why	Gray’s	work	is	relevant	to	conflict	monitoring	in	the	anterior	cingulate	
cortex.			
To	review	quickly,	Gray	(1982;	1990;	Gray	&	McNaughton	2000)	proposed	that	
animals	have	a	behavioral	activation	system	(BAS)	that	motivates	behavior	towards	
goals	and	a	behavioral	inhibition	system	(BIS)	that	halts	ongoing	behavior	in	response	to	
novel	or	unexpected	stimuli.	The	behavioral	activation	system	is	conceptualized	as	the	
go	system,	motivating	behavior	towards	the	pursuit	of	goals.		Goals,	in	this	context,	
refer	to	the	hundreds	of	directed	impulses	and	small	plans	we	have	on	a	daily	basis.		
Colloquially,	we	often	tend	to	think	of	goals	as	big	picture	ideas—you	have	a	goal	
to	complete	this	research	paper,	or	a	goal	to	leave	work	early	enough	to	walk	the	dog	
before	dinner.		But	Gray’s	definition	of	goal-directed	behavior	goes	to	a	much	smaller	
level	(we	might	colloquially	think	of	them	as	micro-goals).		Under	this	framework,	it	is	
considered	goal-directed	behavior	to	wheel	your	rolling	office	chair	over	to	the	phone,	
so	that	you	can	place	a	call.		It	is	also	a	goal	to	pull	a	tissue	from	the	box	to	blow	your	
nose.		These	goals	require	behavior,	and	Gray’s	theory	conceptualizes	the	behavioral	
activation	system	as	the	mechanism	for	initiating	goal-directed	behavior.			
The	problem	for	us	living	things	is	that	we	cannot	pursue	these	little	goals	with	
reckless	abandon.		Our	environmental	situation	or	context	can	change	rapidly	without	
notice,	requiring	us	to	change	our	immediate	plans	and	halt	ongoing	behavior.		For	
example,	your	plan	to	roll	the	chair	over	to	the	telephone	needs	to	quickly	be	changed	
when	you	hear	the	sharp,	distressed	bark	of	the	dog	underfoot.		When	you	hear	the	
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noise	of	the	bark,	or	feel	the	bump	of	his	tail	under	the	chair	wheels,	you	will	
immediately	halt	your	executing	plan	in	reaction	to	the	new	information.		To	inhibit	our	
current	intended	behavior	requires	the	behavioral	inhibition	system.		You	should	think	
of	the	behavioral	inhibition	system	as	being	the	stop	mechanism.	It	halts	ongoing	
behavior,	attempts	to	disengage	us	from	danger,	and	allows	us	to	create	a	new	
behavioral	plan	in	response	to	the	new	information.			
Simultaneously	in	our	minds,	we	are	engaged	in	goal-oriented	behavior	while	
also	keeping	persistent	surveillance	over	our	changing	environment.	This	is	the	heart	of	
Gray’s	dual	process	system—humans	and	animals	alike	have	a	behavioral	activation	
system	that	is	engaged	in	current	goal-directed	behavior	while	also	an	active	behavioral	
inhibition	system	that	is	quietly	surveying	the	environment	for	emergent	new	
information.			
Now,	a	critical	question	has	emerged	about	what	behavioral	inhibition	means	in	
psychological	research.	Amodio	et	al.	2008	note,	“the	primary	source	of	ambiguity	
concerns	whether	BIS	is	associated	with	the	tendency	to	halt	ongoing	behavior	or	to	
engage	in	active	avoidance	behavior	in	response	to	a	potential	threat.	On	one	hand,	
much	research	has	operationalized	BIS	in	terms	of	behavioral	inhibition,	as	originally	
suggested	by	Gray…	on	the	other	hand,	many	researchers	have	described	BIS	in	terms	of	
behavioral	avoidance”	(12).	These	two	conceptualizations	of	the	Gray	system—
inhibition	versus	motivational	avoidance—are	rather	different.		Behavioral	inhibition	is	
the	halting	of	ongoing	behavior	based	on	new	information—it	is	the	interruption	of	
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action.		In	contrast,	behavioral	avoidance	is	actively	avoiding	something	based	on	new	
information—it	is	the	action	of	avoidance.		Behavioral	inhibition	is	about	stopping	a	
plan,	whereas	behavioral	avoidance	is	about	starting	a	plan	of	avoidance.		
Both	functions	could	be	linked	to	the	concept	of	conflict	monitoring	as	they	are	
related	to	detecting	a	conflict,	stopping	conflictual	behavior,	and	redirecting	behavior	to	
avoid	the	conflict.		Still,	conceptual	clarity	is	necessary	because	stopping	a	plan	and	
starting	a	plan	could	be	fundamentally	different	behavioral	motivations,	threatening	to	
confuse	the	underlying	psychological	mechanisms	that	we	look	at	in	this	dissertation.		
Especially	as	they	intersect	with	approach-avoidance	theories.	
Amodio	et	al.	2008	examine	this	conceptual	confusion	directly.		Based	on	a	
review	of	the	literature,	they	conceptualize	BIS	as	specifically	about	inhibition.	They	
argue	that	Gray’s	original	conceptualization	is	theoretically	more	akin	to	halting	ongoing	
behavior	rather	than	initiating	avoidance	behavior.		Then,	using	behavioral	and	
electroencephalography	measures,	Amodio	and	colleagues	find	that	the	BIS	self-report	
(based	on	the	questionnaire	from	Carver	&	White,	1994)	is	correlated	with	ACC	related	
activity	on	a	Go/No-Go	task.		This	means	the	BIS	self-report	is	related	to	an	attentional	
system	for	monitoring	response	conflicts.	(A	deeper	discussion	of	BIS,	BAS,	inhibition	
and	motivational	avoidance	is	included	in	Chapter	Four.)		Additionally,	they	find	that	
self-reported	BIS	is	correlated	with	increased	error-related	negativity	in	the	anterior	
cingulate	cortex	when	subjects	make	errors	on	No-Go	trials.		In	other	words,	when	
subjects	are	supposed	to	inhibit	their	button-pressing,	but	fail	to	do	so,	the	anterior	
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cingulate	cortex	has	a	sharp	moment	of	activity	to	reflect	the	detected	error.	This	
further	establishes	the	relationship	between	Gray’s	BIS	scale	and	ACC	related	activity	
during	the	Go/No-Go	task.	
Thus,	this	chapter	considers	the	BIS	system	a	method	of	halting	ongoing	
behavior,	suggesting	that	it	is	important	or	essential	to	the	process	of	conflict	
monitoring.	Additionally,	I	conceptualize	the	Go/No-Go	task	as	a	behavioral	measure	
designed	to	test	conflict	monitoring	in	a	way	consistent	with	Gray’s	theories	of	a	
behavioral	inhibition	system.	The	experiment	in	this	chapter	is	the	behavioral	and	neural	
complement	to	the	survey	data	on	BIS	in	Chapter	Four.	Below,	we	complete	the	
literature	review	by	looking	at	how	conflict	monitoring	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex,	a	
feature	of	Gray’s	behavioral	inhibition	system,	could	be	related	to	political	ideology.		
Go/No-Go	Task	and	Political	Ideology	
The	Go/No-Go	task	has	already	been	applied	to	political	ideology	twice	and	
religious	belief	once.	Before	wading	in,	though,	we	should	pause	on	what	we	might	
expect	to	find.		From	the	summary	of	literature	above,	we	understand	that	conflict	
monitoring	is	a	general	mechanism	for	detecting	when	one’s	habitual	response	
tendency	is	mismatched	with	responses	required	by	the	current	situation.	We	
understand	that	conflict	monitoring	is	conceptually	related	to	Gray’s	behavioral	
inhibition	system,	a	powerful	cognitive	feature	of	how	we	interact	with	the	world	on	a	
minute-by-minute	scale.	We	also	understand	that	conflict	monitoring	is	not	restricted	to	
autonomic	body	systems	or	low-level	cognition—it	could	just	as	easily	be	related	to	
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abstract	thought.	Given	the	above,	how	do	these	processes	influence	high	level	abstract	
thinking,	such	as	liberal	and	conservative	political	beliefs?	
Generally	speaking,	the	political	psychology	of	ideology	literature	predicts	
conservatives	to	be	both	motivationally	avoidant	and	inhibited	in	cognitive	style.		Jost’s	
Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	and	Hibbing’s	Negativity	Bias	Theory	address	this	
issue	only	in	passing,	as	our	investigation	in	Chapter	Two	details.		Recall	that	prior	
theories	in	political	psychology	have	conflated	approach-avoidance	tendencies	with	
emotional	sensitivity	differences.		Approach	and	avoidance	sensitivity	is	not	the	same	as	
emotional	sensitivity.	The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	of	Jost	and	colleagues	
posits	that	conservatives	are	psychologically	motivated	by	needs	to	reduce	uncertainty,	
ambiguity,	threat,	and	disgust	(Jost	et	al.,	2003).		The	psychological	needs	of	
conservatives	ought	to	be	associated	with	increased	sensitivity	to	avoidance	and	
inhibition	signals.		As	avoiding	uncertainty,	ambiguity,	threat,	and	disgust	are	connected	
to	Gray’s	theory	of	behavioral	avoidance	and	behavioral	avoidance	has	a	connection	to	
inhibition	in	Gray’s	theories,	we	might	expect	to	see	conservatives	being	higher	in	
behavioral	inhibition	as	well.			
The	relationship	of	ideology	to	motivational	avoidance,	inhibition,	and	negative	
affect	has	been	explored	in	prior	chapters.	This	chapter	makes	the	claim	that	conflict	
monitoring	is	a	part	of	the	behavioral	inhibition	system.	With	that	in	mind,	we	can	
develop	hypotheses	on	the	relationship	of	conflict	monitoring	to	political	ideology,	by	
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sketching	a	picture	of	the	relationship	of	motivational	avoidance	and	inhibition	in	
ideology.	
Uncertainty	avoidance	in	conservatives	is	part	of	a	general	predisposition	
towards	caution	and	general	avoidance	(Jost	et	al.,	2003;	Jost	et	al.,	2009).	Jost’s	
theories	also	include	the	idea	of	conservatives	being	more	inhibited.	For	example,	Jost	
and	colleagues	repeatedly	cite	the	Block	and	Block	(2006)	study	that	describes	that	
“inhibited”	preschoolers	disproportionally	grew	up	to	be	political	conservatives	(Jost	et	
al.,	2009;	Jost,	2009).		This	evidence	is	used	to	demonstrate	that	the	psychological	
differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	noted	by	their	Motivated	Social	
Cognition	Theory	occur	early	in	life,	before	the	emergence	of	political	awareness.	While	
motivational	avoidance	and	inhibition	are	different	psychological	constructs,	as	Amodio	
et	al.	2008	details,	it	could	certainly	be	the	case	that	conservatives	have	more	sensitivity	
to	both,	and	we	have	reason	to	believe	that	sensitivity	to	one	would	be	positively	
correlated	with	the	other.		
The	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	of	John	Hibbing	and	colleagues,	on	the	other	hand,	
posits	that	conservatives	have	more	sensitivity	to	negative	emotions.	This	causes	
conservatives	to	exhibit	stronger	physiological	reactions	and	focus	greater	attention	to	
negative	stimuli	(Hibbing	et	al	2014).		Again,	emotional	sensitivity	is	not	the	same	
construct	as	motivational	avoidance,	inhibition,	or	conflict	monitoring,	so	Hibbing	and	
colleagues	have	not	explored	how	either	would	be	related	to	their	theory.	In	my	view,	
being	sensitive	to	negative	emotions,	though,	has	clear	overlap	with	conflict	monitoring.	
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Behavioral	avoidance—the	avoiding	of	unpleasant	things—is	typically	an	emotionally	
negative	experience.	Feelings	of	fear,	disgust,	and	sadness	are	all	negatively	valenced	
and	associated	with	motivated	avoidance.	Most	negative	emotions	trigger	motivational	
avoidance,	although	there	is	one	exception.	Anger	is	emotionally	negative	but	
behaviorally	causes	individuals	to	approach,	as	it	directs	the	angry	individual	to	engage	
with	the	subject	of	the	anger.			
In	another	Hibbing	paper,	Dodd	et	al.	2012	develop	the	idea	that	individual-level	
variation	in	physiological	and	attentional	responses	to	aversive	and	appetitive	stimuli	
are	correlated	with	political	ideology.		Using	skin	conductance	measures	and	eyetracking	
software,	they	find	that	conservatives	have	more	sensitivity	to	aversive	stimuli	while	
liberals	have	more	sensitivity	to	appetitive	(pleasing)	stimuli.	They	demonstrate	that	
those	on	the	right	not	only	respond	more	strongly	to	aversive	images	but	also	devote	
more	attention	to	aversive	images.		
The	research	from	Dodd,	Hibbing,	and	colleagues	does	not	mention	conflict	
monitoring	specifically,	but	their	study	of	attention	opens	the	idea	that	conflict	
monitoring	differences	may	exist.		They	find	that	both	liberals	and	conservatives	pay	
more	attention	to	aversive	images	than	appetitive	images,	but	conservatives’	attention	
to	aversive	images	is	relatively	greater	and	more	pronounced.		Dodd	et	al.	2012	suggest	
that	attention	should	be	studied	alongside	other	psychological	and	physiological	
differences	of	liberals	and	conservatives.		
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Thus,	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory	would	seem	to	be	supportive	of	there	being	a	
relationship	between	conservatives	and	sensitivity	to	aversive	stimuli.		Hibbing,	et	al.,	
2014	note	several	studies	that	have	found	that	conservatives	focus	more	on	threatening	
images	and	react	more	strongly	to	being	startled	(e.g.	Dodd	et	al.,	2012;	Oxley	et	al.,	
2008).		These	reactions	should	properly	be	categorized	as	of	an	“inhibitory”	nature	
rather	than	motivationally	avoidant—the	motivational	drive	to	avoidance	occurs	
chronologically	after	the	startle	reflex	in	response	that	Hibbing’s	team	observed.			
Overall,	while	both	theories	would	be	deeply	interested	in	how	conservatives	
would	differ	from	liberals	on	conflict	monitoring	they	have	thus	far	declined	to	wade	
deeply	into	the	topic.	Three	different	papers	have	looked	at	these	issues	in	the	brains	of	
liberals	and	conservatives	using	the	Go/No-Go	task.		We	take	them	up	below.		
Amodio,	Jost,	and	the	Go/No-Go	Behavioral	Task	
Amodio	et	al.	(2007)	is	the	first	study	to	look	at	conflict	monitoring	in	liberals	and	
conservatives	on	a	Go/No-Go	task	(John	Jost	is	one	of	the	co-authors).		They	look	at	
behavioral	and	electroencephalography	data	during	a	conventional	Go/No-Go	task.	This	
study	broke	new	ground	in	the	literature	by	being	one	of	the	first	to	explore	cognitive	
styles	of	liberals	and	conservatives	with	neuroscience	techniques.		
In	the	Go/No-Go	task,	participants	must	quickly	respond	to	a	frequently	
presented	Go	stimulus.		Participants	are	habituated	to	expect	the	Go	signal,	which	they	
receive	about	80%	of	the	time	at	random	intervals.		Each	time	the	participant	sees	the	
Go	signal,	they	must	quickly	(within	1000	milliseconds)	press	the	Go	button.	However,	
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20%	of	the	time,	at	unpredictable	intervals,	a	No-Go	signal	appears.		Upon	seeing	the	
unusual	No-Go	signal,	participants	must	withhold	the	habitual	pressing	of	the	Go	
button.	As	the	Go	signal	has	become	the	prepotent	response,	participants	struggle	to	
accurately	inhibit	pressing	the	Go	button.	The	difficulty	of	the	struggle	is	demonstrated	
by	decreased	accuracy	during	No-Go	trials.		Where	Go	trials	typically	have	an	accuracy	
rate	of	greater	than	98	percent,	No-Go	trials	can	have	a	significantly	decreased	accuracy	
rate	of	70	percent	or	less.		It	takes	careful	attention	and	cognitive	effort	to	resist	the	
habitual	Go	response	in	response	to	the	No-Go	signal.		
To	assess	performance	on	the	task,	researchers	calculate	an	accuracy	rate	for	Go	
trials	and	a	separate	accuracy	rate	for	No-Go	trials.	The	process	of	conflict	monitoring	is	
observed	in	how	the	participants	handle	the	No-Go	trials.		Fewer	errors	on	No-Go	trials	
represents	stronger,	or	more	successful,	conflict	monitoring.			
Electroencephalography	(EEG)	data	can	also	be	collected	during	a	Go/No-Go	
task,	which	gives	another	measure	of	behavioral	data	corresponding	to	conflict	
monitoring.	As	noted	above,	researchers	have	found	EEG	related	activity	during	the	
Go/No-Go	task	to	be	especially	distinctive	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex.		
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Figure	12.	The	Error-Related	Negativity	Component.	
	
An	event-related	potential	(ERP)	is	a	brain	response	measured	with	
electroencephalography	in	response	to	a	stimuli.	Observing	ACC	activity	during	a	No-Go	
error	(that	is,	when	the	subject	fails	to	inhibit	pressing	the	Go	button)	reveals	an	
particular	ERP	component	called	error-related	negativity	(ERN).	As	observed	in	Figure	
12,	Error-related	negativity	is	a	sharp	spike	in	negative	voltage	that	originates	in	the	ACC	
region	of	the	brain.	This	distinctive	brain	activity,	typically	occurring	50	milliseconds	
after	the	subject	has	locked	in	their	response,	represents	the	subject’s	realization	that	
they	pressed	the	button	when	they	ought	not	have.		A	stronger	error-related	negativity	
response	is	associated	with	greater	conflict	monitoring.		
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Figure	13.	Common	ERP	Components.	
	
Another	event-related	potential	component	correlated	with	the	Go/No-Go	task	
is	the	N2.	The	N2	is	the	second	negative	peak	observed	in	the	ERP	waveform	(see	Figure	
13).		A	stronger	(more	negative)	N2	peak	is	associated	with	increased	conflict	
monitoring	activity	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex.			
In	congruence	with	the	literature	described	above,	Amodio	and	colleagues	
conceptualized	the	Go/No-Go	task	as	a	measure	of	conflict	monitoring,	which	is	part	of	
a	self-regulation	process.	They	also	agree	with	current	literature	that	conflict	monitoring	
is	positively	correlated	with	neurocognitive	activity	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	
(ACC),	in	particular	the	two	event-related	potentials	known	as	the	error-related	
negativity	component	(ERN)	and	the	second	negative	wave	peak	(N2).	
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So,	which	ideological	group	would	have	relatively	higher	conflict	monitoring	as	
measured	in	the	Go/No-Go	task?		Following	Jost’s	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory,		
liberals	are	thought	to	be	more	cognitively	flexible,	reflecting	higher	tolerance	for	
ambiguity	and	complexity,	and	greater	openness	to	new	experiences.	Conservatives,	in	
contrast,	are	cognitively	rigid,	tending	to	be	more	structured	and	persistent	in	their	
decision	making.		Amodio	and	colleagues	(2007)	posit	that	liberals’	greater	cognitive	
flexibility	would	translate	into	stronger	and	more	active	conflict	monitoring.	Thus,	they	
predict	in	their	2007	article	that	liberals	would	make	fewer	accuracy	errors	on	the	
Go/No-Go	behavioral	task,	and	would	have	stronger	ACC	related	activity	including	larger	
average	amplitudes	for	the	ERN	and	N2	components.		Their	hypotheses	are	confirmed	in	
the	paper.		
This	theory	is,	however,	a	departure	from	the	literature	on	Motivated	Social	
Cognition	Theory.		Recall	from	the	literature	review	that	Amodio,	in	a	different	paper,	
(Amodio	et	al.	2008)	establishes	that	the	Go/No-Go	task	(and	related	ACC	activity)	is	
primarily	a	measure	of	behavioral	inhibition.	Our	summary	above	of	the	political	
psychology	of	ideology—both	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	of	Jost	and	the	
Negativity	Bias	Theory	of	Hibbing—suggests	that	conservatives	would	likely	be	more	
inhibited.		It	seems	clear	that	political	conservatives	ought	to	have	more	conflict	
monitoring	or	a	stronger	neural	response	to	conflict	monitoring	processing.			
The	puzzle	continues.	In	the	literature	review	above,	you	can	see	that	the	
Go/No-Go	task,	which	taps	into	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex,	is	consistently	related	to	a	
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number	of	attentional	cognitive	processes,	including	conflict	monitoring,	response	
inhibition,	and	error	detection.		Noticeably	absent	from	this	list	is	“cognitive	flexibility.”	
So	where	does	“cognitive	flexibility”	come	from?		Amodio	and	his	colleagues	appear	to	
conceptualize	the	Go/No-Go	behavioral	task	differently	between	papers.		In	Amodio	et	
al.	2008,	when	searching	for	a	neural	correlate	of	Gray’s	Behavioral	Inhibition	System,	
they	report	that	ACC	related	behavior	from	the	Go/No-Go	task	is	correlated	with	self-
reported	BIS	scores,	signifying	that	the	Go/No-Go	task	is	a	measure	of	behavioral	
inhibition.		We	walk	away	from	that	paper	thinking	that	the	Go/No-Go	task	is	about	
behavioral	inhibition.		And,	if	you	independently	consulted	with	Jostian	theory	of	
conservatism	as	motivation	social	cognition,	you	would	assume	that	conservatives	are	
likely	more	inhibited	and,	therefore,	would	have	a	stronger	performance	on	the	Go/No-
Go	task	and	more	ACC	related	activity	during	the	task.			
However,	Amodio	et	al.	2007	interprets	the	task	differently	from	Amodio	et	al.	
2008.		Instead	of	behavioral	inhibition,	now	this	disposition	is	called	cognitive	flexibility.	
For	this	paper,	Amodio	and	colleagues	state	that	ACC	activity	from	the	Go/No-Go	task	
reflects	a	general	mechanism	for	monitoring	response	conflict,	and	they	theoretically	
connect	this	general	mechanism	to	a	more	flexible	cognitive	style	for	liberals.	As	they	
believe	conservatives	are	more	cognitively	rigid,	they	will	be	less	sensitive	to	conflict	
monitoring	compared	to	liberals.		Thus,	liberals	should	have	greater	conflict-related	ACC	
activity	on	the	task	compared	to	conservatives.			
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Replicating	Amodio	and	Jost	in	the	Go/No-Go	Task	
To	sort	out	this	potential	confusion,	it	would	be	useful	to	see	how	other	
researchers	have	looked	at	the	Go/No-Go	task	and	political	ideology.	Only	one	
published	paper	has	directly	replicated	Amodio	et	al.	2007.		Weissflog	et	al.	(2013)	
purportedly	confirm	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	findings	that	liberals	made	fewer	errors	and	
produced	larger	ACC-generated	ERPs	(ERN	and	NoGo	N2).		A	key	contribution	for	their	
study	is	that	they	go	beyond	self-identification	of	political	ideology,	employing	related	
scales	of	egalitarianism	and	traditionalism.		This	is	an	important	extension	of	the	
Amodio	and	Jost	work	because	they	(Amodio	et	al.	2007)	are	limited	to	a	self-
identification	scale.			
Weissflog	and	colleagues	find	that	increased	attitudes	favoring	social	equality	
(egalitarianism)	had	the	greatest	contribution	to	ERN	and	N2	effects,	and	behavioral	
accuracy	on	the	task	was	more	strongly	associated	with	openness	to	social	change	
(traditionalism).		In	general,	their	findings	follow	the	same	story	as	the	Amodio	et	al.	
2007	paper,	finding	political	liberalism	across	their	scales	was	associated	with	improved	
accuracy	and	stronger	ACC	related	neuroactivity	on	the	Go/No-Go	task.		Like	Amodio	et	
al.	2007,	Weissflog	and	colleagues	interpret	this	finding	as	consistent	with	the	
Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	(Jost	et	al.	2003),	claiming	this	as	support	for	the	idea	
that	liberals	are	more	cognitively	flexible	than	conservatives.	Like	Amodio	and	Jost,	
there	is	no	account	for	how	inhibition	may	or	may	not	be	associated	with	political	
liberalism.		
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There	are	some	puzzling	findings	within	the	Weissflog	et	al.	2013	article	worth	
considering.	First,	there	are	some	issues	with	the	sample	employed.		The	initial	pool	was	
256	Canadian	undergraduates,	but	only	34	were	chosen	for	the	experiment.		This	very	
small	sample	had	only	two	males,	raising	questions	about	gender	as	a	confound.		
Moreover,	on	the	self-placement	scale,	they	lack	solid	representation	from	
conservatives	and	oversample	of	extreme	liberals.	13	were	somewhat	to	extremely	
liberal,	13	neither,	8	were	somewhat	to	moderately	conservative.		Zero	participants	
were	near	the	high	limit	of	conservatism.	Amodio	et	al.	2007	have	this	same	problem—
their	article	and	appendices	do	not	contain	clear	write-ups	of	the	variable	descriptives,	
but	the	scatterplot	of	the	relationship	between	ideology	and	ERN	amplitudes	in	Amodio	
et	al.	2007	reveals	very	few	moderate	conservatives	and	zero	extreme	conservatives.		
Additionally,	the	Weissflog	paper	finds	no	relationship	between	accuracy	on	
NoGo	trials	and	a	measure	of	egalitarianism	(p	>	0.41),	which	is	inconsistent	with	their	
stated	theory	and	the	theory	of	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	paper.	With	egalitarianism	being	
one	of	the	major	pillars	of	the	Jost	et	al.	2003	theory	of	conservatism	as	motivated	
social	cognition,	we	need	more	information	to	try	to	understand	why	the	theory	
appears	to	break	down	on	this	key	relationship.			
Third,	Weissflog	and	colleagues	do	fail	to	replicate	one	of	the	key	relationships	in	
Amodio	et	al.	2007.	Recall	that	Amodio	and	colleagues	find	two	ERP	components	to	be	
related	to	political	ideology,	the	ERN	and	the	N2.		These	two	components	are	supporting	
evidence	to	the	idea	that	conflict	monitoring	is	related	to	political	ideology.		Although	
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Weissflog	and	colleagues	find	consistent	results	with	the	N2	in	their	study,	they	fail	to	
replicate	the	finding	on	the	ERN	(r	=	0.27,	p	=	0.13).		The	ERN	is	very	important	to	the	
claims	in	the	Amodio	article,	and	it	is	puzzling	that	the	findings	do	not	replicate.	When	
Jost	and	Amodio	(2012)	examine	the	Weissflog	study	in	a	review	paper,	they	do	not	
comment	on	this	counterintuitive	finding.			
Although	Weissflog	is	the	only	direct	replication	of	Amodio	and	Jost	on	the	
Go/No-Go	task,	there	is	another	study	that	will	be	of	interest	to	us	with	regard	to	
political	ideology.		Inzlicht	et	al.	2009,	in	two	small	samples	(n	=	28	&	29),	study	the	ACC	
during	a	Stroop	color-naming	task	(described	above)	as	it	relates	to	religious	conviction.	
They	theorize	that	religious	conviction	should	be	related	to	reduced	activity	in	the	
anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	because	the	religious	belief	system	helps	to	reduce	
incidents	of	uncertainty,	conflict,	and	error	by	strengthening	convictions	and	narrowing	
attention	away	from	inconsistencies.		Inzlicht	and	colleagues	indeed	find	that	weaker	
religiosity	is	connected	to	stronger	ERN.		As	Jost	and	Amodio	2012	note,	“given	the	
strong	association	between	conservatism	and	religiosity,	this	finding	is	broadly	
consistent	with	[our]	results”	(60).			
Unfortunately,	this	study	also	has	a	few	puzzling	interpretation	issues.	First,	
religious	belief	is	fundamentally	different	than	political	belief,	even	if	the	two	are	
typically	correlated.	And,	in	fact,	Inzlicht	et	al.	find	no	relationship	between	political	
conservatism	and	religious	belief	in	their	sample.	Jost	and	Amodio	did	not	report	
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religiosity	in	their	2007	paper,	so	we	do	not	know	if	they	were	able	to	measure	or	
control	for	it.			
Second,	Inzlicht	and	colleagues	wrap	their	theory	around	the	idea	of	religious	
belief	being	a	kind	of	anxiolytic	drug	that	protects	believers	from	cognitive	conflict,	
reducing	the	need	for	conflict	detection.	The	theory	of	Jost	and	Amodio	around	
cognitive	flexibility	does	not	link	into	the	anxiolytic	drug	hypothesis,	and	we	could	use	
more	theoretical	work	to	understand	what	the	connection	could	be.		
Third,	another	issue	for	connecting	the	Inzlicht	et	al.	2009	work	to	the	Amodio	
and	Jost	findings	is	that	Inzlicht	et	al.	find	no	relationship	between	cognitive	rigidity	and	
religious	belief	(their	table	1,	pg.	388).	Jost	and	Amodio	2012	(and,	Amodio	et	al.	2007)	
theorize	that	cognitive	rigidity	is	the	reason	why	liberals	outperform	conservatives	in	
the	conflict	monitoring	tasks.		Inzlicht	demonstrates	in	study	1	that	religion	drives	these	
effects	on	the	behavioral	task,	and	not	cognitive	rigidity	does	not.		This	leaves	a	puzzle	
for	our	interpretation,	because	Inzlicht	and	colleagues	seem	to	test	an	important	part	of	
the	Amodio	and	Jost	hypothesis,	and	then	rejects	it.		
Finally,	as	with	Weissflog	et	al.	2013,	Inzlicht	et	al.	2009	actually	deliver	another	
failed	replication	of	a	central	Amodio	et	al.	2007	finding.		As	before,	the	ERN	and	
conservatism	results	fail	to	replicate	(their	table	3	on	pg.	390),	with	Inzlicht	and	
colleagues	finding	no	relationship	between	ERN	activity	and	political	conservatism.	
Additionally,	Inzlicht	and	colleagues	find	no	correlation	between	accuracy	on	the	task	
and	political	conservatism	whatsoever	(their	table	3,	pg.	390).	Remember	that	Inzlicht	et	
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al.	2009	is	not	using	a	Go/No-Go	task,	but	is	instead	using	a	Stroop	task.	These	two	tasks	
are	conceptually	similar	in	the	way	they	are	used	by	Inzlicht	et	al.	and	Amodio	et	al.		
The	discussion	above	illustrates	the	need	for	more	replication	of	the	Amodio	et	
al.	2007	finding.		The	remainder	of	this	chapter	describes	my	study	which	is	intended	to	
directly	replicate	Amodio	et	al.	2007	using	a	larger	sample	of	non-students	while	closely	
imitating	the	exact	parameters	of	the	Amodio	Go/No-Go	task.	After	I	describe	my	
findings,	I	will	summarize	how	the	three	published	studies	intersect	with	the	findings	of	
this	chapter.	
Hypotheses		
This	chapter	focuses	on	a	replication	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007.		Although	the	
literature	review	above	raises	more	questions	than	answers	about	what	kind	of	effects	
we	ought	to	find	for	political	ideology,	I	will	lay	out	the	same	hypotheses	as	Amodio	et	
al.	2007.		The	Conservatism	as	Motivated	Social	Cognition	theory	posits	that	
conservatives	have	greater	cognitive	rigidity	compared	to	liberals.		This	cognitive	rigidity	
causes	conservatives	to	be	less	adaptive	to	new	and	unexpected	information.	In	a	
Go/No-Go	task,	Amodio	and	Jost	expect	that	liberals	will	have	a	stronger	(more	
negative)	ERN	response	to	making	errors	on	No-Go	trials,	a	stronger	(more	negative)	N2	
component	on	successful	No-Go	trials,	and	greater	behavioral	accuracy	on	the	NoGo	
trials.	The	hypotheses	are	summarized	in	Table	9.	
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Table	9.	Go/No-Go	and	ACC	Hypotheses.			
	
Method	
Participants	
Participants	for	this	study	are	the	same	as	in	the	prior	chapters,	but	crucial	
details	will	be	repeated	here	for	completeness.	Fifty-one	non-student	adults	(age	24-52	
years,	M	=	30.7,	sd	=	5.8)	served	as	participants	(32	female,	19	male).	The	testing	session	
averaged	less	than	two	hours	and	30	minutes,	including	breaks	and	the	
electroencephalography	capping	process.	Participants	completed	four	tasks	during	the	
session,	and	they	had	short	breaks	of	five	minutes	between	tasks.	Participants	were	
compensated	at	a	rate	of	$20/hour,	with	a	minimum	payment	of	$40	and	a	maximum	of	
$50	for	the	session.		
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Procedure	
After	arriving	at	the	laboratory,	participants	were	briefed	on	the	tasks	they	
would	perform,	and	asked	to	sign	consent	forms.		Afterwards,	they	were	led	to	a	dimly-
lit,	sound-proofed	room	in	a	comfortable	chair,	approximately	three	feet	from	a	nearby	
computer	monitor.	Experimenters	were	blind	to	participants’	ideology	scores	and	other	
attitudes.		
After	the	capping	process	was	completed,	and	testing	was	successful,	
participants	completed	four	behavioral	tasks	in	total,	with	numerous	breaks.	The	total	
capping	time	was	about	20-40	minutes,	and	the	total	testing	time	(including	breaks)	was	
about	110	minutes.	The	Go/No-Go	behavioral	task,	the	subject	of	this	chapter’s	
investigation,	was	the	first	of	the	four	tasks.		The	Go/No-Go	task	took	approximately	25	
minutes	to	complete.		
Recording	the	EEG	Signals	
As	detailed	in	Chapter	Five,	I	employed	software	techniques	to	convert	our	64	
channels	of	recorded	data	to	virtual	channels	that	correspond	to	the	traditional	10-20	
system,	which	allows	comparison	of	my	work	to	other	Go/No-Go	studies.	These	virtual	
channels	in	the	10-20	system	allow	researchers	using	diverse	systems	to	be	able	to	
compare	their	results	via	a	common	mapping	of	scalp	electrodes.	The	virtual	electrode	
system	in	this	chapter,	and	the	general	data	filtering	procedure	follows	the	
specifications	of	Chapter	Five.		
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As	with	Chapter	Five	data,	eyeblinks	and	other	artifacts	in	the	ERP	signal	were	
manually	screened.		ERP	signals	were	filtered	according	to	typical	conventions.	In	this	
case,	we	used	relatively	strong	filtering,	removing	frequencies	below	1	Hz	and	above	30	
Hz	(96	dB,	zero-phase	shift).		This	strong	filtering	imitates	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	study.				
Measuring	Conflict	Monitoring	on	the	Go/No-Go	
Figure	14.	An	Individual	Trial	of	Go/No-Go	Task.		
	
The	procedure	for	collecting	EEG	data	on	the	Go/No-Go	task	follows	Amodio	et	
al.	2007	closely.	Subjects	learned	the	Go/No-Go	task	with	100	practice	trials,	and	then	
completed	three	blocks	of	200	trials	each,	for	a	total	of	600	trials.		Figure	14	visually	
represents	an	individual	trial	in	the	Go/No-Go	task.	A	fixation	cross	is	first	shown	for	
500ms,	to	focus	and	reset	attention	while	steading	the	eyes	and	face.	Then,	a	letter	
briefly	flashes	on	the	screen.		The	letter	“M”	was	a	Go	signal,	and	the	letter	“W”	was	a	
NoGo	signal.	Participants	then	had	900ms	to	response.		During	a	Go	trial,	when	the	
letter	“M”	was	displayed,	participants	are	supposed	to	press	a	large	black	button	on	a	
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remote	controller	in	their	hands	with	their	pointer	finger.	During	a	NoGo	trial,	when	the	
letter	“W”	was	displayed,	participants	are	supposed	to	do	nothing	and	avoid	pressing	
any	buttons	on	their	controller.	After	the	response	window	ends,	participants	are	shown	
a	feedback	screen	for	1000ms,	which	informs	them	if	they	failed	the	trial.		The	feedback	
screen	is	triggered	either	by	an	incorrect	response	or	if	the	participant	responded	after	
the	900ms	interval	(they	were	too	slow).		After	the	feedback	screen,	there	is	a	final	
blank	screen	for	500ms	before	the	next	trial	begins.		After	a	block	of	200	trials,	
participants	received	30	seconds	of	rest	before	the	next	block	began.			
80	percent	of	signals	were	Go	signals.		When	the	high	frequency	of	Go	signals	is	
coupled	with	a	rhythmic,	fast	response,	it	creates	a	habitual,	prepotent	response	in	the	
subject	to	press	the	Go	button	in	their	hand.	When	the	NoGo	signal	does	trigger,	for	
20%	of	the	trials,	participants	must	inhibit	their	prepotent	response	and	avoid	pressing	
the	Go	button.				
I	measure	three	different	kinds	of	data	during	the	task.	First,	I	measure	an	EEG	
component	called	error-related	negativity	(ERN),	a	strong	negative	wave	that	occurs	
after	subjects	make	an	error	during	a	NoGo	trial.		An	error	during	a	NoGo	trial	means	
that	the	subject	received	the	NoGo	signal,	but	failed	to	correctly	inhibit	pressing	the	Go	
button.		The	ERN	is	the	pattern	that	emerges	when	you	aggregate	all	of	the	individual	
ERPs	for	each	NoGo	error	trial	together	into	a	grand	average,	from	-50ms	to	150ms	
around	the	response.	ERN	occurs	between	50	milliseconds	before	the	error	response	
through	150	milliseconds	after	the	response.	I	measure	the	mean	amplitude	of	the	ERP	
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signal	over	that	period	of	200	milliseconds	for	analysis	below.	Amodio	et	al.	2007	used	
mean	ERN	amplitudes	to	estimate	their	ERP	components,	but	Amodio	et	al.	2008	
preferred	peak	ERN	amplitudes.	In	this	study,	my	results	did	not	change	by	using	peak	
amplitude	measures,	so	I	employed	mean	amplitude	to	be	consistent	with	Amodio	et	al.	
2007.			
Second,	I	measured	an	additional	EEG	component	called	the	N2,	which	is	the	
second	strong	negative	peak	that	occurs	after	subjects	have	a	successful	NoGo	trial.		A	
successful	NoGo	trial	means	the	subject	correctly	inhibited	pressing	the	habitual	Go	
button	after	seeing	the	rarer	NoGo	signal.	The	N2	component	is	formed	by	aggregating	
ERPs	from	each	successful	NoGo	trial	together	into	a	grand	average	waveform.	
Following	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	we	utilize	the	mean	negative	amplitude	between	200	and	
400	milliseconds,	during	a	successful	NoGo	trial.		
Finally,	I	measured	behavioral	accuracy	on	NoGo	trials,	which	is	the	number	of	
correct	NoGo	trials	divided	by	the	total	number	of	NoGo	trials.	Higher	accuracy	on	NoGo	
trials	represents	greater	conflict	monitoring	in	the	subject.		
Measuring	Ideology	
Five	survey	measures	of	political	ideology	were	utilized	in	this	sample.	These	
subjects	and	the	ideology	measures	employed	are	identical	to	prior	chapters.		Like	
Amodio	et	al.	2007	and	other	replications,	the	sample	skews	left,	and	does	not	contain	
any	“extreme”	conservatives.		This	sample	has	a	deeper	pool	of	solid	conservatives	than	
previous	research	teams	have	been	able	to	gather.		
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As	a	brief	reminder,	first,	I	utilize	the	conventional	seven	point	self-placement	
scale	from	the	American	National	Election	Studies,	which	spans	from	“Very	liberal”	(1)	
to	“Very	conservative”	(7).	Second,	I	use	the	full	Wilson-Patterson	issue	attitude	battery	
(Wilson	1968;	updated	by	Smith	et	al.	2011),	which	asks	simple	agree/disagree	
questions	on	20	different	topics	in	contemporary	politics.		The	full	scale	is	the	aggregate	
number	of	conservative	answers	given	in	the	20	questions	(ergo,	a	low	score	is	more	
liberal	and	a	high	score	is	more	conservative).		Third,	I	use	a	subscale	developed	
specifically	for	my	data	(see	Chapter	Four)	that	focuses	on	Wilson-Patterson	items	
related	to	economic	conservatism.		Fourth,	I	use	a	parallel	subscale	designed	to	tap	into	
social	conservatism	using	Wilson-Patterson	items.		Finally,	I	employed	a	relatively	
uncommon,	but	useful,	scale	from	the	World	Values	Survey	that	focuses	on	principles	of	
economic	justice	and	fairness.		
Results	
Before	proceeding	into	the	hypotheses,	I	will	note	a	couple	of	results	that	speak	
to	the	general	Go/No-Go	task.		In	terms	of	accuracy	in	the	task,	NoGo	trials	were	
significantly	more	difficult	than	Go	trials	(accuracy	of	Mnogo	=	0.77,	Mgo	=	0.995;	t(100)	=	
12.029,	p	<	0.01),	as	expected.	Additionally,	as	expected,	being	more	accurate	on	Go	
trials	is	correlated	with	being	more	accurate	on	NoGo	trials	(r	=	0.37,	p	<	0.01).	
Individual	differences	in	task	performance	are	expected.		
In	terms	of	response	time	on	the	task,	as	expected,	average	response	time	on	
correct	Go	trials	was	slower	than	response	time	on	NoGo	error	trials	(Mgo	=	200.3,	
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MnogoError	=	165.8;	t(100)	=	6.1343,	p	<	0.01).	NoGo	errors	are	a	failure	to	inhibit	the	
button	pressing,	so	we	would	expect	them	to	be	made	in	haste.	Also,	as	expected,	
response	time	on	correct	Go	trials	is	correlated	with	response	time	on	error	NoGo	trials	
(r	=	0.695,	p	<	0.01).		Again,	individual	differences	in	task	performance	are	expected,	so	
differences	in	response	time	should	be	correlated.		
In	terms	of	the	ERP	components	being	examined,	a	couple	of	important	
observations	of	this	data.		First,	as	expected,	the	mean	ERN	and	peak	ERN	are	very	
strongly	correlated	(r	=	0.91,	p	<	0.01).		Second,	as	expected,	the	mean	N2	and	peak	N2	
are	also	extremely	highly	correlated	(r	=	0.93,	p	<	0.01).		These	associations	reveal	why	
my	results	would	not	change	substantially	by	using	one	variation	of	component	
measurement	versus	another.			
	
Table	10.	Correlation	Matrix	of	Go/No-Go	and	ERP	Component	Results.	
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Table	10	presents	correlations	between	the	major	variables	of	interest	for	the	
Amodio	and	Jost	hypotheses.		
Hypothesis	1:	Conservatives	have	weaker	ERN	
The	first	hypothesis	is	that	political	conservatism	should	be	associated	with	a	
weaker	(less	negative)	ERN	component	during	errors	made	on	NoGo	trials.		I	fail	to	
confirm	this	hypothesis.		Contrary	to	the	findings	in	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	I	find	no	
statistically	significant	relationship	between	self-identified	political	ideology	and	ERN	
strength.		Figures	14	and	15	visualizes	data	from	Amodio	et	al.	2007	alongside	with	data	
from	this	chapter.		
	
	 	
		
172	
Figure	15.	Grand	Average	ERNs	and	Political	Ideology	
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Figure	16.	Scatterplots	of	Ideology	and	ERN	Data.		
	
Recall	that	each	replication	study	of	Go/No-Go	and	political	ideology	utilized	the	
self-identified	ideology	scale.	Although	my	failed	replication	of	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	
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findings	is	surprising,	my	null	results	are	consistent	with	findings	from	Weissflog	et	al.	
2013	and	Inzlicht	et	al.	2009.	Of	four	research	teams	with	this	data,	three	cannot	find	
this	relationship	in	their	data.			
I	employed	four	other	alternative	measures	of	political	ideology,	including	an	
index	of	20	political	issues	that	have	been	aggregated	together	(Wilson-Patterson),	an	
economic	conservatism	subscale	from	the	Wilson-Patterson	scale,	a	social	conservatism	
subscale	from	the	Wilson-Patterson	scale,	and	a	battery	of	questions	concerning	
economic	justice	from	the	World	Values	Survey.		None	of	these	measures	have	any	
relationship	to	ERN	measures	whatsoever,	consistent	with	my	null	finding	on	the	self-
identification	scale.			
As	Amodio	et	al.	2007	and	Inzlicht	et	al.	2009	did	not	utilize	alternative	measures	
of	ideology	at	all,	the	only	replication	paper	that	might	contribute	to	this	mystery	is	
Weissflog	et	al.	2013.		Weissflog	et	al.	2013	utilized	Altemeyer’s	(1999)	Right	Wing	
Authoritarian	Scale	(1996)	and	Kluegel	and	Smith’s	egalitarianism	and	inegalitarianism	
scale	(1986),	which	are	at	least	distantly	related	to	the	general	construct	of	political	
ideology.		Weissflog	et	al.	2013	found	that	the	liberal	ends	of	each	scale	were	correlated	
with	stronger	ERN	responses.		So,	in	this	respect,	my	findings	about	alternative	
measures	of	ideology	are	at	odds	with	the	Weissflog	findings,	although	it	is	worth	
considering	how	conceptually	similar	Right-Wing	Authoritarianism	and	egalitarianism	
scales	are	to	political	ideology.			
	 	
		
175	
Hypothesis	2:	Conservatives	have	weaker	N2	Component	
The	second	hypothesis	is	that	political	conservatism	should	be	associated	with	a	
weaker	(less	negative)	N2	component	during	successful	NoGo	trials.		Unlike	both	
Amodio	et	al.	2007	and	Weissflog	et	al.	2013,	I	fail	to	find	a	statistical	difference	
between	self-identified	liberals	and	conservatives	on	the	N2	component.		In	fact,	the	
correlation	coefficient	of	self-reported	ideology	and	the	N2	component	is	trending	
towards	statistical	significance	p	=	0.055,	but	this	effect	is	reversed	from	Amodio	and	
Jost	expectations—it	is	the	self-identified	conservatives	who	have	a	stronger,	more	
negative,	N2	component	on	the	Go/No-Go	task.			
Table	10	shows	that	none	of	the	alternative	political	ideology	measures	
replicated	the	N2	results	of	Amodio	and	Jost,	either.		Unexpectedly,	there	is	a	
statistically	significant	relationship	between	economic	conservatism	and	a	stronger	
(more	negative)	N2	component.	This	finding	is	unusual	for	a	number	of	reasons.		First,	it	
is	contrary	to	the	Amodio	and	Jost	predictions,	as	it	is	liberals	who	ought	to	have	
stronger	N2	responses	based	on	their	2007	paper,	but	my	conservatives	are	so.		Second,	
Jost’s	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	treats	social	conservatism	as	a	major	part	of	
being	conservative,	and	it	is	odd	to	find	the	N2	completely	unrelated	to	social	
conservative	but	instead	important	for	economic	issues,	while	at	the	same	time	
unrelated	to	the	economic	justice	scale.		Overall,	we	should	treat	this	finding	with	
caution—it	is	inconsistent	with	the	general	picture	of	the	null	relationship,	and	it	goes	
against	all	predictions.			
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Hypothesis	3:	Conservatives	have	less	accuracy	on	NoGo	trials	
The	third	hypothesis	concerns	whether	conservatives	have	less	accuracy	on	the	
difficult	NoGo	trials	compared	to	liberals.		While	Amodio	et	al.	2007	finds	liberals	to	
have	superior	performance	(r	=	0.30,	p	<	0.05),	I	do	not	replicate	this	finding.		Although	
the	relationship	does	not	quite	reach	the	0.05	threshold,	self-identified	conservatives	in	
my	sample	are	correlated	with	superior	accuracy	during	NoGo	trials	(r	=	0.275,	p	=	
0.055).	If	anything,	my	self-identified	conservatives	are	more	accurate	than	liberals	on	
the	trials.		Conservatives	also	outperform	liberals	on	Go	trials	(r	=	0.326,	p	<	0.022);	
Amodio	et	al.	2007	did	not	report	data	about	Go	trial	accuracy	and	ideology.		
The	pattern	of	findings	in	the	self-identified	conservatives	do	not	reappear	in	
alternative	ideological	measures,	giving	pause	in	how	to	interpret	the	findings	above.			
Discussion	
In	summary,	this	chapter	described	the	current	state	of	knowledge	about	
whether	liberals	and	conservatives	may	have	differences	in	their	basic	conflict	
monitoring	processing,	in	the	context	of	a	Go/No-Go	task.	Following	a	ground-breaking	
study	from	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	I	set	out	to	replicate	their	study	as	a	way	to	sort	out	
confusion	over	how	the	Go/No-Go	task	should	be	interpreted.	If	the	conflict	monitoring	
aspect	of	the	Go/No-Go	task	is	akin	to	behavioral	inhibition,	we	would	expect	
conservatives	to	have	a	stronger	performance	and	neural	activity	on	the	task.		However,	
Amodio	et	al.	2007	interpreted	the	Go/No-Go	task	as	a	measure	of	cognitive	flexibility,	
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asserting	(and	finding)	that	liberals	outperform	conservatives	on	the	task,	as	well	as	
have	stronger	neural	correlates	during	the	task.			
	
Table	11.	Summary	of	Go/No-Go	Studies.		
	
My	study	fails	to	replicate	any	part	of	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	study.		Additionally,	
I	wrote	about	two	other	studies	that	closely	replicate	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	each	which	
had	their	own	trouble	replicating	the	findings	(Weissflog	et	al.	2013	had	several	
elements	successfully	replicate).		A	summary	of	those	findings	are	in	Table	11.		Overall,	
these	studies	are	rather	mixed	in	their	findings.	It	appears	that	liberal	and	conservative	
differences	require	additional	investigation	and	more	careful	study.		My	work	
demonstrates	that	liberal	and	conservative	physiological	differences	may	exist,	but	not	
concerning	conflict	monitoring	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex.			
As	before,	the	results	of	this	chapter	urge	caution	moving	forward	for	the	
psychological	differences	noted	by	Jost,	Hibbing,	and	their	colleagues.	Further	
discussion	of	the	big	picture	of	the	findings	of	this	chapter	are	taken	up	in	the	next	
chapter.		 	
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CHAPTER	SEVEN	
DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSION	
The	political	psychology	of	ideology	holds	great	promise	for	our	understanding	
about	the	origins	of	political	beliefs.	Political	psychologists	working	in	this	tradition	are	
beginning	to	understand	the	complex	web	of	physiological,	emotional,	and	cognitive	
factors	that	make	up	our	political	minds.	This	new	wave	of	research	has	successfully	
pushed	our	understanding	of	political	attitudes	deep	within	the	black	box	of	human	
cognition,	and	it	moves	us	closer	to	understanding	our	political	identities.			
Biology	and	politics	scholars	have	established	a	research	program	based	on	
differences	in	root	psychological	characteristics	of	liberals	and	conservatives.		These	
differences	have	been	shown	to	be	both	emotional	and	cognitive,	and	they	have	been	
linked	to	differences	in	behavioral	outcomes.		Additionally,	and	importantly,	these	
scholars	have	shown	that	dispositional	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	
emerge	even	outside	of	political	contexts	or	political	information.		In	other	words,	the	
root	psychological	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	are	not	restricted	to	
political	topics	alone,	but	can	manifest	in	basic,	everyday	behavior	and	thought.			
Two	of	the	most	important	theories	about	the	political	psychology	of	political	
ideology	featured	prominently	in	this	dissertation.		The	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	my	term	
for	the	research	program	coming	from	John	Hibbing,	Kevin	Smith,	and	the	Political	
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Physiology	Lab	of	Nebraska	University,	posits	that	political	conservatives	have	a	
persistent	bias	towards	negativity,	which	attracts	their	attention	and	triggers	stronger	
physiological	reactions.		The	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory,	developed	by	social	
psychologist	John	Jost	and	numerous	colleagues	over	the	past	few	years,	argues	that	
psychological	factors	of	fear,	threat,	and	uncertainty	avoidance	motivate	an	individual	
to	adopt	conservative	political	beliefs.			
The	three	studies	presented	in	this	dissertation	follow	closely	in	the	literature	
that	proceeded	them.		First,	I	focused	on	dispositional	traits	related	to	emotion	and	
cognition	from	outside	of	a	political	context.		Second,	following	current	work	in	
psychology,	I	noted	that	negativity	and	avoidance	are	not	the	same	theoretical	
construct,	and	this	allowed	my	work	to	try	to	distinguish	between	the	assorted	
dispositional	differences	noted	by	Hibbing	and	Jost.		Third,	my	studies	inherited	
hypotheses	from	these	major	theories.	From	the	Negativity	Bias	Theory,	I	hypothesized	
that	conservatives	are	more	sensitive	to	negative	emotion.	From	the	Motivated	Social	
Cognition	Theory,	I	hypothesized	that	conservatives	are	more	sensitive	to	avoidance	and	
inhibition.		Thus,	the	studies	described	in	prior	chapters	establishes	footing	on	these	
two	theories,	and	in	the	theoretical	space	first	outlined	by	research	teams	led	by	
Hibbing	and	Jost.		
My	work	contributes	to	this	research	program	in	two	ways.		First,	I	have	
integrated	Gray’s	theories	of	behavioral	inhibition	and	approach	alongside	these	two	
prominent	theories.	My	goal	was	to	demonstrate	how	inhibition	and	activation	are	
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conceptually	related	to	the	work	of	Hibbing	and	Jost,	and	then	test	a	series	of	
dispositional	traits	that	ought	to	differentiate	liberals	from	conservatives.	I	had	hoped	to		
clarify	and	enrich	our	understanding	of	the	research	on	dispositional	differences.	
Second,	in	the	process	of	investigating	inhibition	and	approach,	I	did	a	direct	replication	
of	one	of	the	most	important	political	neuroscience	studies	published	in	the	subfield	of	
biology	and	politics.		This	replication	closely	mimicked	the	methods	of	Amodio	et	al.	
2007,	while	also	using	a	larger	sample	of	non-student	adults.	As	of	August	2016,	Over	
400	papers	have	cited	Amodio	et	al.	2007	but	there	have	been	very	few	replications	of	
this	important	study.			
Overall,	the	studies	in	this	dissertation	have	presented	surprising	results	that	
urge	caution	for	this	research	program.	While	searching	for	dispositional	differences	
between	liberals	and	conservatives	with	multiple	methodologies,	I	was	surprised	to	
learn	that	very	few	dispositional	differences	could	be	found	between	liberals	and	
conservatives.	The	bigger	picture	of	my	work	could	largely	be	called	a	robust	null	
finding.	This	final	chapter	outlines	my	findings	and	integrates	the	bigger	picture	of	the	
work	with	recommendations	for	how	future	studies	should	proceed.	In	particular,	I	will	
draw	attention	to	the	failed	replication	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	and	urge	caution	for	
future	studies	of	political	cognition.	
In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	I	review	the	need	for	more	replication	in	social	
science,	and	well	as	discuss	the	findings	in	this	dissertation	and	the	implications	of	my	
work	for	understanding	how	liberals	and	conservatives	differ	in	cognitive	flexibility.	 
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Replication	Efforts	in	Social	Science	
My	dissertation	joins	the	recent	movement	towards	more	replication	in	social	
science.	Social	science	has	never	been	more	popularly	read	or	more	influential	than	it	is	
today.		Driven	by	increased	public	outreach	by	scientists	and	universities,	combined	with	
a	more	empirically	minded	style	of	journalism,	social	science	research	has	exploded	into	
the	public	policy	scene.		This	increased	demand	for	social	science	is	a	good	thing	for	
society,	informing	debates	and	increasing	the	level	of	knowledge	through	rigorous,	data-
driven	analysis.		Never	before	has	social	science	been	so	important	to	good	governance	
and	society.		But,	also,	never	before	has	it	been	more	important	to	make	sure	that	
science	is	methodologically	rigorous	and	open	to	analysis	by	outside	research	teams.			
We	already	have	examples	of	how	errors	in	research	have	deeply	affected	the	
policy	world.		For	example,	in	2013,	a	graduate	student	studying	economics	uncovered	
an	innocent	spreadsheet	error,	and	overturned	an	authoritative	academic	study	that	
was	being	utilized	by	heads	of	state	and	Nobel	prize	winners	to	theorize	over	the	role	of	
government	debt	in	the	industrialized	world	(Roose	2013;	Pollin	and	Ash	2013).		
We	also	have	examples	of	how	the	drive	for	fame	and	funding	can	tempt	
scholars	towards	cheating	and	fraud.		Broockman	and	Kalla’s	uncovering	of	Michael	
LaCour’s	fraudulent	publication	in	Science	shocked	the	entire	academic	world	(Singal	
2015).	The	story	was	picked	up	by	numerous	major	media	organizations,	including	the	
New	York	Times	and	FiveThirtyEight(Carey	and	Belluck	2015;	Bialik	2015).	Another	case,	
even	more	galling,	is	Dutch	social	psychologist	Diederik	Stapel	notoriously	faking	data	
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for	years,	resulting	in	at	least	55	publications	made	with	fraudulent	data	(Bhattacharjee	
2013;	Neuroskeptic	2015;	Univers	2012).			
These	cases,	rare	and	remarkable,	made	a	huge	splash	in	the	media.		But	the	
larger	struggles	of	social	science	to	foster	reproducible	research	have	also	become	more	
public	in	recent	years.		Many	commentators	have	discussed	the	issues	of	publication	
bias,	researcher	degrees	of	freedom,	and	p-hacking.		Co-authors	Leif	Nelson,	Joe	
Simmons,	and	Uri	Simonsohn	and	their	academic	blog	called	Data	Colada	
(http://datacolada.org/)	as	well	as	popular	academic	blogger	Andrew	Gelman	
(http://andrewgelman.com/)	have	coined	the	term	“researcher	degrees	of	freedom”	as	
short-hand	for	a	number	of	the	issues	that	can	arise	with	researcher	null	hypothesis	
testing.			Publication	bias,	where	academic	publications	tend	towards	publishing	
successful	experiments	that	confirm	hypotheses	while	confining	negative	results	to	a	file	
drawer,	has	a	sharp	impact	on	the	way	modern	science	is	practiced	today.		Recently,	
social	scientists	have	become	more	and	more	anxious	about	these	problems.		
Researcher	Brian	Nosek	and	the	Many	Labs	project	(over	270	scientists)	created	an	
initiative	called	the	Reproducibility	Project,	published	in	Science,	which	aimed	to	
sponsor	and	conduct	replication	studies	of	100	recent	psychology	studies	(Yong	2015).		
Unfortunately,	only	40	percent	of	those	replications	successfully	replicated	the	originals,	
and,	on	average,	the	size	of	the	effect	in	the	studies	that	did	replicate	were	only	half	as	
large	(Yong	2015).		
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These	events	illustrate	the	need	for	more	replication	of	important	social	science	
work.		My	dissertation	is	intended	to	contribute	to	that	need.	Below,	I	summarize	my	
results	and	discuss	the	implications	for	my	replication	of	several	key	studies	related	to	
the	political	psychology	of	ideology.	 
Summarizing	Dissertation	Results	
In	Chapter	Four,	I	examined	the	survey	data	collected	from	466	non-student	
adults	employed	by	Loyola	University	Chicago.	The	primary	purpose	of	the	chapter	was	
to	summarize	the	demographic	characteristics	and	politics	of	the	sample	from	which	I	
drew	participants	to	undergo	behavioral	experiments	in	the	lab.		However,	this	survey	
also	gave	us	an	opportunity	to	test	for	differences	self-reported	dispositions	towards	
inhibition	and	activation	in	a	large	N	study,	which	could	not	be	done	on	the	small	
samples	typically	brought	into	laboratories.	This	work	taps	into	the	Motivated	Social	
Cognition	hypothesis	about	conservatives	and	behavioral	inhibition.		Based	on	prior	
research	into	the	psychological	profiles	of	conservatives,	drawing	from	the	empirical	
work	of	many	research	teams,	we	expected	that	conservatives	would	report	greater	
behavioral	inhibition	compared	to	liberals.		To	my	surprise,	and	against	expectations	
from	prior	work,	it	was	the	liberals	in	the	sample	who	reported	higher	behavioral	
inhibition.		The	correlation	was	moderate	but	statistically	reliable.			
Chapter	Five	combines	self-reports	in	surveys	on	emotional	affect	with	a	
measurement	of	electroencephalography	in	a	laboratory	setting.			A	survey	
questionnaire	helped	me	assess	trait	sensitivities	towards	many	discrete	emotions,	and	
		
184	
general	negative	affect.		I	also	had	the	opportunity	to	measure	frontal	
electroencephalography	in	these	subjects,	which	can	depict	a	pattern	of	brain	activity	
that	is	known	to	be	connected	to	both	negative	emotion	and	avoidance	sensitivity.		My	
findings,	again,	are	surprising.	Across	all	of	the	trait	emotional	sensitivity	scales	
employed,	I	found	robust	null	results.		No	evidence	was	found	for	the	idea	that	
conservatives	are	more	sensitive	to	negativity	in	this	sample.		Additionally,	the	
electroencephalography	measure	of	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry	revealed	that	
liberals	and	conservatives	do	not	have	different	patterns	of	brain	activity.		As	the	
patterns	are	a	neural	correlate	of	sensitivity	to	both	avoidance	sensitivity	as	well	as	
negative	emotion	sensitivity,	these	findings	are	puzzling	and	challenging	for	both	the	
Negativity	Bias	Theory	and	the	Motivated	Social	Cognition	Theory	predictions,	as	
conservatives		in	this	study	are	neither	sensitive	to	negative	affect	nor	are	they	
dispositionally	avoidant.	Overall,	I	find	that	liberals	and	conservatives	do	not	have	
differences	in	emotional	sensitivity	or	in	frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry.		
Chapter	Six	continues	the	investigation	using	electroencephalography	measures	
alongside	a	behavioral	experiment	called	the	Go/No-Go	task.	My	goal	was	to	investigate	
conflict	monitoring	processes	in	the	brain,	which	have	been	connected	to	avoidance	and	
inhibition	in	past	literature.		The	Go/No-Go	task	allowed	me	to	look	for	differences	in	
accuracy	and	anterior	cingulate	cortex	related	neural	activity	between	liberals	and	
conservatives.		This	study	was	also	an	attempt	at	a	direct	replication	of	an	important	
and	ground-breaking	study	in	political	neuroscience	study	by	Amodio	et	al.	(2007),	by	
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using	a	non-student	sample	and	more	richly	measuring	political	ideology.		I	did	not	
replicate	these	findings,	however.		Liberals	in	my	study	did	not	have	better	accuracy	on	
the	Go/No-Go	task,	and	did	not	have	statistically	different	neural	activity	in	the	anterior	
cingulate	cortex.			
Next,	I	will	address	the	implications	of	my	work	for	our	understanding	of	liberals	
and	conservatives.		My	results	have	large	implications	for	how	researchers	should	
consider	and	study	the	work	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007.		Below,	I	specifically	focus	on	what	
we	can	learn	about	the	cognitive	flexibility	of	liberals	and	conservatives	from	studies	of	
the	Go/No-Go	task.		
Political	Ideology	and	Cognitive	Flexibility	
Amodio	et	al.	2007	introduced	the	research	world	to	liberal	and	conservative	
differences	in	behavioral	conflict	monitoring,	as	measured	with	the	Go/No-Go	task.		
They	find	that	liberals	are	more	successful	at	inhibiting	habitual	responses	with	the	
introduction	of	unexpected	information.	This	increased	success	is	also	correlated	with	
increased	neural	activity	related	to	the	Anterior	Cingulate	Cortex	(ACC),	a	region	of	the	
brain	known	to	be	associated	with	conflict	monitoring.	Amodio	and	colleagues	review	
their	evidence,	and	find	that	the	pattern	of	their	data	suggests	that	liberals	are	more	
cognitively	flexible.		
Three	statistical	relationships	form	the	foundation	of	the	paper.		The	first	
measure,	purely	behavioral,	is	that	liberalism	is	associated	with	increased	accuracy	on	
NoGo	trials.		Liberals	are	more	successful	at	inhibiting	their	habituated	Go	response	
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when	they	see	a	NoGo	signal.	Conservatives,	in	contrast,	are	more	persistent	in	their	
response	patterns,	causing	increased	errors	when	a	change	in	response	behavior	is	
called	for.		
The	next	two	measures	are	based	on	event-related	potentials	(ERPs),	which	are	
consistent	patterns	of	brain	activity	observable	as	electric	signal	on	the	scalp	in	
response	to	particular	stimuli.	The	second	measure	is	an	ERP	called	error-related	
negativity	(ERN)	during	failed	NoGo	trials.		ERN	is	a	component	that	arises	in	the	
individual	when	they	fail	to	correctly	inhibit	the	Go	button	press	during	a	NoGo	trial.	
Upon	realizing	the	error,	there	is	a	distinctive	pattern	of	brain	activity	that	represents	a	
sharp	negative	trough	about	50	milliseconds	after	the	mistaken	button	press.	Liberals	
have	a	stronger	(more	negative)	ERN	component	in	response	to	a	failed	trial,	reflecting	
greater	conflict	monitoring	neural	activity.	The	third	measure	is	an	ERP	called	the	NoGo	
N2,	which	is	a	component	that	arises	in	the	brain	in	response	to	a	successful	inhibition	
during	a	NoGo	trial.		When	subjects	successfully	inhibit	the	Go	button	press	in	response	
to	a	NoGo	signal,	there	is	a	strong	negative	trough	in	the	electroencephalography	signal,	
occurring	roughly	around	200	milliseconds.	This	negative	trough	is	the	second	
observable	trough	in	the	signal,	giving	rise	to	the	name	“N2.”	Liberals	were	observed	to	
have	a	stronger	(more	negative)	NoGo	N2	compared	to	conservatives.			Again,	this	
neural	difference	is	believed	to	represent	a	difference	in	basic	conflict	monitoring	
sensitivity,	with	liberals	being	more	sensitive	than	conservatives.		As	conservatives	have	
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less	conflict	monitoring	related	neural	activity,	they	are	deemed	to	be	less	cognitively	
flexible	and	more	persistent	than	liberals.		
As	of	August	2016,	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	paper	has	been	cited	over	400	times.		
Biology	and	politics	literature	in	both	Political	Science	and	Psychology	have	relied	on	this	
paper	for	establishing	that	physiological	and	psychological	differences	between	liberals	
and	conservatives	can	be	observed	directly	in	brain	functioning,	even	during	a	task	that	
is	completely	unrelated	to	politics.		These	findings	have	been	cited	by	Hibbing	and	
colleagues	as	an	example	of	how	liberals	and	conservatives	are	different	in	their	core	or	
root	psychological	dispositions,	deeply	within	the	biological	self	(e.g.	Hibbing	et	al.	
2014).		These	findings	have	also	been	useful	and	illustrative	for	Jost	and	colleagues,	as	
liberals	being	more	cognitively	flexible	fits	nicely	with	the	Conservatism	as	Motivated	
Social	Cognition	theory	(e.g.	Jost	and	Amodio	2012;	Jost	et	al.	2003).		In	fact,	revealingly,	
the	literature	that	Jost	created	and	inspired	is	often	referred	to	as	the	Rigidity-of-the-
Right	hypothesis.		
Although	Amodio	et	al.	2007	continues	to	be	widely	read	and	widely	cited,	there	
has	been	only	one	published	attempt	to	replicate	(Weissflog	et	al.	2013).	There	is	also	
one	other	published	study	on	religious	belief	and	conflict	monitoring	using	a	Stroop	task	
(Inzlicht	et	al.	2009).	This	study	was	referenced	by	Jost	and	Amodio	2012	as	being	
broadly	consistent	with	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	and	they	consider	it	broadly	as	an	extension	
of	their	work	(Jost	and	Amodio	2012,	60).	To	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	this	dissertation	
presents	the	second	attempt	to	directly	replicate	Amodio	et	al.	2007.	
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In	Chapter	Six,	I	reviewed	all	known	data	on	the	relationship	between	conflict	
monitoring	and	political	ideology	and	offered	a	new	study	of	my	own.		To	review	briefly,	
I	find	that	Amodio	et	al.	2007	has	not	been	successfully	replicated	in	full	by	any	
published	study.		Weissflog	et	al.	2013	comes	closest,	and	it	does	contain	findings	that	
are	supportive	of	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	theory.		Some	attitudinal		measures	in	this	
study	(traditionalism	and	egalitarianism)	are	conceptually	related	to	political	liberalism,	
and	are	shown	by	Weissflog	and	colleagues	to	be	correlated	with	increased	behavioral	
accuracy	and	increased	neural	activity	reflected	in	the	ERN	and	N2.	This	fits	with	Amodio	
et	al.	2007’s	three	central	findings,	but	used	different	scales	for	political	ideology.		
However,	in	terms	of	ideological	self-identification,	the	measure	employed	by	Amodio	
et	al.	2007,	Weissflog	and	colleagues	did	not	replicate	one	of	the	three	core	Amodio	et	
al.	Findings,	specifically	that	self-reported	liberals	have	stronger	(more	negative)	ERN	
during	the	task.		Data	from	the	Weissflog	et	al.	study	trends	in	a	consistent	direction,	
but	failed	to	reach	conventional	levels	of	statistical	significance	(p	=	0.13).		Weissflog	et	
al.’s	sample	was	32	undergraduate	students	at	a	Canadian	university.	This	sample	size	is	
not	unusually	small	for	a	neuroscience	study,	but	the	small	size	could	potentially	explain	
why	they	failed	to	replicate	(but,	then,	we	would	also	need	to	be	skeptical	about	the	
relationships	that	they	did	show.)	
What	about	the	Inzlicht	et	al.	2009	study?	Inzlicht	and	colleagues	studied	the	
relationship	of	religious	belief	to	conflict	monitoring	using	a	Stroop	task	in	a	
conceptually	similar	way	to	a	Go/No-Go	task.		Inzlicht	and	colleagues	presented	data	on	
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22	undergraduates	that	showed	decreased	religious	belief	to	be	related	to	increased	
accuracy	on	the	Stroop	task	and	increased	strength	of	the	ERN.		Non-believers	
performed	better	on	the	behavioral	task	and	had	a	stronger	ERN	component.	Jost	and	
Amodio	2012	cite	this	paper	as	supportive	for	the	theory	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007	because	
religious	belief	is	closely	related	to	political	conservatism.	In	the	view	of	Jost	and	
Amodio	2012,	Inzlicht’s	work	demonstrates	that	religious	believers—who	are	likely	
political	conservative—do	worse	on	the	task	and	have	a	weaker	ERN	response	because	
they	are	less	cognitively	flexible	than	religious	non-believers	(who	are	likely	to	be	liberal)	
(Jost	and	Amodio	2012,	60).			
However,	this	reading	of	the	Inzlicht	findings	has	several	problems.	First,	Inzlicht	
et	al.	specifically	find	no	relationship	between	religious	belief	and	political	conservatism	
in	their	sample	(Table	3,	390)		They	also	specifically	find	no	relationship	between	
political	ideology	and	ERN	amplitude	(Table	3,	390).		Inzlicht	and	colleagues	state	that	
“the	correlation	between	the	ERN	and	religious	conviction	did	not	diminish	after	we	
controlled	for	conservatism,	IQ,	or	any	of	the	Big	Five	personality	factors”	(389),	arguing	
that	political	conservatism	cannot	explain	the	correlation	between	ERN	and	religious	
conviction	that	they	found	(389).		Moreover,	religious	believers	actually	had	improved	
behavioral	accuracy	on	the	task,	which	is	contrary	to	what	Amodio	et	al.	2007	and	Jost	
and	Amodio	2012	would	have	predicted.	Finally,	religious	believers	in	Inzlicht	et	al.	had	
no	relationship	to	“cognitive	closure”	(Table	2,	388),	which	presents	problems	for	
considering	the	religious	believers	to	be	cognitively	rigid.			
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My	study	of	liberals,	conservatives,	and	the	Go/No-Go	task	attempted	to	closely	
replicate	the	methods	and	design	choices	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007.		As	described	above,	
and	with	great	detail	in	Chapter	Six,	I	ultimately	find	no	support	for	any	differences	
between	liberals	and	conservatives	on	the	task.		The	three	important	metrics	connected	
to	liberals	described	in	Amodio	et	al.	2007—increased	behavioral	accuracy,	increased	
ERN	strength,	and	increased	N2	strength—are	not	present	in	my	data.		Before	
considering	implications	of	these	failures	to	replicate,	we	should	consider	the	strength	
and	usefulness	of	the	samples	across	the	relevant	Go/No-Go	studies.		
Comparing	Samples	of	Go/No-Go	Data 	
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Figure	17:	Measures	of	Ideology	in	Three	Go/No-Go	Samples	
 
	
Note:	Amodio	et	al.	2007	and	Weissflog	et	al.	2013	utilized	a	self-report	ideology	scale	
with	11	points	instead	of	the	conventional	7	point	scale	used	widely	in	political	science	
and	public	opinion	surveys	such	as	the	American	National	Election	Studies.	I	
transformed	their	data	from	11	point	to	7	point	by	multiplying	each	subject’s	score	by	
(7/11).	The	histogram	bins	further	smooths	out	all	three	distributions	to	provide	a	
generalized	picture	of	the	data	from	the	studies	that	allows	clear	comparison.	
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The	figure	above	presents	the	ideological	distribution	of	the	samples	employed	
by	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	Weissflog	et	al.	2013,	and	Chapter	Six	of	my	dissertation.		
Information	about	the	ideological	spread	of	Inzlicht	et	al.	2009’s	sample	is	unavailable,	
unfortunately.		Data	for	the	outside	studies	in	this	figure	were	compiled	by	me	through	
close	viewing	of	the	supplied	scatterplots.	The	raw	data	from	both	studies	are	not	
available	online.		
A	key	goal	of	replication	of	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	Go/No-Go	experiment	was	to	
increase	the	number	of	political	conservatives	in	the	sample.		As	can	be	observed	in	the	
figure	above,	my	sample	includes	substantially	more	subjects	who	self-place	on	the	
conservative	side	of	the	scale.		Like	the	prior	studies,	I	had	difficulty	finding	extreme	
conservatives	(e.g.	the	sevens)	who	were	willing	to	come	into	the	lab.	However,	I	was	
able	to	recruit	a	total	of	17	subjects	who	identified	right-of-center.		Amodio	et	al.	2007	
and	Weissflog	et	al.	2013	each	had	8	subjects	who	identified	right-of-center.		
Another	key	goal	was	to	broaden	the	sample	in	age	range	and	size.	Both	Amodio	
et	al.	2007	and	Weissflog	et	al.	2013	utilized	a	convenience	sample	of	college	
undergraduates.		Amodio	et	al.	2007	featured	43	students	recruited	from	both	UCLA	
and	New	York	University,	while	Weissflog	et	al.	2013	used	32	students	from	Brock	
University	in	Canada.		I	used	a	convenience	sample	of	51	non-student	employees	at	
Loyola	University	Chicago.	Consequently,	both	Amodio	and	Weissflog	have	age	
distributions	in	the	normal	undergraduate	college	range,	while	my	sample	averaged	
30.7	years	old,	with	standard	deviation	of	5.8	years	and	a	range	of	ages	from	24-52	
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years.	My	sample	and	Amodio	et	al.	2007	each	had	63%	females,	while	Weissflog	et	al.	
2013	was	about	94%	female	(2	males	of	32	participants).	My	sample	was	also	
approximately	18%	larger	than	Amodio	et	al.	2007	and	60%	larger	than	Weissflog	et	al.	
2013.	Overall,	thus,	my	sample	has	considerable	strengths	over	the	other	two	studies	in	
terms	of	representativeness	both	politically	and	demographically.		
Next	Steps	
Overall,	the	results	from	these	studies	offer	a	few	important	conclusions.		First,	
in	a	big	picture	sense,	it	does	not	appear	that	Gray’s	systems	of	behavioral	inhibition	
and	behavioral	activation	manifest	differently	between	liberals	and	conservatives.	
Whether	measuring	disposition	towards	inhibition	and	avoidance	with	a	survey	
questionnaire,	or	with	emotional	valence	in	hemispheric	asymmetry	measures,	or	with	
the	Go/No-Go	task	and	anterior	cingulate	cortex	measures,	the	results	paint	a	fairly	
robust	null	finding.	This	was	a	worthwhile	area	of	investigation,	given	the	emphasis	in	
prior	literature	on	base	level	physiological	differences	between	liberals	and	
conservatives	concerning	related	phenomena	like	emotional	sensitivity	towards	threat,	
fear,	and	disgust.		Yet,	across	these	studies,	we	largely	get	a	robust	null	finding	for	
conservatives	being	more	inhibited.		More	work	with	different	samples	could	
significantly	contribute	to	these	questions,	but	for	the	moment,	generalizing	from	these	
three	studies,	it	appears	clear	that	liberals	and	conservatives	do	not	have	meaningful	
differences	in	behavioral	motivations	to	inhibit	(and,	approach	sensitivity,	too,	did	not	
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seem	to	be	related	to	political	ideology,	which	was	a	more	exploratory	objective	in	this	
dissertation).			
A	second	important	conclusion	is	that	the	work	on	emotional	sensitivity	in	
Chapter	Five	fails	to	find	evidence	that	conservatives	are	more	sensitive	to	negative	
emotion	or	more	sensitive	to	avoidance.		Persuasive	work	from	Hibbing	and	colleagues	
suggest	conservatives	pay	more	attention	to	negative	stimuli	and	are	more	sensitive	to	
the	effects	of	negative	emotion.		Jost	and	colleagues	have	research	that	suggests	
conservatives	could	be	more	avoidant	in	cognitive	style.		In	Chapter	Five	I	explore	these	
ideas	by	measuring	sensitivity	to	positive	and	negative	affect,	as	well	as	measuring	
frontal	hemispheric	asymmetry,	which	is	a	well-known	neural	correlate	for	sensitivity	to	
emotion	and	avoidance.	With	multiple	measures	of	political	ideology,	I	do	not	find	a	
robust	correlation	between	negative	emotion	and	political	conservatives	on	the	
emotional	scales.	I	also	do	not	find	that	conservatives	have	the	hemispheric	asymmetry	
pattern	that	has	been	correlated	to	negative	emotion	and	avoidance	sensitivity.			
Finally,	a	third	important	conclusion	is	that	the	widely	cited	Amodio	et	al.	2007	
has	not	been	successfully	replicated	in	whole.		My	experiment	fails	to	replicate,	and	I	
bring	attention	to	two	published	studies	that	also	struggle	to	replicate	some	of	the	
major	findings	of	the	Amodio	et	al.	2007	article.		Given	the	relatively	scarcity	of	studies	
that	note	important	root	cognitive	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	
outside	of	Amodio	et	al.	2007,	we	continue	to	have	a	dire	need	for	more	studies	in	this	
area.	Go/No-Go	task	performance	and	related	anterior	cingulate	cortex	activity	will	
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need	additional	studies	to	more	firmly	establish	a	connection	between	liberalism	and	
cognitive	flexibility	because	critical	questions	remain	about	whether	a	difference	
currently	exists.			
Briefly,	we	can	summarize	some	of	the	standard	limitations	with	studies	like	
mine.			First,	as	already	noted	in	Chapter	Four,	the	sample	is	not	nationally	
representative.		This	pool	of	participants	is	drawn	from	one	geographical	location	at	one	
specific	time	and	place.	Moreover,	they	were	unusual	in	the	sense	that	they	worked	at	a	
university	and	had	a	much	higher	level	of	education	than	the	general	public.	As	non-
student	adults,	they	do	have	the	advantage	of	having	a	diversity	of	ages	and	experiences	
that	are	not	typically	present	in	most	convenience	samples.	Second,	the	recruitment	
survey	sample	size	was	reasonably	large	for	social	science	research	(at	466	participants)	
but	still	not	large	enough	to	effectively	capture	a	deep	poll	of	extreme	conservatives.	
Peer	work	in	this	area	also	has	great	difficulty	getting	strong	conservatives	into	their	
study,	and	this	study	is	an	improvement	over	past	studies	in	this	regard.			
Another	limitation	is	that	the	measures	in	the	survey	are	all	self-reported,	and	
we	can	only	draw	correlational	inferences.		The	relationship	I	find	between	self-reported	
behavioral	inhibition	and	liberalism	could	have	several	explanations	that	the	survey	data	
alone	cannot	account	for.		Principally,	the	challenge	for	interpretation	is	over	how	to	
interpret	the	self-reports.	Are	conservatives	less	inhibited,	or	do	they	report	less	
inhibition	on	surveys,	due	to	social	desirability	differences	or	self-perception	
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differences?		Additionally,	as	always	with	correlational	studies,	causation	cannot	be	
determined.		
Later	chapters	address	the	weaknesses	of	survey	data	by	bring	subjects	into	the	
lab,	but	these	studies	have	standard	limitations	as	well.		The	sample	size	of	the	
neuroscience	studies		was	only	51	people.		While	51	subjects	is	significantly	above	
average	for	electroencephalography	studies,	more	statistical	power	would	always	be	
useful	for	trying	to	spot	effect	sizes	that	are	not	expected	to	be	very	large.		
The	project	of	biology	and	politics	continues	to	be	incredibly	promising	for	
understanding	the	puzzle	of	political	ideology.	As	Hatemi	and	McDermott	(2011)	write,	
biological	models	of	political	behavior	have	vast	potential	to	contribute	meaningfully	to	
studies	of	political	behavior.	When	I	began	this	work	in	2012,	I	was	looking	to	expand	
our	understanding	of	how	conservatives	and	liberals	differ	dispositionally	by	looking	at	
multidimensional	ideology.	At	the	conclusion	of	my	work,	however,	I	want	to	bring	
attention	to	something	else	entirely.		The	results	of	my	studies	strongly	suggest	a	
compelling	case	for	why	we	need	more	work	to	better	understand	the	dispositional	
differences	of	liberals	and	conservatives.	My	dissertation	posits	that	the	question	of	
root	psychological	differences	between	liberals	and	conservatives	is	still	largely	open	for	
consideration.	 	
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